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Abstract
In this dissertation we argue against the possibility of defining a notion of conditional
probability in quantum theory, both at a mathematical and physically meaningful level.
We defend that the probability defined by the Lüders rule, the only possible candidate to
play such a role, cannot be interpreted as such. This claim holds whether quantum events
are interpreted as projection operators in an abstract Hilbert space, as the physical values
associated to them, or as measurement outcomes, both from a synchronic and a diachronic
perspective. The only notion of conditional probability the Lüders rule defines is a purely
instrumental one. In addition, we show that the unconditional quantum probabilities can
also be interpreted as probabilities only under a purely instrumental perspective, where
the difficulties in interpreting them non-instrumentally are, ultimately, the same as those
we encounter in giving a non-instrumental conditional interpretation of the probability
defined by the Lüders rule.
We frame this discussion within the general issue of conceptual change in science and
show how, generally, the fact that two concepts are co-extensive in their shared domain
of application – as the probability defined by the Lüders rule and classical conditional
probability are for compatible events – does not guarantee that the more general concept is
a conceptual extension of the more limited one. To give an appropriate account of concept
extension, we show that concepts present an ‘open texture’ that does not allow for a set of
jointly necessary and sufficient conditions to characterize an extended concept, and thus
formulate a new account, namely the ‘Cluster of Markers account’, in terms of a cluster
of markers which are expected to hold for the extended concept. This account, we argue,
can capture the complexity involved in actual cases of conceptual change in science and
can account for the fact that there are concepts which, even if co-extensive in their shared
domain of application, do not share enough meaning to justify regarding them as defining
the same concept.
1
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Quantum Probability: a peculiar kind of probability
From about the beginning of the twentieth century experimental physics amassed an
impressive array of strange phenomena which demonstrated the inadequacy of classical
physics.1.1 The attempt to discover a theoretical structure for the new phenomena was
resolved in 1926 and 1927 in the theory called quantum mechanics. This new theory
is, by its very nature, a statistical or stochastic theory; that is, it only yields probabil-
istic predictions for the values of physical quantities. Traditionally, this feature of quantum
mechanics has been taken as showing that the exact outcome of an experiment is fun-
damentally unpredictable, and that one has to be satisfied with merely computing the
probabilities of various outcomes.
In addition, quantum mechanics determines that the laws of combining these probab-
ilities are not those of the classical probability theory of Laplace. As Feynman remarks,
‘Nature with her infinite imagination has found another set of principles
for determining probabilities; a set other than that of Laplace, which never-
theless does not lead to logical inconsistencies.’ ([Feynman, 1945] p.533)
The quantum mechanical laws approach very closely the laws of Laplace as the size of
the objects involved in the experiments increases, but differ considerably when dealing with
objects of atomic dimensions. Therefore, the laws of probabilities which are conventionally
applied are quite satisfactory in analyzing the behaviour of the roulette wheel but not the
behavior of a single electron or a photon of light.
In this introduction, we illustrate the probabilistic laws of quantum mechanics by
describing an experiment dealing with a single electron.1.2 We focus on the all time
favourite: the two-slit experiment (see figure 1.1.). In this experiment a source emits
identically prepared electrons; all the electrons have the same energy but come out in
different directions to impinge on a detecting screen (S2). Between them is another screen
with two slits (S1), call them A and B, through which the electrons may pass; they are
then detected one by one as they ‘hit’ the detecting screen. The electrons are emitted at a
1.1. This introduction draws on [Feynman, 1945] and [Fine, 1972].
1.2. One can just as well use light instead of electrons in this experiment. The same points would be illustrated.
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steady rate slow enough to ensure that no more than one electron passes through the appar-
atus at the same time,1.3 and the experiments are run long enough to have a large number
of electrons detected. What one measures for various positions R on the detector screen
is the mean number of pulses per second. In other words, one determines experimentally
the (relative) probability p that the electron passes from the source to R as a function of R.
When one runs the experiment with both slits open, the graph of the probability that
the electron hits S2 at R, pAB(R), is the complicated curve illustrated qualitatively in
figure 1.1.(a). It has several maxima and minima, and there are locations near the center
of the screen at which electrons hardly ever arrive. Quantum physics yields precisely the
laws governing the structure of this curve.
To understand this curve, one might at first suppose that each electron which passes
from the source to the detecting screen S2 must go either through slit A or slit B. As a
consequence, one expects that the chance of arrival at R is the sum of two parts, namely,
pA(R), the chance of arrival at R coming through slit A, plus pB(R), the chance of arrival
at R coming through slit B. However, one can show by direct experiment that this is not
the case. Indeed, each of the component probabilities is easy to determine: to determine
the probability pA(R), we simply close slit B and measure the chance of arrival at R with
only slit A open; and similarly, by closing B, we find the chance pB(R) of arrival through
slit B. These probabilities are given in figure 1.1.(b).
Figure 1.1. Double slit experiment.
1.3. Indeed, if the detectors are extremely sensitive (such as a Geiger counter), one finds that the current
arriving at S2 is not continuous, but corresponds to a rain of particles. If the intensity of the source is very low the
detector will record pulses representing the arrival of a particle, separated by gaps in time during which nothing
arrives. If we had detectors simultaneously all over the screen S2, with a very weak source, only one detector would
respond, then, after a little time, another would record the arrival of an electron, etc. There would never be a
half response of the detector, either an entire electron arrives or nothing happens. And two detectors would never
respond simultaneously (except for the coincidence that the source emits two electrons within the resolving time of
the detectors – a coincidence whose probability can be decreased by further decreasing the source’s intensity).
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As one can clearly see, the sum of pA(R) and pB(R) does not agree with the probability
pAB(R). Hence, experiment tells us definitely that pAB(R) pA(R)+ pB(R); that is, that
the chance of arrival at R with both holes open is not the sum of the chance with just hole
A open plus that with just hole B open, i.e. an additive pattern. In fact, the complicated
curve pAB(R) is exactly the intensity of distribution of an interference pattern, i.e. the
pattern one would expect if waves were to start from the source and, after passing through
the two slits, were to impinge on the screen S2. The additive and interference pattern are
substantially different: there are places, for example, where the interference pattern shows
a light patch of few electron hits but where the additive pattern shows a dark patch of
many electron hits. And conversely, there are places where the interference pattern shows
a dark patch of many hits but where the additive pattern shows a light one.
How is the interference pattern then to be understood? One might be tempted to say
that, given that it is not true that pAB(R)= pA(R)+ pB(R), we must conclude that when
both slits are open it is not true that the particle goes through one slit or the other. For
if it had gone through one or the other we could classify all the arrivals at R into two
disjoint classes, namely, those arriving via slit A and those arriving through slit B, and
the frequency of arrival at R would be surely the sum of the frequency of those coming
through A and of those coming through slit B.
However, it is easy to perform an experiment which speaks against this conclusion.
One has to merely place a source of light behind the slits and watch to see through which
slit the electron passes. For electrons scatter light, so that if light is scattered behind slit
A we may conclude that an electron passed through slit A; and if it is scattered in the
neighborhood of slit B, then the electron has passed through slit B. When one runs this
experiment, one finds, in effect, that for every electron which arrives at the screen S2 light
is scattered either behind slit A or behind slit B, and never (if the source is very weak) at
both places. Thus, one verifies that the electron does pass through either slit A or slit B.
Moreover, the fact that when these which-slit measurements are performed no inter-
ference pattern is found – in fact, one retrieves the classical additive pattern – does not
alter this conclusion. For if observation is to be an objective guide to reliable information,
then what we observe must correspond to how things are, either simultaneous with or just
prior to our observation. Thus, when both slits are open, just prior to our observation of
an electron at the outlet of slit A, the electron must have been passing through slit A,
regardless of actually measuring or not which slit the particle goes through. And this is,
of course, compatible with a possible disturbance of the electrons by our observation of
them that would subsequently result in retrieving the additive instead of the interference
pattern.1.4
1.1 Quantum Probability: a peculiar kind of probability 9
In fact, Niels Bohr and Werner Heisenberg, among others, offered the following reas-
oning as an explanation of these results. Their basic idea is that just by ‘watching’ the
electrons one changes their chance of arrival at R. Indeed, to observe them one needs to
use light, and the light in collision with the electron alters its motion and thus its chance
of arrival at R. And the difficulty is that, for objects of atomic dimensions, one cannot get
rid of this disturbance (by direct measurement). In effect, since the momentum carried by
the light is h/λ, where λ is the wavelength associated to the photon, weaker effects could
be produced by using light of longer wave length λ. However, there is a limit to this. For if
light of too long a wave length is used, one will not be able to tell whether it was scattered
from behind slit A or slit B (given that a source of light of wave length λ cannot be located
in space with precision greater than that of order λ). Thus, any physical agency designed
to determine through which slit the electron passes produces enough disturbance to alter
the distribution from pAB(R) to pA(R)+ pB(R).
In addition, Bohr and Heisenberg claimed that the consistency of quantum mechanics
requires a limitation to the subtlety to which experiments can be performed. In the case
of the double-slit experiment it says that any attempt to determine which slit the electron
passed through without deflecting the electron, and thus changing its momentum and
destroying the interference pattern, must necessarily fail. Note that this is different from
saying that any attempt to design an apparatus to determine which slit the electron passed
through, while being delicate enough so as not to deflect the electron sufficiently to destroy
the interference pattern, turns out to actually fail. Indeed, while the latter statement
implies that one cannot in fact make a precise direct simultaneous measurement of the
position and momentum of the electron passing through the double slit screen, the former
implies that no such (precise simultaneous) measurement whatsoever – neither direct nor
indirect – can be in principle performed.1.5
1.4. See [Fine, 1972], section 6, for further discussion of this point.
1.5. Actually, this is the content of Heisenberg’s uncertainty relations [Heisenberg, 1927], whose interpretation is
a rather intricate issue. What is uncontroversial is that, in the case of, say, position q and momentum p, they imply
that there is no way to make a precise direct simultaneous measurement of position and momentum. Indeed, if one
measures position on half the copies of an identically prepared system in state ψ, and momentum on the other half,
there is a statistical scatter such that the product of the standard deviation of position and of momentum is always
greater or equal to ~/2. That is, ∆pψ∆qψ>~/2, where ∆pψ= 〈ψ, p2 ψ〉 − |〈ψ, p ψ〉|2 and ∆qψ= 〈ψ, q2 ψ〉 − |〈ψ,
q ψ〉|2 are the standard deviations of position and momentum in the state vector ψ.
However, what these relations imply at an interpretive level is controversial. Some hold that the uncertainty to
which incompatible quantities can be determined is only a restriction on our simultaneously knowing their values by
means of direct measurements (one could then, in principle, come to know them by means of indirect measurements,
namely, by observing one of them directly and then inferring the value of the other one), while others, take a stronger
view, and hold that the uncertainty relations restrict what is or can be simultaneously real.
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Moreover, according to Bohr and Heisenberg’s view and their so-called Copenhagen
interpretation,1.6 all the puzzling features of quantum mechanics can be traced back to
this inevitable and uncontrollable physical disturbance brought about by the act of meas-
urement. Presented with this situation, the practicing physicist takes the following view.
When no attempt is made to determine which hole the electron passes through, one cannot
say that it must have passed through one hole or the other. Only in a situation where an
apparatus is operating to determine which hole the electron goes through is it permissible to
say that it passes through one or the other. That is, when one watches, one observes, and
thus can say, that the electron goes either through one or the other hole, but if one is not
looking, one does not observe, and thus cannot say, that it either goes one way or the other.
But is this all we can say about the quantum mechanical image of the world? Should we
be satisfied with taking the practicing physicist view which remains silent about whatever
it is not directly observing? Should we also hold, along with Bohr and Heisenberg, that
quantum mechanics implies that the act of observation necessarily alters the phenomenon
being observed, that by the very act of watching the observer necessarily affects the
observed reality? And, maybe, as the popular interpretation of Bohr has it, slip into
saying that quantum mechanics is ‘subjective’, that some of the data quantum physics
provides depend on the subjectivity of this or that particular experiencing subject?
We think not. Although, ultimately, we will conclude that we do not understand the
quantum mechanical image of the world, we will, at least, understand much better the
precise difficulties which give rise to this perplexing situation. Moreover, we will show that
the Copenhagen doctrine is mistaken in that not all the conceptual problems of quantum
mechanics can be traced back to the alleged irreducible and uncontrollable disturbance of
the system measured by a measuring instrument. In addition, hopefully, we may move a
little step further in our understanding of the picture of the world our best science offers.
1.2 Overview
In this dissertation we consider the puzzling phenomena described by quantum mechanics
(such as the double-slit experiment) and try to understand what picture of the world
quantum mechanics might provide. To do so, we undertake a conceptual (or philosophical)
investigation of the concept of quantum probability. In particular, we focus on the notion
of conditional probability, for it turns out to be a particularly beautiful and encompassing
way of tackling many of the conceptual difficulties of quantum theory.
1.6. We do not go into the intricacies of the differences between Bohr andHeisenberg’s interpretation of quantum
mechanics and simply refer to this roughly described view as the Copenhagen interpretation. A somewhat more
detailed account of Bohr’s view is given in section 9.1.2.
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Consider again the double slit experiment with the two slits open. An analysis in terms
of conditional probabilities is not correct since it does not yield the interference pattern that
is found experimentally. Indeed, let A be the event that the electron passes through slit
A, B the event that it passes through slit B, and R the event that the electron strikes the
region R of the detecting screen. Given that the notion of conditional probability is defined
as the pro rata increase of a joint probability distribution, i.e. for two classical events A
and B, the probability of A conditional on B with respect to the probability p, is given by
Pp(A|B)= p(A∩B)
p(B)
(1.1)
one can write the following conditional probabilities:
− Pp(R|A) = p(R∩A)p(A) is the probability that the electron strikes at R given that it
passes through slit A,
− Pp(R|B) = p(R∩B)p(B) is the probability that the electron strikes at R given that it
passes through slit B, and
− Pp(R|A ∪ B) = p[R∩ (A∪B)]p(A∪B) is the probability that the electron strikes at R given
that it passes through either slit A or slit B.
A simple calculation shows that Pp(R|A∪B) can be expressed in terms of Pp(R|A) and
Pp(R|B) as 1.7
Pp(R|A∪B)= 1
2
Pp(R|A)+ 1
2
Pp(R|B) (1.2)
for p(A)= p(B) corresponding to the most simple experimental arrangement.
An analysis in terms of conditional probabilities thus yields an additive distribution
pattern which, as we have seen, is not what we obtain experimentally. The two slit experi-
ment, and more generally quantum mechanical phenomena, cannot, therefore, be analyzed
in terms of classical conditional probabilities. And hence the question arises as to whether
and, if so how, an appropriate notion of conditional probability can be introduced in
quantum mechanics.
A long-standing literature claims that the answer is ‘yes’; that it is in fact possible
to define an appropriate extension of conditional probability with respect to an event in
quantum mechanics, namely the probability defined by the so-called Lüders rule. This rule
yields the correct probabilistic predictions for the quantum phenomena as, for example,
the double slit experiment. Indeed, it predicts that the probability to arrive at R when
the two slits are open, is not, as in the classical case, the weighted sum of the probabilities
1.7. By distributivity: Pp(R|A ∪ B) = p(R∩ (A∪B))p(A∪B) =
p((R∩A)∪ (R∩B))
p(A∪B) . Since A and B are two mutually
exclusive events, Pp(R|A ∪ B) = p(R∩A)+ p(R∩B)p(A)+ p(B ) . And if we set p(A) = p(B) corresponding to the most simple
experimental arrangement, then Pp(R|A∪B) = 12
p(R∩A)
p(A)
+
1
2
p(R∩B)
p(B)
.
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when each slit is open; rather, the characteristic quantum interference terms are present
in this probability, namely1.8
Pψ(R|A∪B)= 1
2
Pψ(R|A)+ 1
2
Pψ(R|B)+ I (1.3)
where,
Pψ(R|A)= 〈ψA′ , PRψA′ 〉
Pψ(R|B)= 〈ψB′ , PRψB′ 〉
I =
1
2
〈ψA′ , PRψB′ 〉+ 12 〈ψB
′ , PRψA′ 〉 (1.4)
More generally, the Lüders rule states that for two quantum events, represented by projec-
tion operators P and Q on the Hilbert space H associated to the system, the probability
of the quantum event P conditional on the quantum event Q is given by
PW(P |Q)= Tr(QWQP )Tr(QW ) (1.5)
where W is a density operator on H. In the context of quantum probability theory, rule
(1.5) satisfies the formal condition of specifying the only probability measure on the state
space that reduces to a pro rata conditional probability for compatible events. Moreover,
this formal condition is analogous to an existence and uniqueness property of classical
conditional probability. Thus, several authors have argued for interpreting the Lüders rule
as defining an appropriate notion of conditional probability in quantum mechanics.
In addition, the Lüders rule appears in the orthodox interpretation of quantum mech-
anics. Indeed, it is the generalized version of the so-called ‘Projection Postulate’, which
determines uniquely the state of the system after a measurement of a certain physical
quantity. The new density matrix representing this state can then be used to calculate
probability assignments for subsequent measurements. In effect, imagine we perform a
measurement of a certain observable, where Q belongs to its spectral decomposition, on
a system in state W , and find measurement outcome q. The Lüders rule determines that
the new state is Wq=
QWQ
Tr(QWQ)
. If we then perform a measurement of a second observable,
where P belongs to its spectral decomposition, the probability to find measurement out-
come p in this second measurement is given by this new density operator as
PW(p|q)= pWq(p)=Tr
(
QWQ
Tr(QWQ)
P
)
(1.6)
Thus, in these cases, it (seemingly) becomes meaningful to speak of the probability dis-
tribution of a physical quantity given the result of a previous measurement of another
physical quantity. Indeed, it seems that the probability given by (1.6) can be interpreted
as the probability of measurement outcome p conditional on measurement outcome q.
1.8. A detailed derivation of this result is given in section 4.4.2. and 7.6.
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Hence, the proposal is that the Lüders rule defines the notion of conditional probability
in quantum mechanics both for quantum events represented by projection operators and
for measurement results. The quantum notion agrees with its classical counterpart when
it applies to compatible events (those represented by commuting projection opertors) but
differs from it when incompatible events (those represented by non-commuting projection
opertors) are involved. In these cases it cannot be interpreted as a classical conditional
probability but rather is seen as providing an extension of this notion appropriate for the
quantum context.
In our dissertation we first argue that, even if the probabilities defined by the Lüders
rule are the only probabilities which are co-extensive with conditional probabilities for
compatible events, we have no reason to assimilate them to conditional ones for incompat-
ible events, neither for physical values nor at a formal level for projection operators, both
from a synchronic and a diachronic perspective. Rather, we give many reasons against this
assimilation. Second, we argue that the orthodox interpretation of quantum mechanics
also does not justify the understanding of the probability defined by the Lüders rule as
a conditional-on-measurement-outcome probability (again both from a synchronic and a
diachronic perspective). The only notion of conditional probability the Lüders rule defines
is a purely instrumental one which reduces quantum theory to a mere algorithm for gen-
erating the statistical predictions of the outcomes of measurements.
We develop these arguments in Chapters 5 and 7. In sections 5.3 and 5.4 we show why
the probability defined by the Lüders rule cannot be understood as a synchronic conditional
probability for physical values. In section 7.3 we show why it also cannot be understood
as a synchronic nor diachronic conditional probability for measurement results, nor as a
diachronic conditional probability for physical values. This allows us to further establish
the inadequacy of the formal notion of conditional probability for projection operators,
both from a synchronic and a diachronic perspective (sections 5.2 and 7.4). Finally, in
section 7.5, we argue that the only notion of conditional probability offered by the Lüders
rule is a purely instrumental one. Indeed, if when one says the probability of a certain
measurement outcome p given a previous measurement which has outcome q is PW(p|q)
one only means that if these two measurements are repeated many times, one after the
other, one expects that the fraction of those which give the outcome p is roughly P(p|q),
then no problems arise. But as soon as one attempts to say anything else, then all the
problems we consider in sections 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, 7.3 and 7.4 appear.
Thus, we conclude that, contrary to the standard view, the probability defined by the
Lüders rule does not acquire a precise meaning, in the sense of synchronic or diachronic
conditional probability, when quantum mechanics is interpreted as a generalized probab-
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ility space or as probability space for measurement results. While establishing this result,
we also show that the puzzles of quantum mechanics cannot be traced back to an inevitable
and uncontrollable physical disturbance brought about by the act of measurement.
It is important to note that these questions do not apply to another type of (pur-
portedly) conditional probability which also arises in the context of measurements. Indeed,
it is not uncommon to hear that all quantum probabilities are conditional probabilities for
measurement outcomes conditional on measurements. However, in section 6.4 we argue
that these conditional-on-measurement probabilities (not conditional-on-measurement-
outcome probabilities) are not really conditional probabilities. For there is an important
distinction between the role of background conditions which specify the conditions in
effect at the assessment of a probability function – in this case, the measurement pro-
cedure – and the propositions that can really be conditioned on.
In Chapter 8, we consider the interpretation of the unconditional quantum probabil-
ities. We show that, similarly to the probabilities defined by the Lüders rule, these can
only be interpreted as probabilities under a purely instrumental view of quantum mech-
anics. And we argue that the difficulties in giving a (non-instrumental) interpretation of
quantum unconditional probability are ultimately the same as those we encountered in
giving a (non-instrumental) interpretation of the probability defined by the Lüders rule.
More concretely, we argue that quantum Bayesianism is not a viable interpretation of
quantum mechanics, both from a subjective and an objective perspective; and that a (non-
instrumental) frequency interpretation of the quantum probabilities is not possible either.
Finally, in Chapter 9, we frame this discussion within the general issue of the dynamics
of conceptual change in science. We first show that the standard account of conceptual
generalization or extension, based on co-extension of the ‘extended’ and the old concept in
their shared domain of application (as for example, that presented by the logical positivists,
by Imre Lakatos or by Albert Einstein), is inadequate. We then argue that concepts present
an ‘open texture’ that does not allow for a set of jointly necessary and sufficient conditions
to characterize an extended concept, and propose a new account of concept extension in
terms of a ‘cluster of markers’ which, though not fast-holding conditions, do provide an
appropriate rationale to evaluate conceptual extension. This account, we argue, provides a
more adequate analysis of when two concepts, even if co-extensive in their shared domain
of application, do not share enough meaning to justify regarding them as defining the same
concept, and comes closer to capturing the actual relations between concepts which appear
in different theoretical contexts.
In Chapter 10 we bring this dissertation to an end by briefly summarizing our main
conclusions.
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Chapter 2
Classical Conditional Probability
In classical probability theory the probability of an event A conditional on another event
B is defined as the probability of their joint event A ∩ B, divided by the probability of
the conditioning event B. This ratio is supposed to capture the notion of conditional
probability, namely the probability of an event, qualified or informed by some body of
evidence. In this chapter we consider whether this is in fact so.
We first argue that the ratio p(A ∩ B)/p(B) should not be seen as a definition of
conditional probability but rather as an analysis of this notion (section 2.3). Then we
show why ratio can in fact capture such notion, both from an intuitive understanding
of probability and from the perspective of two particular interpretations of probability,
namely the subjective Bayesian and the frequency interpretation of probability. Finally,
we give two formal characterizations of the conditional measure defined by the ratio p(A∩
B)/p(B) (section 2.4); first, as the only probability measure defined on the whole classical
event space such that for events A contained in B, conditionalizing on B just involves a
renormalization of the initial probability measure; and second, as the only measure which
is necessarily additive with respect to conditioning events.
2.1 Classical Probability Theory
The theory of probability has a mathematical and a foundational or philosophical aspect.
Whereas there is a significant consensus about its mathematics, there is much disagreement
about the philosophy. In this section we only briefly introduce the main formal elements of
classical probability theory. The aim is to quickly lay out the formalism in which to consider
interpretive questions about conditional probability and establish the notation we use.
Let us start with the definition of a classical probability space and the concepts in
terms of which it is defined.2.1
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Definition 2.1. Classical Probability Space. A classical probability space consists of
a triple 〈S,F(S), p〉 where
i. S is a space of points w called the sample space and sample points
ii. F(S) is a σ-field of subsets of S. These subsets are called events.
iii. p( · ) is a probability measure on F(S).
Definition 2.2. σ-Field. A set of subsets F(S) of a space S is a σ-field if it is closed under
complementation ( c), and countable unions ( ∪ ) and intersections ( ∩ ). The complement
of S is the empty set ∅.
With these operations the set of subsets of a real space form a Boolean algebra B.
In full generality a Boolean algebra is a set A together with binary operations ‘ + ’
and ‘ · ’, a unary operation ‘ − ’, and elements ‘0’, ‘1’ of A for which the following laws
hold: commutative and associative laws for addition and multiplication, the distributive
laws both for multiplication over addition and for addition over multiplication, and the
special laws x+(x · y) = x, x · (x+ y) = x, x+(− x) = 1, and x · (− x)= 0. In a classical
event structure, in which events are represented by subsets of S, the set A consists of
the set F(S) of subsets of S, ‘+ ’ corresponds to the union of subsets, ‘ · ’ corresponds to
their intersection, and ‘ − ’ corresponds to the complementation with respect to S, with
members ‘∅’ and ‘S’ playing the role of ‘0’ and ‘1’ respectively.
The standard axiomatization of probability is the following. It was first provided by
[Kolmogorov, 1950].
Definition 2.3. Classical Probability. A set function p( · ) defined on a σ-field F(S) of
subsets of S is a classical probability measure if
i. (Non-negativity) p(A)> 0 for all A∈F(S).
ii. (Normalization) p(S)= 1
iii. (σ-additivity) for every finite or countable collection {Ai} of sets in F(S) such that
Ai is disjoint from Aj, i j,
p(
⋃
i
Ai)=
∑
i
p(Ai) (2.1)
2.1. We mostly follow [Breiman, 1968].
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Notice that additivity is really the essential constraint for a probability measure: non-
negativity simply establishes a scale and normalization says that the whole sample space
is maximally probable, which seems almost self-evident.
Denote the class of Borel subsets of R, i.e. the smallest family of subsets of R that
includes the open sets and is closed under complements and under countable intersections,
by B(R). A random variable is a measurable function f :S→R with the following special
features:2.2
Definition 2.4. Random Variable. A real function f(w) defined on S is called a random
variable if for every Borel set b in the real line R, the set {w; f(w)∈b} is in F(S). For
b∈B(R) and random variable f, f−1(b) is the event that f has a value in b.
In a random experiment, the elements of S correspond to the possible outcomes of
the experiment, the sets in F(S) correspond to random events, and the measure p(A) for
A ∈F(S) gives the probability that the event A occurs. Random variables correspond to
measurable quantities for the random experiment. In effect, we can associate with each
quantity A a function fA such that for every point w of the sample space S, fA(w) yields a
real number, namely, the value of A. Thus the possible values of A will correspond to the
range of the function fA: A will take a value in the Borel set b for the set of sample points
w for which fA(w)∈b. That is, A will take a value in b for all sample points w∈ fA−1(b).
Therefore the event (A,b), namely ‘quantity A has a value in b’ is represented in classical
theory by the subset of the phase-space fA
−1(b)⊆S.
One can associate probabilities to the events f−1(b) in the usual way: p[f−1(b)] is the
probability of the event that the random variable f has value in b.
Definition 2.5. Classical Probability Distribution. For a random variable f defined
on S, the probability measure pf on B(R) defined by
pf(b)= p[f
−1(b)] (2.2)
is called the distribution of f.
If f , g are random variables, one can also define the probability of the simultaneous
occurrence of events such as f−1(a)∩ g−1(b), a,b∈B(R).
2.2. We restrict ourselves to the family of Borel subsets ofR because it is not possible to construct a probability
measure defined on all subsets of R.
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Definition 2.6. Classical Joint Distribution. The joint distribution of f , g is defined
as the probability measure pf ,g on B(R
2) satisfying, for all a,b∈B(R),
pf ,g(a×b)= p[f−1(a)∩ g−1(b)] (2.3)
pf ,g(a×b) is naturally interpreted as the probability that f has a value in a and g has a
value in b. It can be shown that pf ,g always exists and satisfies the consistency conditions
as to the marginal distributions pf(a) and pg(b), i.e.
pf ,g(a×R)= pf(a) (2.4)
pf ,g(R×b)= pg(b) (2.5)
Thus, the joint distribution pf ,g determines the marginal distributions pf and pg. The
converse, however, does not hold: one can give examples of cases in which the individual
distributions pf , pg do not determine the joint distribution pf ,g. Nevertheless the distribu-
tions of x1 f +x2 g for all x1, x2∈R do determine pf ,g. In fact, it can be shown that pf ,g
is the unique measure on B(R2) that satisfies
pf ,g{(y1, y2):x1 y1+ x2 y2∈b}= p{ω ∈S:x1 f(ω)+ x2 g(ω)∈b} (2.6)
for every E ∈B(R), x∈R2.
The definition of joint distribution can be easily generalized for a finite set of n random
variables. The joint distribution of f1, , fn is defined as the probability measure pf , ,fn
on B(Rn) satisfying:
pf1, ,fn(a1× ×an)= p[f1−1(a1)∩ ∩ fn−1(an)] (2.7)
for all a1, , an ∈B(R). pf1, ,fn always exists and satisfies the consistency conditions as
to the marginal distributions pf1, ,fn(a× ×R)= pf1(a).
2.2 Conditional Probability: A Definition
Conditional probability is, roughly, probability given some body of evidence or information.
In classical probability theory this notion is defined by the so-called ratio formula, which
stipulates that the probability of an event A conditional on another event B, Pp(A|B),
is given by the ratio of two unconditional probabilities, namely their joint probability
p(A∩B) divided by the probability of B.
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Definition 2.7. Conditional Probability with Respect to an Event. Given a classical
probability space 〈S,F(S), p〉, for sets A,B ∈F(S), such that p(B)> 0, the probability of
event A conditional on event B is defined as
Pp(A|B)= p(A∩B)
p(B)
(2.8)
This new function Pp is indeed a probability function. It is non-negative given that p is
non-negative; it is also normalized, i.e.
Pp(B |B)= p(B ∩B)
p(B)
= 1 (2.9)
And it is additive: for every finite or countable collection {Ai} of sets in F(S) such that
Ai is disjoint from Aj, i j, it satisfies Pp(∪iAi|B)=
∑
i
Pp(Ai|B). In effect,
Pp(∪iAi|B)= p[(∪iAi)∩B]
p(B)
=
p[∪i (Ai∩B)]
p(B)
=
∑
i
p(Ai∩B)
p(B)
=
∑
i
Pp(Ai|B) (2.10)
What is essential for additivity to hold is first, that the distributive law, i.e. (∪iAi)∩B=
∪i (Ai ∩ B), holds in F(S); and second, given that the sets Ai ∩ B are disjoint, that the
probability of their union is simply the sum of the probability of each set.
Following [Beltrametti & Cassinelli, 1981] and [Hughes, 1989], we use the notation
Pp( · | · ) for conditional probability rather than the standard notation p( · | · ) to emphasize
the distinction between the conditional probability function Pp and the unconditional one
p. For even if Pp is defined in terms of p, they are conceptually distinct notions.
2.3 Justification of the Ratio Analysis
It is part of the orthodoxy to take (2.8) as the definition of conditional probability: uncon-
ditional probability is taken as the basic notion, and conditional probability is taken as a
subsidiary one mathematically defined in terms of it (and is thus taken as the fourth axiom
of classical probability by adding it to the axioms of definition 2.3). However, thought
of this way, there is nothing conditional about conditional probability – it is just one
mathematical function of two variables defined in terms of a function of one variable. But
this abstract function is of interest precisely because it comes close to capturing some other
intuitive notion: the probability of A given B; that is, the probability that A has, given
that certain conditions obtain, among others, that a probability of 1 is assigned to event B.
Conditional probability is thus not just a technical term devoid of any associated
intuitions; it is meant to capture the notion of ‘the probability of A, qualified by or informed
by some condition B’, words which are loaded with philosophical and commonsensical
associations. E. J. Lowe writes
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‘... we can only make clear sense of the notion of ‘conditional probability’
if we attempt to explain it [...] in conditional terms – not, that is, as a
new kind of probability, but rather as the (ordinary!) probability that a
proposition has if certain conditions obtain. In short: talk about conditional
probability is properly construed not as talk about a conditional kind of
probability, but rather as talk of a conditional kind about probability.’([Lowe,
2008] p.222)
Some authors, therefore, prefer to denote the conditional-on-B probability function of
A by pB(A) rather than by Pp(A|B).
Now the problem is that the ratio in (2.8) may or may not express our associations
adequately. So while we are free to stipulate that Pp(A|B) is merely shorthand for the ratio
p(A∩B)/p(B), we are not free to stipulate that ‘the conditional probability of A, given B’
should be identified with this ratio. Hence the ratio formula (2.8) should not be regarded
as a stipulative definition, but rather as an analysis of the notion of conditional probability
in need of justification.2.3 We refer to this analysis as the ratio analysis, or simply by ratio.
What is then the rationale for the identification of conditional probability with ratio?
That is, why is the probability of an event qualified or informed by some condition captured
by the ratio analysis?
2.3.1 General Rationale
Consider the following example. Imagine a fair die is about to be tossed. The probability
that it lands with ‘1’ showing up, i.e. p(1), is one sixth; this is an unconditional probab-
ility. But the probability that it lands with ‘1’ showing up conditional on or given that
the outcome is an odd number, i.e. Pp(1|odd), is one third. Intuitively, this conditional
probability is one third because the possible outcomes are narrowed to the three equally
possible odd ones, and ‘1’ is one of them. And this number agrees with what the ratio
formula delivers, namely
Pp(1|odd)= p(1∩ odd)
p(odd)
=
1/6
1/2
=
1
3
(2.11)
Let us spell out the underlying rationale in more detail. First, if we know that the outcome
of the throw is an odd number, then the appropriate sample space is not S = {1, 2, 3,
4, 5, 6} anymore; rather S gets replaced by a new one, namely the set of odd outcomes
2.3. [Hájek, 2003, 2008] and [Easwaran, 2008] defend this view. See also [Mellor] Chp.7.
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Sodd= {1, 3, 5}. There are however many probability measures on this new sample space.
For example, the outcome ‘1’ could be assigned a probability of one half while ‘3’ and ‘5’ a
probability of one fourth each. Or both ‘1’ and ‘3’ could have a zero probability, while ‘5’
have a probability one.
What specifically defines the conditional probability measure is that the sample space
changes from S to Sodd and nothing else. That is, the conditional probability given ‘odd’,
by definition, differs from the original one solely by taking into account the qualification
of an odd outcome. This means that one has to eliminate the points in S that are not in
Sodd (2, 4 and 6), without altering the relative probability of the points which remain (1,
3 and 5), i.e. by increasing the latter’s value ‘pro rata’. Thus, Pp(1|odd) is derived from
the initial probability measure by dividing the initial measure by the initial probability of
odd, i.e. Pp(1|odd) = p(1)p(odd) =
1/6
1/2
=
1
3
, which agrees with what the ratio formula delivers.
Indeed, in this example A= {1} is a subset of B= {odd}; hence, A∩B=A and the ratio
formula reduces simply to P(A|B)= p(A)
p(B)
.
For general subsets A that are not necessarily subsets of B, as for example A= {1, 2,
3} and B= {odd}, one has to consider only the probability of the sample points in A that
are also in B and disregard the rest. For the sample points in A that are not also in B
will not be possible outcomes in the new event space SB and, therefore, will be assigned
zero probability. Hence for any set A, not generally included in B, its conditional-on-B
probability is the sum of the initial probability of the sample points that are both in A and
in B, i.e. p(A ∩ B), increased pro rata. In other words, the conditional probability of A
given B is the probability of that part of A lying in B increased pro rata. Just what the
ratio analysis stipulates.
2.3.2 Ratio and Interpretations of Probability
The ratio analysis also captures the notion of conditional probability under specific inter-
pretations of probability. It is standard to assume that probability comes in at least two
varieties: epistemic and physical . Epistemic interpretations take probabilities to be related
to our knowledge of the world, whereas physical interpretations regard probabilities as
features of the objective material world, unrelated and independent of our knowledge of it.
Physical probabilities are thus necessarily objective in the sense of being agent-independent,
whereas epistemic probabilities can be either subjective or objective depending on whether
or not prior degrees of belief are taken to be uniquely determined by the agent’s background
knowledge.
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Under the subjective epistemic view, probabilities measure how strongly one believes
certain propositions and are, therefore, features of the people who hold those beliefs; they
are neither features of the world nor features of what the credences are about and are
generally referred to as credences or degrees of belief . In contrast, under the physical view,
probabilities exist heedless of our beliefs and interests, and of our ever coming to conceive
or know about them; they are neither relative to evidence nor matters of opinion and are
generally referred to as chances. Finally, under the objective epistemic view, probabilities
measure how far evidence confirms (or disconfirms) a certain hypothesis and are neither
real features of the world nor matters of opinion.
There are different particular interpretations of these three kinds of probabilities. We
here focus and develop one particular interpretation of two of them, namely the frequency
interpretation of chances and the subjective Bayesian interpretation of credences.2.4 We
present both of them in turn, first, specifying how the notion of conditional probability
is understood under each of them, and then showing how the ratio analysis agrees with
such understanding. Appendix A provides a more detailed presentation on the subjective
Bayesian interpretation of probability.
2.3.2.1 Frequency Interpretation
Long run relative frequency is typically a good guide to determining chances. Some, e.g.
[Reichenbach, 1949], [von Mises, 1957], think that, more than being a good guide, such
relative frequency should be identified with objective chance. This view is normally referred
to as the ‘Frequency Interpretation’. Frequentism applies to chances but not to credences.
In addition, frequentists may deny that credences exist; that is, frequentists may deny
either that belief comes by degrees or that, in case they do, these degrees have a probability
measure.
Frequencies do not measure possibilities of outcomes but just how often the outcomes
occur in a large number of (identical) experiments. Indeed, frequentism provides a non-
modal surrogate for the idea of chance as a measure of physical possibility. Probabilities
are generally taken as measuring possibilities, where possibility is further (standardly) seen
as coming in degrees. And hence, frequentism, by identifying ‘how possible something is’
with ‘how frequently something occurs’, can interpret probabilities as measuring physical
possibilities. Note, however, that it does not explain possibilities as such, it just explains
them away.
2.4. On the various interpretations of probability see, for example, [Gillies, 2000a], [Mellor, 2005].
24 Classical Conditional Probability
Frequentism is also closely related to the ‘Humean view of causation’, namely the view
in which all it takes for causes to be sufficient for their effects is that they always produce
them. Similarly, causes are necessary for their effects if the latter never occur without the
presence of the former (i.e. effects only occur in the presence of their causes). Frequentism
about chances then gives a Humean reading of this idea of sufficiency and necessity: causes
are sufficient for their effects if there is a zero chance (relative frequency) for them not to
occur. Similarly, a cause is necessary for its effect if there is a zero relative frequency of
the effect in the absence of its cause.
Let us see how the frequency interpretation justifies the ratio analysis of conditional
probability. Suppose that we run a long sequence of n trials, on each of which B might or
might not occur. On a simple frequency interpretation the probability of B is identified
with the relative frequency of trials on which it occurs, that is, the number of trials on
which B appears divided by the total number of trials:
p(B)≡ nb(B)
n
(2.12)
Consider among those trials in which B occurs the proportion of those on which A also
occurs, namely nb(A ∩B)/nb(B). This is by definition the conditional probability of A
given B, that is,
P(A|B)= nb(A∩B)/nb(B) (2.13)
Now divide both terms by the total number of trials n. Under a simple frequentist inter-
pretation nb(A∩B)/n is identified with the probability of the joint occurrence of A and
B, that is,
p(A∩B)≡ nb(A∩B)
n
(2.14)
And nb(B)/n is identified with the probability of B as (2.12) shows. Hence, P(A|B) =
p(A∩B)
p(B)
, as the ratio analysis stipulates.
Similarly, in terms of the die example, to conditionalize on ‘odd’ under the frequency
reading is to select the subsequence of throws with results 1, 3 and 5. This selection leaves
unaltered the numbers of throws with each of these three results, and hence the ratios of
the relative frequencies of these results are also unaltered. Thus the conditional probability
of ‘1’ given ‘odd’ agrees with the ratio analysis.
2.3.2.2 Subjective Bayesian Interpretation of Probability
Consider now the subjective Bayesian interpretation wherein probabilities are defined as
the subjective degrees of belief of a coherent agent. Degrees of belief are measured through
so-called betting quotients and coherence requires that the agent will not accept a series of
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bets that will make her lose whatever happens. This ensures that degrees of belief satisfy
the standard axioms of probability.
The most usual approach to subjective conditional probability is the so-called Ramsey
test , which takes the subjective conditional probability P(A|B) as given by the degree
of belief one has in A when supposing B (or hypothetically adding B to one’s stock of
beliefs).2.5 The notion of supposition is crucial for it allows one’s conditional degree of
belief to differ from how one’s beliefs would actually change were one to learn B with cer-
tainty. (See Appendix A for further detail.) However, regardless of what exactly conditional
degrees of belief are – or whether they can be reduced to some notion of supposition –
betting behavior, as with the notion of degree of belief, sheds important light on this notion.
Indeed, it seems that Pp(A|B) ought to have some connection to the agent’s disposition
to accept bets on A that will be called off if B is not true.
It turns out there is a standard Dutch book argument suggesting that under this
interpretation, one ought to set Pp(A|B) to what the ratio analysis stipulates. In effect,
one can show that an agent would be incoherent, i.e. be ‘Dutch Booked’, if she does not set
her conditional degree of belief in A given B to her degree of belief in their joint occurrence
divided by the degree of belief in B, i.e. if she does not set Pp(A|B) = p(A∩B)p(B) . Thus the
coherent agent will set her conditional degree of belief to precisely what the ratio formula
requires.
More intuitively using the die example, if the probabilities are read as degrees of belief
and all we know is that ‘odd’ is true but nothing about which particular result of the throw
actually made ‘odd’ true, then we should leave the relative values of our degrees of belief
in the three odd results unaltered. And hence our degrees of belief conditional on ‘odd’
are derived from our initial unconditional ones by increasing their value ‘pro rata’, again
in agreement with the ratio analysis.
We end this section by emphasizing the distinction between conditional probability
and conditionalization. Subjectivists typically recognize no constraints on initial or prior
subjective probabilities beyond the coherence condition. But they typically advocate a
learning rule for updating probabilities in the light of new evidence. This rule is the so-
called principle of conditionalization which states that, when one acquires new evidence B
at time tf , one should systematically transform one’s initial probability assignment pi(A)
to generate a final or posterior probability assignment pf(A) by conditioning on B, that is,
pi(A)  pf(A)=Ppi(A|B) (2.15)
2.5. One also finds in the literature the attempt to define subjective conditional probability as the probability
of a conditional, that is, as the degree of belief assigned unconditionally to an indicative conditional. However, this
account does not work. See [Easwaran, 2008], [Eells and Skyrms, 1994].
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It is important to realize that the notions of conditional probability and conditionalization
are distinct notions: while conditionalization is a diachronic notion – it applies to prob-
abilities held at a time prior to learning of evidence B and to probabilities held at a time
posterior to this learning, conditional probability is a synchronic notion – it applies only
to probabilities at one time. And arguments in favour of the synchronic notion do not
necessarily support the diachronic rule. (See Appendix A for further detail)
But regardless of whether or not conditionalization is the appropriate rule for updating
probability assignments it is clear that one can always associate a diachronic dimension
to the notion of conditional probability. For one can straightforwardly use the conditional
probability function to update a probability assignment. And this is all we need to have
in mind when evaluating whether it is conceptually possible to define either a quantum
notion of conditional probability or a quantum conditionalization rule.
2.3.3 Problems for the Ratio Analysis
In this section we have emphasized that the ratio formula (2.8) should not be regarded as
a stipulative definition of conditional probability, but rather as an analysis of that notion.
And we have seen various justifications for why this should be so. However, [Alan Hájek,
2003] has forcefully argued against the adequacy of the ratio formula as an analysis of
conditional probability. Briefly, he argues that conditional probabilities can be well defined
in many and important cases in which the ratio analysis goes silent. However, given that
Hájek’s arguments give rise to difficulties which are not particularly problematic for the
project of defining a quantum notion of conditional probability, we will simply bracket his
arguments in our discussion. We provide a brief summary of them in Appendix B.
2.4 Two Characterizations of Conditional Probability
We now consider two formal characterizations of the conditional measure Pp( · | · ) defined
by the ratio p(A∩B)/p(B). First, we show that the conditional probability measure thus
defined is the only probability measure defined on the whole event space F(S) such that
for sets A contained in B, conditionalizing on B just involves a renormalization of the
initial probability measure p(A) to Pp(A|B), where Pp(B |B)=1. In other words, starting
with a probability p defined over S, if for all A⊆B one defines a probability measure mp
in terms of the initial probability measure p as mp(A) =
p(A)
p(B)
, then mp can be extended
to all F(S); the extension is a new probability measure which is unique and is precisely
given by the usual ratio. We refer to this characterization of conditional probability as ‘the
existence and uniqueness characterization’ (section 2.4.1).
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Second, we present a characterization of conditional probability which arises given that
not only is the conditional probability measure necessarily additive with respect to the
conditioning events, but, conversely, any measure additive with respect to the conditioning
events is necessarily a conditional probability measure. More specifically, if a probability
measure m has the structure of a mixture of the conditional probability measures Pp( · |Bi)
with weights p(Bi)
p(B)
for Bi ∩ Bj = ∅, that is, m(A) =
∑
i
p(Bi)
p(B)
Pp(A|Bi), then m is the
conditional probability with respect to B = ∪i Bi. We refer to this characterization of
conditional probability as ‘additivity with respect to conditioning events’ (section 2.4.2).
2.4.1 Existence and Uniqueness
Let 〈S,F(S), p〉 be a classical probability space. To every subset A∈F(S), p( · ) assigns
A a value in the interval [0,1]. We have seen that every probability measure p( · ) defines a
conditional probability measure Pp( · | · ), such that the conditional probability of A given
B is given by Pp(A|B) = p(A∩B)p(B) (with p(B) 0). The following theorem shows that the
conditional probability measure thus defined from p( · ) is the only probability measure on
the set of all events F(S) such that for every event A in F(B), Pp(A|B)= p(A)p(B) .2.6
Theorem 2.1. Existence and Uniqueness. Given a non-empty set S and a field F(S)
of subsets of S, let B belong to F(S) and p( · ) be any probability measure on F(S) such
that p(B) 0. For any A in F(B) – the subsets of B that are in F(S) – define the function
mp(A)=
p(A)
p(B)
(2.16)
Then:
1. m( · ) is a probability measure on F(B),
2. there exists an extension Pp( · |B) of m( · ) to all F(S),
3. the extended probability measure Pp( · |B) is unique and, for all C in F(S), is given
by
Pp(C |B)=m(C ∩B)= p(C ∩B)
p(B)
(2.17)
This theorem, hence, states that there is only one way of extending a conditional probab-
ility measure defined for sets A in F(B) as Pp(A|B)= p(A)p(B) , to all sets C in F(S) which is
precisely given by the ratio formula Pp(C |B)= p(C ∩B)p(B) . The extended probability measure
of any measurable subset A of B agrees with the original probability of that subset, i.e.
Pp(A|B)=mp(A); and for general subsets C in F(S) simply assigns C the probability that
corresponds to that part of C which is contained in B, and zero value to the remaining
part, i.e. Pp(C |B)=mp(C ∩B).
2.6. See [Cassinelli & Zanghí, 1983], [Teller & Fine, 1975], [Hughes, 1989].
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This uniqueness result may seem to distinguish conditional probability formally. In
fact it does not. For in classical probability every probability measure on a subspace is
uniquely extendable to the full space; there is nothing special about a conditional probab-
ility measure defined by the ratio rule. Indeed the following theorem holds:2.7
Theorem 2.2. Extendability of Classical Probability. Given a non-empty set S and
a field F of subsets of S, let B belong to F(S) and m( · ) be a probability measure on F(B).
Then:
1. there exists an extension p( · ) of m( · ) to all of F(S),
2. this extension is unique and, for all C in F(S), is given by
p(C)=m(C ∩B) (2.18)
Hence, it is a simple consequence of this general fact about classical extendability that in
the special case of conditional probabilities the extension will satisfy the ratio formula.
That is, theorem 2.1 is just a particular instance of the more general theorem 2.2 when
m( · ) for A in F(B) is defined as mp(A)= p(A)p(B) . There is nothing special about conditional
probability: all other measures m( · ) on F(B), which also assign B probability one but
which need not be defined as the ratio p(A)
p(B)
, will be likewise extendable to the full space
F(S).
Note that both points 1. and 2. of theorem 2.2 depend only on the probability measure
m( · ) restricted to F(B): as we have seen, the extended probability measure p(C) =
m(C ∩ B) simply assigns C the probability that corresponds to that part of C which is
contained in B, and zero value to the remaining part. To anticipate, the situation will not
be analogous in the quantum case: although an analogue version of theorem 2.1 holds,
points 2. and 3. in that case will depend critically on the initial measure p( · ) defined on
the full space. Thus it will not be possible to see the quantum version of theorem 2.1 as a
consequence of an analogue version of theorem 2.2; in fact the quantum version of theorem
2.2 is false.
2.4.2 Additivity with Respect to Conditioning Events
The conditional probability measure with respect to an event B=∪iBi, with Bi∩Bj=∅ for
i j, is necessarily additive with respect to the (disjoint) conditioning events Bi. In effect,
Pp(A| ∪Bi)= p[A∩ (∪iBi)]
p(B)
=
p[∪i (A∩Bi)]
p(B)
=
∑
i
p(A∩Bi)
p(B)
(2.19)
2.7. This theorem was formulated by Arthur Fine. The proof is simple. Imagine there is another measure p′( · ),
where p′( · ) p( · ) that also satisfies the condition p′(A)=m(A). For all C ∈F (S), p′(C)= p′(C ∩B)+ p′(C ∩ (S−
B)). Now p′(B)=m(B)=1 and so p′(S−B)=0; and since 06p′(C∩(S−B))6p′(S−B), we get p′(C)= p′(C∩B).
But C ∩B ∈F (B) and so p′(C) = p′(C ∩B)=m(C), which is equal to p(C). And thus p′(C)= p(C).
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And multiplying (2.19) by p(Bi)
p(Bi)
, we get that
Pp(A| ∪Bi)=
∑
i
p(Bi)
p(B)
Pp(A|Bi) (2.20)
One can also show that the converse also holds. That is, that any measure which is
additive with respect to the (disjoint) conditioning events Bi is necessarily the conditional
probability measure given B=∪iBi. The following theorem establishes this result.2.8
Theorem 2.3. Let 〈S,F(S), p〉 be a classical probability space, B an element of F(S) such
that p(B) 0 and {Bi} a countable disjoint set of elements of F(S) such that B =∪iBi.
Let m be a probability measure such that for each Bi and A, an element of F(S),
m(A)=
p(A)
p(B)
(2.21)
Then m is the conditional probability with respect to B.
Let us go through the proof of this theorem to see exactly how it establishes that
additivity with respect to conditioning events characterizes conditional probability.
Proof.
To prove theorem 2.3, it suffices to show that it holds for a set A⊆B. For if m(A)= p(A)
p(B)
coincides with Pp(A|B) for A⊆B, then it coincides with Pp on the whole F(S) because
of theorem 2.1. Let A be any element of F(S) such that A⊆B, then
A=A∩B=A∩ (∪iBi)=∪i (A∩Bi) (2.22)
Hence m(A)=m[∪i (A∩Bi)], and since m is a probability measure:
m(A)=
∑
i
m(A∩Bi) (2.23)
Now for each index i, A∩Bi⊆Bi, so that, by definition (2.21) of m,
m(A∩Bi)= p(A∩Bi)
p(B)
(2.24)
And inserting (2.24) into (2.23),
m(A)=
∑
i
p(A∩Bi)
p(B)
=
∑
i
p(A∩Bi)
p(B)
=
p(
∑
i
A∩Bi)
p(B)
=
p(A∩B)
p(B)
=
p(A)
p(B)
(2.25)
Hence m(A)=Pp(A|B) 
Additivity with respect to the Bi’s can be now made explicit by multiplying (2.25) by
p(Bi)
p(Bi)
:
m(A)=
∑
i
p(A∩Bi)
p(B)
p(Bi)
p(Bi)
=
∑
i
p(Bi)
p(B)
p(A∩Bi)
p(Bi)
=
∑
i
p(Bi)
p(B)
Pp(A|Bi) (2.26)
2.8. See [Cassinelli & Zanghí, 1984].
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Thus we can reformulate theorem 2.3 in the following way:
Theorem 2.4. Additivity with Respect to Conditioning Events. Let 〈S, F(S),
p〉 be a classical probability space, B an element of F(S) such that p(B)  0 and {Bi}
a countable disjoint set of elements of F(S) such that B = ∪i Bi. Let m be a probability
measure such that for each Bi and A, an element of F(S), m(A) is the convex combination
of the conditional measures Pp( · |Bi), i.e.
m(A)=
∑
i
p(Bi)
p(B)
Pp(A|Bi) (2.27)
Then m is the conditional probability with respect to B, i.e.
m(A)=P(A|B)=
∑
i
p(Bi)
p(B)
Pp(A|Bi) (2.28)
Hence, in addition to the characterization of conditional probability provided by theorem
2.1, conditional probability can also be characterized by its being additive with respect to
conditioning events.
Note that additivity with respect to conditioning events is another way of stating the so-
called theorem of compound probabilities or law of total probability, namely, for a partition
{Bi} of B – Bi disjoint and ∑ Bi= I – the total probability of A is given by
p(A)=
∑
Pp(A|Bi)p(Bi) (2.29)
Indeed from (2.28) it follows that
Pp(A|
∑
Bi) p(B)=
∑
p(Bi)Pp(A|Bi) (2.30)
And given that
∑
Bi= I and p(B)= 1, (2.30) reduces to (2.29).
To anticipate, the situation will not be analogous in the quantum case. In effect, unlike
the classical case, there is not a unique probability measure on the quantum event structure
which coincides with the quantum analogue of Pp( · |B) for each Bi. And quantum condi-
tioning, when conditioning is taken over a set of quantum events that mutually exclude each
other, does not in general return a classical convex mixture over the components in the sum.
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Chapter 3
Quantum Probability Theory
By quantum mechanics we will refer to the Hilbert space formalism, including the
dynamical rule for the quantum state given by the Schrödinger equation, Born’s rule
for calculating probabilities, and the association of physical magnitudes with Hermitian
operators. These elements seem to be the core of the (non relativistic) theory. There
are many mathematical formulations of quantum mechanics: the standard formulation
in terms of Hilbert spaces and operators, Feynman path integrals, axiomatic and algeb-
raic approaches, C∗ algebra formalism, etc. In addition, the quantum mechanical formalism
can be expressed as a theory of probability, an approach which is traditional and goes
back at least to [von Neumann, 1932].3.1 In this chapter we present the formalism of
quantum probability theory in detail. This approach is useful in general to study the
mathematical structure of quantum theory. For us the motivation is straightforward: it
is the natural framework in which to consider whether it is possible (and, if so how)
to define a quantum notion of conditional probability.
The probability theory underlying quantum mechanics is phrased in terms of operators
on a Hilbert space. In general these operators do not commute and hence quantum prob-
ability is sometimes called a non-commutative probability theory. This non-commutativity
is the main difference between the classical and quantum probability theories and has
far-reaching consequences. At the formal level, this claim is uncontroversial: quantum
mechanics simply uses a method for calculating probabilities which is different from that of
classical probability theory. However, whether this also implies that the interpretation of
quantum probability is fundamentally different from classical probability requires further
investigation. We do this in chapters 5 to 8. In the present chapter we simply lay out the
basic formalism of quantum probability theory.
Traditionally a theory of probability distinguishes between the set of possible events
(called the algebra of events, or the set of possible outcomes) and the probability measure
defined on them. In section 3.1, we consider the mathematical entities which represent
3.1. More modern formulations can be found, for example, in the following books: [Mackey, 1963], [Bub, 1974],
[Gudder, 1979], [Beltrametti & Cassinelli, 1981], [Varadarajan, 1985], [Gudder, 1988], and [Pitowsky, 1989].
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quantum events and their algebraic structure, and, in section 3.2, the probability functions
which can be defined over this structure. Then, in section 3.3, we consider the standard
semantic rule for ascribing values in quantum mechanics, namely the eigenstate-eigenvalue
link, a term coined by Arthur Fine.3.2 Finally, in section 3.4, we present the connection
between the non-commutativity of the quantum mechanical operators and the joint prob-
ability distributions ascribed to these.
3.1 Quantum Events and their Structure
Standard presentations of quantum mechanics go as follows. Each physical system is asso-
ciated with a Hilbert space H. A Hilbert space is a vector space on which an inner product
has been defined and which is complete.3.3 This stands in striking contrast to the classical
case in which a physical system is not associated with a vector space but with a real space.
Observables are also not represented by real-valued functions on a real space as for a
classical system but by Hermitian operators acting on the Hilbert space associated with a
system.3.4 The possible values of the observable are given by the spectrum of the operator
which represents it.
For operators with a discrete spectrum, the possible values of the corresponding observ-
able are restricted to a discrete set of eigenvalues. An observable A will take a certain value
ai, where ai is a discrete eigenvalue of the operator A, for a system whose state lies in the
eigenspace Lai
A associated with the eigenvalue ai; the quantum event ‘A takes the value ai’
is thus represented by the subspace Lai
A of the relevant Hilbert space. For general operators
that do not admit eigenvectors and have a continuous spectrum, to each Borel set b on
R there corresponds a closed subspace LA(b) of H such that the value of A is within b;
the quantum event ‘A takes the value b’ is thus represented by the subspace LA(b) of the
relevant Hilbert space.3.5 Hence, in quantum theory events are not represented by subsets
of the real phase space as for a classical system, but by closed subspaces of a Hilbert space.
3.2. See for example, [Fine, 1970].
3.3. V is a vector space if for any vectors u, v ∈V and λ1, λ2∈C, λ1u+λ2 v ∈V . A vector space is complete if
any converging sequence of vectors in the space converges to a vector in the vector space.
3.4. An operator A on H is said to be linear if ∀ψ, ϕ1, ϕ2∈H, λ∈C, 〈ψ,Aλ ( ϕ1+ ϕ2)〉=λ 〈 ψ,Aϕ1〉+λ 〈 ψ,
A ϕ2〉, where 〈 , 〉 represents the inner product in H. A linear operator A on H is said to be a Hermitian operator
if ∀ψ, ϕ∈H, 〈ψ,Aϕ〉= 〈Aψ, ϕ〉.
3.5. The identification between quantum events and subspaces of a Hilbert space assumes the so-called eigen-
state-eigenvalue link, which we present in detail in section 3.3 after defining quantum states in section 3.2.
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There is a natural one-to-one correspondence between the set of orthogonal projection
operators PA of H and the set of closed subspaces LA of H.3.6 Projection operators have
the property of ‘projecting onto a subspace’: given a subspace L, we can decompose any
vector ψ of H into two parts, ψ= ψL+ ψL⊥, such that ψL lies in L and ψL⊥ is orthogonal
to ψL, and the projection operator P over subspace L is then defined by its action over the
arbitrary vector ψ as P ψ = ψL. Given the bijection between the set of closed subspaces
and the set of orthogonal projection operators, we can use projectors and closed subspaces
interchangeably and represent the event that the observable A has a value ai [in the set b],
i.e. (A, ai) [(A,b)], both as the closed subspace Lai
A [LA(b)] or as the projection operator
Pai
A [PA(b)].
The usual operations of (1) set-containment A ⊆ B, (2) set-union A ∪ B, (3) set-
intersection A ∩B, and (4) set-complementation Ac in S have their natural counterparts
for subspaces and projectors. In subspace language these are (1)M ⊆N , (2) spanM ∪N =
M ⊕N – where span means the closed span, (3) M ∩N , and (4) orthogonal complement
M⊥. And, in projection language, (1) P 6Q (so that PQ=QP =P ), (2) the orthogonal
projection onto the closed subspace spanned by the ranges of P and Q, i.e. P ∨Q , (3) the
orthogonal projection onto the intersection of the ranges of P and Q, i.e. P ∧Q, and (4)
the orthogonal projection onto the complement of the closed subspace spanned by the range
of P , i.e. P⊥= I −P , where I is the identity operator on H. If P and Q are orthogonal,
then P ∧Q=P Q and P ∨Q=P +Q.
With these operations, the algebraic structure of the set of quantum events is not a
Boolean algebra; rather is a complete orthocomplemented lattice.3.7 We denote the set of
orthogonal projections of H as L(H); L(H) is thus the set of possible quantum mechanical
events. For our present purposes it suffices to note that in L(H) the distributive property
does not hold. This can easily be seen in the following example.
Example 3.1. Non-Distributivity. Consider a spin-1 particle. The system’s associated
space is a three-dimensional Hilbert space, for which one complete orthonormal basis is
given by the set of unit vectors {ψz−1, ψz0, ψz+1}, corresponding to the eigenvalues {− 1,0,
1} of the spin observable in the z-direction Sz. Each of these vectors spans a subspace of
the Hilbert space H {Lsz−1, Lsz0, Lsz+1}, with its corresponding projector operator {Psz−1,
Psz0, Psz+1}. Consider a nontrivial linear combination ψa of ψz−1 and ψz0 and denote by
La the subspace spanned by ψa, so that La⊆Lsz−1⊕Lsz0.
3.6. A linear operator P onH is said to be a projection operator if P is Hermitian and Idempotent, i.e. P 2=P .
3.7. For a detailed account see, for example, [Beltrametti & Cassinelli, 1981], [Hughes, 1989].
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Figure 3.1. Non-distributive quantum event structure.
For the lattice of projectors {Psz−1, Psz0, Psz+1} to be Boolean the condition of dis-
tributivity must hold, i.e.
Pa∧ (Psz−1∨Psz0)= (Pa∧Psz−1)∨ (Pa∧Psz0) (3.1)
(or equivalently, La∩ (Lsz−1⊕Lsz0)= (La∩Lsz−1)⊕ (La∩Lsz0)). However, while the left-
hand side of the equation is
Pa∧ (Psz−1∨Psz0)=Pa (3.2)
the right-hand side is
(Pa∧Psz−1)∨ (Pa∧Psz0)= 0 (3.3)
And thus equality (3.1) is violated.
It is important to note that although the algebra L(H) as a whole is not Boolean, it
does contain Boolean sub-lattices: each observable considered separately can be identified
with a Boolean algebra and so can every set of compatible observables. (We call two
physical quantities compatible when they are represented by commuting operators; and
two Hermitian operators A,B in H are said to commute whenever AB=BA.3.8) Indeed,
for P and Q projection operators on the Hilbert space H, P and Q commute if and only
if the sublattice of L(H) generated by P , Q, P⊥ and Q⊥ is Boolean.
To sum up, in quantum probability theory the measurable space 〈S,F(S)〉 of classical
probability theory is replaced with the pair 〈H,L(H)〉.
3.2 Quantum Probability
Quantum theory can be essentially regarded as a theory of probability defined over the
projection lattice L(H). This probability measure is a map p( · ) from the projection
operators into the real numbers in the closed interval [0,1] which is normalized and additive
for orthogonal projection operators.
3.8. Note also that only if two physical quantities are compatible is their ‘product’ a physical quantity: indeed,
the product of two Hermitian operators A,B is Hermitian if and only if AB=BA.
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Definition 3.1. Quantum Probability. A real function p( · ) defined from the lattice
L(H) of projection operators on a Hilbert space H is a quantum probability measure if
i. (Non-negativity) p(P )> 0 for all P ∈L(H).
ii. (Normalization) p(PI)= 1, where I stands for the identity operator on H
iii. (Additivity) for every countable set of mutually orthogonal projection operators {Pi}
in L(H),
p(
∑
i
Pi)=
∑
i
p(Pi), (forPi Pj=0 if i j) (3.4)
Unit vectors ψ on H and, more generally, density operatorsW on H, define all the possible
quantum probability measures. Indeed, if ψ is a unit vector in H and P a projection
operator of L(H), the function defined by the inner product
pψ(P )= 〈ψ, Pψ〉 (3.5)
defines a probability function on L(H), where additivity holds given the additivity property
of the inner product.3.9 And any given density operator W defines a probability function
pW on L(H) by
pW(P )=Tr(WP ) (3.6)
for P ∈L(H). A density operator W on H is a positive trace-class operator – an operator
such that its trace is positive for all ψ ∈ H – of trace one, where the trace of a positive
operator is defined as the quantity
TrA=
∑
i
〈ψi, Aψi〉 (3.7)
for an orthonormal basis {ψi} of H. (Note that this quantity is independent of the basis
{ψi}.)
The probability measures pW defined by density operators correspond to classical stat-
istical mixtures of the probability measures pψ defined by vectors. Indeed, any density
operator can be expressible as a weighted sum of orthogonal projection operators Pi, i.e.
W =
∑
i
ai Pi where ai> 0 and
∑
i
ai= 1, so that expression (3.6) can be written as the
weighted sum of the traces Tr(PiP ), where Tr(PiP )= 〈ψi, Pψi〉, for an orthonormal basis
{ψj} of H such that Piψj= δijψj.3.10
3.9. Indeed, pψ(
∑
Pi)= 〈ψ,
∑
i
Piψ〉=
∑
i
〈ψ,Piψ〉=
∑
i
pψ(Pi).
3.10. In detail, Tr(Pi P ) =Tr(P Pi) =
∑
j
〈ψj, P Pi ψj〉, with {ψj} any orthonormal basis of H. And we can
choose {ψj} such that Piψj= δijψj so that
∑
j
〈ψj , P Piψj〉= 〈ψi, P ψi〉= pψi(P ).
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In contrast to classical mechanics in which the state of a system is determined by its
position and momentum, in quantum theory the physical state of a system is given by a
probability function on L(H). If ψ is a unit vector of H, we call the probability function
pψ(P )= 〈ψ,Pψ〉, where P ∈L(H), a pure state. If W is a density operator in H, we call
the probability function pW(P ) =Tr(WP ), where P ∈L(H), a mixed state.3.11 Quantum
states can thus be represented in full generality by density operators W on L(H).
Remarkably, the converse of this results holds as well. [Gleason, 1957] proved that if the
dimension of H is equal or greater than 3, the probability measures on L(H) representable
by density operators on H exhaust the set of all probability measures on L(H), where each
probability measure corresponds uniquely to a density operator.3.12
Theorem 3.1. Gleason’s Theorem. If the dimension of H is no less than 3, then every
probability measure p on L(H) arises from a density operatorW in H, according to the rule
pW(P )=Tr(WP ) (3.8)
for every projection operator P ∈L(H).
Gleason’s theorem thus characterizes the set of all possible states on set L(H) of sub-
spaces of H: it contains just those states which are representable by density operators
on H. Hence once one assumes the algebraic structure of the set of quantum events is
L(H), Gleason’s theorem dictates the probabilistic structure. An important consequence of
Gleason’s theorem is that it rules out all discontinuous measures over L(H) when dim(H)>
3. This is because for any given density operator W the map P→Tr(WP ) is continuous
on the unit sphere of H. Thus, non-trivial probability measures having only the values 0
and 1 are not admitted. This is one way of putting the no-go results of the Bell-Kochen-
Specker theorem.3.13
There is a simplified version of Gleason’s theorem for the case in which the density
operator is a one-dimensional projection operator. It is a considerably weaker form of
Gleason’s theorem but requires a less sophisticated proof.3.14 Following [Malley, 1998,
2004], we refer to it as ‘micro-Gleason’.
3.11. In effect, a mixed state is a function p: H→ [0,1] of the form p=∑
i
λi pψi, where ψi are unit vectors, and
λi>0,
∑
λi=1. Mixed states correspond to the fact that convex combinations of probability measures are again
probability measures. One can show that the ψi can always be chosen to be orthogonal and that the mixed state
p=
∑
i
λipψi can always be represented by the density operatorW =
∑
i
λiPi, where Pi is the orthogonal projection
onto the span of ψi.
3.12. [Gleason, 1957]. See also [Beltrametti & Cassinelli, 1981], p.115.
3.13. See [Beltrametti & Cassinelli, 1981] p.267ff.
3.14. [Gudder, 1979], p.129 corollary 5.17.
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Theorem 3.2. Micro-Gleason’s Theorem. Let dim H > 3 and let p be a probability
measure on the lattice of projectors L(H) which assigns probability one to any one-dimen-
sional projector Pψ, i.e. p(Pψ)= 1, where ‖ψ‖=1. Then p must be such that
pψ(P )=Tr(PψP )= 〈ψ,Pψ〉 (3.9)
for all projectors P ∈L(H).
It is instructive to see why equality (3.9) holds. Given Tr(PψP )=Tr(PPψ ) and
∑
j
〈φj ,
φj〉=1, we have
Tr(PPψ)=
∑
j
〈φj , P Pψφj〉=
∑
j
〈φj , P ψ〉 〈ψ , φj〉= 〈ψ,P ψ〉
∑
j
〈φj , φj〉 (3.10)
and thus Tr(PψP )= 〈ψ,Pψ〉.
To sum up, we may identify quantum probability theory with the quantum probability
space (H,L(H),W ), which is defined as follows:
Definition 3.2. Quantum Probability Space. A quantum probability space consists of
a triple 〈H,L(H),W 〉 where
i. H is a closed complex Hilbert space.
ii. L(H) is the set of projection operators on H. These projectors represent quantum
events.
iii. W are the density operators which generate all the possible probability functions
according to the rule pW(P )=Tr(WP ), for every projection operator P ∈L(H).
3.3 Eigenstate-Eigenvalue Link
Recall that in section 3.1 we identified the quantum event ‘observable A takes the value
ai’, with the projection operator Pai by saying that ‘A will take the value ai for all systems
whose state lies in the eigenspace Lai associated with the eigenvalue ai’. This identification
rests upon an assumption that has come to be known as the eigenvalue-eigenstate link , (or
e-e link in short). This link is the standard rule for ascribing values in quantum mechanics,
although many interpretations of quantum mechanics actually deny it.
3.3 Eigenstate-Eigenvalue Link 39
The e-e link states that an observable A has a well-defined value for a quantum system
in state ψ if and only if ψ is an eigenstate of A, that is, Aψ= aiψ, in which case ai is the
value of A in state ψ. It can be analyzed as the conjunction of two rules which correspond
to the ‘if’ and ‘only if’ part:
1. Rule of Law. The eigenstate to eigenvalue rule says that if ψ is an eigenstate of
A with eigenvalue ai, then the system, whose state is ψ, has the value ai for the
observable A. Fine calls this the ‘Rule of Law’: if for some eigenvalue ai of the
operator A, the state ψ of a system is an eigenstate of A, then the ‘law’ requires
that we attribute the value ai to the system.
2. Rule of Silence. The eigenvalue to eigenstate rule says that if the system, whose
state is ψ, has the value ai for the observable A, then ψ is an eigenstate of A with
eigenvalue ai. Fine, considering the contrapositive formulation of this rule, refers
to it as the ‘Rule of Silence’: if there is no eigenvalue ai of A such that ψ is an
eigenstate of A, then we must be silent about saying that the system has the value
ai for the observable A.
Note that when we identify the quantum event ‘observable A takes the value ai’ with Pai
by saying that ‘A will take the value ai for all systems whose state lies in the eigenspace
Lai’ we are using the eigenstate to eigenvalue rule (or the rule of law). And that when we
only allow eigenstates to take determinate values, we employ the eigenvalue to eigenstate
rule (or the rule of silence)
A more general way to formulate the e-e link is as follows.3.15
Definition 3.3. Eigenstate-Eigenvalue Link
1. Eigenstate to eigenvalue link: if pW(Pai) = 1, then the system, whose state is W,
takes value ai for observable A.
2. Eigenvalue to eigenstate link: if the system, whose state is W, takes value ai for
observable A, then W is such that pW(Pai)= 1.
3.4 Joint Probability Distributions
As (3.6) prescribes, the probability that observable A takes a value in the Borel set b is
given by the function Tr(WPA(b)). Thus in quantum probability theory observables play
the role of random variables and the projection operators PA(b) correspond to events. By
analogy with classical probability theory, we call the probability measure b→Tr(WPA(b))
the distribution of the observable A in the state W .
3.15. [Dickson, 1998], pp.18-19.
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Definition 3.4. Quantum Probability Distribution. The probability measure
b→Tr(WPA(b)) (3.11)
is the probability distribution of observable A in state W.
In classical probability theory the joint distribution for random variables f , g is defined
by (2.3) as the probability measure pf ,g on B(R2) satisfying pf ,g(a × b) = p[f−1(a) ∩
g−1(b)] for all a,b∈B(R). In an analogue way, one could try to define a joint probability
distribution for two self-adjoint operators A, B and a system in state W as the function
pW ;A,B on the subsets of R2 of the form a×b, with a,b∈B(R), such that
pW ;A,B(a×b)=Tr[WPA(a)PB(b)] (3.12)
However, it is not possible to define a joint probability distribution in this way when dealing
with non-commuting observables because (3.12) may not be a real number. Only when A
and B commute does there exist a third observable C and two Borel functions f , g such
that A= f(C) and B= g(C) 3.16 and hence pW ;A,B takes the form
pW ;A,B(a×b)=Tr[WPC(f−1(a)∩ g−1(b)] (3.13)
analogous to the classical joint distribution. In this way commuting observables act like
random variables and their stochastic properties can be found using classical probability
theory.
A better way of defining a joint distribution of two observables in the quantum setting
is by taking the lead from a fact we pointed out in section 2.1, namely that even if pf , pg
do not determine pf ,g, the distributions of x1 f +x2 g for all x1, x2∈R do determine pf ,g
as the unique measure on B(R2) which satisfies pf ,g{(y1, y2):x1 y1+x2 y2∈a}= p{w∈S:
x1 f(w) + x2 g(w) ∈ a} for every a ∈ B(R), x ∈ R2. Motivated by this fact, we give the
following definition of a joint probability distribution over L(H).
Definition 3.5. Quantum Joint Probability Distribution. Let A1 and A2 be observ-
ables such that xA= x1A1+ x2A2 are self-adjoint for every x=(x1, x2)∈R2. A1 and A2
have a joint distribution in state W if there exists a measure pA1,A2 on B(R
2) such that
for every a∈B(R2)
pA1,A2{y ∈R2:x y ∈a}=Tr(WP xA(a)) (3.14)
There have been other proposals for definitions of joint distributions in the quantum
mechanics literature 3.17 but we will henceforth only consider that given by (3.14).
3.16. [von Neumann, 1955].
3.17. [Gudder, 1968], [Margenau, 1963a], [Urbanik, 1961], [Varadarajan, 1962].
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3.4.1 Joint Distributions and Commutativity
The joint distribution of two observables A1, A2 as defined by (3.14) need not always exist.
In fact, while it always exists for compatible observables and agrees with that defined
by (3.13), it does not generally exist for incompatible observables. However, the relation
between the non-existence of the joint distribution of two observables and their incom-
patibility is subtle and depends critically on the fact that a joint distribution is defined in
terms of a particular state W . In this section we present the connection in detail.
We begin with a result which was first established by [Nelson, 1967] (pp.117-119) and
then reproved by [Gudder, 1979] (pp.18-19). It establishes that a pair of observables may
be treated as random variables if and only if they commute.
Theorem 3.3. Nelson-Gudder. Let A1, A2 be self-adjoint operators on a Hilbert space
H. Then A1, A2 commute if and only if they have a joint distribution in every state.
It is critical for the above bi-conditional to hold that it applies to every state rather
than to a particular state. In effect, it is not the case that if A1,A2 have a joint distribution
in a particular state W , then A1, A2 commute. Or contra-positively, it is false that if A1,
A2 do not commute, then necessarily their joint distribution in state W does not exist. To
emphasize, whereas if the joint distribution of two observables in a particular stateW does
not exist, then the observables do not commute, it is not true that if two observables do
not commute that their joint probability distribution does not exist for anyW . In symbols,
where joint distribution is abbreviated as j.d.,
A1, A2 commute :⇒ there exists j.d. of A1, A2 in stateW (3.15)
or contra-positively:
there does not exist j.d. of A1, A2 in stateW :⇒ A1, A2donot commute (3.16)
There have been several recent attempts in the literature to achieve a result that, while
remaining valid, is as ‘close’ as possible to the invalid implications given in (3.15) and
(3.16). The conditions for these results were originally formulated in terms of conditions for
hidden variable models of quantum mechanics. However, they can be easily reformulated in
terms of joint probability distributions since, as [Fine, 1982a, 1982b] proves in detail, ‘the
idea of deterministic hidden variables is just the idea of a suitable joint probability func-
tion.’ We here present a brief overview of them in terms of joint probability distributions.
James Malley proves the following result.3.18
Theorem 3.4. Malley 2004. If all observables have joint distributions in every state,
then all observables must commute.
3.18. [Malley, 2004], p. 5, Theorem 2 and its proof on pp. 6-7, [Malley & Fine, 2005].
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which is a generalization of theorem 3.3. Malley and Fine further proved the following
stronger result.3.19
Theorem 3.5. Malley & Fine 2005. If a given set of observables do not commute in
a particular state, then not all observables have joint distributions in that state.
In effect, it might be the case that if A1, A2 do not commute, their joint distribution
does exist in a particular ψ.
In 2006 Malley then showed that any attempt to augment with joint probabilities for
pairs of incompatible observables leads to contradictions. In more detail, he proved that
the existence of a joint distribution for all observables imply that the space of projectors
collapses to a single one-dimensional projector. That is, if one insists on defining joint dis-
tributions for all observables, then there can at most be a single one-dimensional projector
acting on the Hilbert space H.
Finally, [Malley & Fletcher, 2008], in a still unpublished article, have proved an even
stronger result.3.20 Suppose a given projector pair {P ,Q} with a joint distribution in state
W (note that the projectors need not be orthogonal for this to be the case). Call the pair
ortho-consistent if p(P = 1, Q = 1) = 0. That is, the probability for their simultaneous
occurrence is zero, but one can still ascribe them a properly defined joint distribution.
(Note that every orthogonal pair of projectors is necessarily ortho-consistent.) Then, we
have the following result:
Theorem 3.6. Malley & Fletcher 2008. Suppose an arbitrary nonorthogonal projector
pair {P ,Q} has a properly defined joint distribution in stateW. Then there exists a finitely
constructible set of projectors S= {P , Q,R, .., Z} such that
1. there exists at least one joint distribution for S that is consistent with that for
{P , Q};
2. given any joint distribution on S, consistent with that for {P , Q}, there exists at
least one orthogonal pair in S that fails to be ortho-consistent.
Given that the second result contradicts quantum mechanics – an orthogonal pair of pro-
jectors is necessarily ortho-consistent – one can conclude that even in those cases in which
a non-commuting projector pair {P ,Q} can be ascribed a joint distribution in a particular
W , this ascription will always result in a contradiction with the quantum mechanical
probabilistic ascriptions for a finitely constructible set of projectors S = {P , Q, R, .. , Z}
to which they belong. And this certainly draws us very close to the desired result, namely
if P and Q do not commute then their joint distribution does not exist for any W .
3.19. [Malley & Fine, 2005], p.53, Theorem 1.
3.20. I here follow Arthur Fine’s reformulation of their result.
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Hence, the requirement that each pair of statistical variables in quantum theory have
a joint distribution in every state is at variance with the most fundamental and distinctive
feature of quantum theory: the use of non-commuting observables. It is not simply that
joint distributions happen to be undefined; rather the fact that some joints are undefined
points to the essential feature of the theory: without this feature, quantum theory would
simply reduce to a classical probability theory.
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Chapter 4
Quantum Conditional Probability
We have just seen that, because of its non-commutative structure, quantum mechanics
does not assign joint probabilities to all pairs of quantum events; and that, moreover, the
fact that some joints are undefined points to the essential feature of quantum theory. We
also saw in Chapter 2 how the notion of conditional probability is standardly analyzed as
the pro rata increase of a joint probability distribution. Hence, the question arises as to
whether and, if so how, an appropriate notion of conditional probability can be introduced
in quantum mechanics.
A long-standing literature claims that the answer to both questions is ‘yes’; that it is in
fact possible to define an appropriate extension of conditional probability with respect to
an event in quantum mechanics, and that it is given by the probability defined by the so-
called Lüders rule. This rule states that for all projectors P and Q of L(H), the probability
of the quantum event represented by projector P conditional on the event represented by
projector Q is given by
PW(P |Q)= Tr(QWQP )Tr(QWQ) (4.1)
In the context of quantum probability theory this rule satisfies the formal condition of
specifying the only probability measure on the state space that reduces to a pro rata
conditional probability for compatible events. Moreover, this formal condition is analogous
to the existence and uniqueness property of classical conditional probability captured by
theorem 2.1. Thus, several authors have argued for interpreting the Lüders rule as defining
the appropriate notion of conditional probability in quantum mechanics.
Explicit arguments for this view are found in [Bub, 1979] and in [Cassinelli & Truni,
1979], which have then been expounded in [Cassinelli & Zanghí, 1983, 1984], [Bub, 1979a,
1979b] and [Beltrametti & Cassinelli, 1981]. Modern textbooks in the Philosophy of
Quantum Mechanics presenting this view are, among others, [Hughes, 1989] and [Dickson,
1998].4.1 These authors claim that
4.1. In addition, in his 1979 book Gudder presents it as the standard view for ‘quantum conditional expectation’
with references that go back to at least to 1954 with H. Umegaki’s paper ‘Conditional Expectations on an Operator
Algebra I’ Tohoku Mathematics Journal 6, pp. 177-181.
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‘[The Lüders rule] acquires a precise meaning, in the sense of conditional
probabilities, when quantum mechanics is interpreted as a generalized prob-
ability space’ ([Cassinelli & Zanghí, 1983], p.245).
‘I want to suggest that the Lüders rule is to be understood as the quantum
mechanical rule for conditionalizing an initial probability assignment [...]
with respect to an element in the non-Boolean possibility structure of the
theory’ ([Bub, 1979b], p.218)
Hence, in their view, the probabilities dictated by the Lüders rule are to be properly
interpreted as the quantum conditional probabilities. Busch and Lahti in the ‘Compendium
of Quantum Physics’ state:
‘The Lüders rule is directly related to the notion of conditional prob-
ability in quantum mechanics, conditioning with respect to a single event.’
([Busch & Lahti, 2009], p.1)4.2
Another argument is also standardly invoked in favour of this same conclusion. Recall
that classical conditional probability, in addition to being characterized by the existence
and uniqueness theorem 2.1, is also characterized by being additive with respect to con-
ditioning events (as theorem 2.4 shows). It turns out that the probability defined by the
Lüders rule lacks this additive property and it is precisely because of this that the Lüders
rule can account for the specifically quantum interference effects. In effect, when quantum
conditioning is taken over a set of quantum events that mutually exclude each other, the
probability defined by the Lüders rule yields the interference of probabilities that is typical
of some quantum situations, as for example in the two-slit experiment we considered in
the introduction. Thus, Bub writes:
‘The natural generalization of the classical conditionalization rule
appropriate to non-Boolean possibility structure is the Lüders rule. Thus,
the ‘paradox’ involved in the two-slit experiment is resolved by showing
precisely how the assumption of a non-Boolean possibility structure explains
the existence of the ‘anomalous’ interference effects’ ([Bub, 1979b], p.224).
In this chapter we present in detail the arguments in favour of interpreting the probab-
ilities defined by the Lüders rule as conditional probabilities. We begin in sections 4.1 and
4.2 by motivating the need for an extended or generalized notion of conditional probability
in quantum mechanics; to do so we consider the difficulties that arise when one attempts
to define conditional probability by ratio or by a quantum analogue of ratio within the
structure of quantum theory. In section 4.3 we present the argument for the conditional
4.2. The page numbering refers to the paper on the web; the book in which it appears is still unpublished.
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interpretation of the probabilities defined by the Lüders rule based on its uniqueness and
existence characterization. Then, in section 4.4, we show how these probabilities fail to
be additive with respect to conditioning events and why this is taken to support their
conditional interpretation.
4.1 No Ratio Analysis in Quantum Theory
We saw in chapter 3 that, because of its non-commutative structure, quantum mechanics
does not assign joint probabilities to all pairs of quantum events; it does so for commuting
pairs, but not necessarily for non-commuting ones. We also saw that the requirement that
each pair of statistical variables in quantum theory have a joint distribution in every state
is at variance with the most fundamental and distinctive feature of quantum theory: the
use of non-commuting observables. Hence, the ratio analysis of conditional probability is
wildly at odds with the most fundamental and distinctive aspects of quantum theory.
What are the implications of this failure of the ratio analysis to provide an analysis of
conditional probability in quantum theory? Two different perspectives seem available. On
the one hand, one can hold, as we mentioned in section 2.3.3 (and developed in appendix
B), that the ratio formula is not a definition of conditional probability but an analysis of
the notion and that, moreover, it is only a partially successful analysis. Hence the failure
of ratio in quantum theory could be seen as a defect of the analysis itself. One could then
consider whether a modified version or a different analysis might adequately capture the
quantum notion of conditional probability.
On the other hand, one might argue that, regardless of ratio being a definition or an
analysis of conditional probability, to demand that the same definitions or analyses of
classical notions hold in quantum theory is utterly unreasonable – after all, if this were the
case, quantum probability theory and, hence, quantum mechanics, would not present any
novelties with respect to classical theory! And that hence, the failure of ratio in quantum
theory has no implications for a quantum notion of conditional probability. One could then
consider whether such a notion does in fact exist. A notion which, while being different in
some aspects from its classical counterpart, is sufficiently similar to it to justify calling it
an extension or a generalization of the latter.
Although both perspectives are logically possible, we focus on the latter one since
we bracket the arguments against the adequacy of the ratio formula as an analysis of
conditional probability. Moreover, as we will soon see, the characterizations of conditional
probability given in section 2.5 – in which conditional probability was defined in accordance
to the ratio analysis – will be important in evaluating whether there is a quantum notion
of conditional probability. So let us see whether such a notion exists.
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4.2 A Quantum Analogue of Ratio?
At first sight one might be tempted to define the conditional probability function in a
quantum probability space 〈H,L(H),W 〉 in strict analogy with the classical case as
PpW(P |Q)≡ pW(P ∧Q)pW(Q) (4.2)
for all projection operators P , Q∈L(H) and pW(P ) =Tr(WP ). For, just as the classical
probability of an event A conditional on another event B is given by their joint probability
– the probability of their intersection A∩B – divided by the probability of B, the quantum
probability of a quantum event P conditional on another quantum event Q should be given
by the probability of the event P ∧Q – the orthogonal projection onto the intersection of
the ranges of P and Q – divided by the probability of Q. In this way, one would circumvent
the difficulty with the non-existence of joint probability distributions – pW(P ∧ Q) is
defined for all projectors in L(H) – and hope to capture the core features of conditional
probability.
However, the function defined by (4.2) is not a probability measure on L(H). This
is easily seen by noticing that it is not an additive function as definition 3.1 requires.
Indeed, for every countable set of mutually orthogonal projection operators {Pi} in L(H),
additivity requires that
p(
∑
i
Pi)=
∑
i
p(Pi) (Pi Pj=0 if i j) (4.3)
But for two orthogonal projectors P1 and P2, PpW as defined by (4.2) is not in general
additive; that is,
PpW(P1+P2|Q) PpW(P1|Q)+PpW(P2|Q) (4.4)
(Note, however, that since P1 and P2 are orthogonal, this poses no problem for their
unconditional probability; that is p(P1 ∨ P2) = p(P1+ P2).) This failure of additivity can
be easily seen in the following case. Let ϕ1 and ϕ2 be two orthogonal vectors in H, and ψ
an element of the subspace spanned by ϕ1 and ϕ2. Then,
(Pϕ1+Pϕ2)∧Pψ=Pψ (4.5)
Pϕi∧Pψ=0, for i=1, 2 (4.6)
So that,
PpW [(Pϕ1+Pϕ2)|Pψ]≡
pW [(Pϕ1+Pϕ2)∧Pψ]
pW(Pψ)
=
pW(Pψ)
pW(Pψ)
= 1 (4.7)
PpW(Pϕi|Pψ)≡
pW(Pϕi∧Pψ)
pW(Pψ)
= 0 (4.8)
But then,
PpW(Pϕ1+Pϕ2|Pψ) PpW(Pϕ1|Pψ)+PpW(Pϕ2|Pψ) (4.9)
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And additivity fails.
As we pointed out in section 2.1, additivity is the critical feature of a probability
function. In effect, for an event that is made up of sub-events which have no overlap, the
probability of the event must be the sum of the probabilities of the components. End
of story: this is what characterizes a probability function. Moreover, this requirement
seems to be fully justified for a quantum probability function since it is defined only for
orthogonal events. The non-additivity problem arises because in (4.4) PW(P |Q), as defined
by equation (4.2), applies to a further event Q, which need not be orthogonal to P1 and P2.
And hence, the differences that exist between Boolean and non-Boolean event structures
arise. Recall that we showed in example 3.1 that L(H) is not distributive; this is precisely
what precludes the function defined by equation (4.2) from being a probability function.
Indeed, if Q is not orthogonal to two orthogonal events P1 and P2
(P1+P2)∧Q P1∧Q+P2∧Q (4.10)
and hence
pW [(P1+P2)∧Q] pW(P1∧Q)+ pW(P2∧Q) (4.11)
which then implies (4.9). In contrast, in a classical event structure,
(A1∪A2)∩B=(A1∩B)∪ (A2∩B) (4.12)
so that the conditional probability measure, as defined by the ratio p(A ∩ B)/p(B), is
additive.
4.3 The Lüders Rule
Hence, to define a conditional probability function in quantum theory, one needs, to begin
with, a function linking events P and Q in an additive way; it will then also have to link
them in a way which allows its interpretation precisely as a conditional probability. The
existence and uniqueness characterization of classical conditional probability (theorem 2.1)
provides the key for finding this function.
4.3.1 Existence and Uniqueness Theorem
Let us start then by defining a conditional function for projectors P 6 Q; since the sub-
lattice of projectors P 6Q, i.e. L(Q), is Boolean, this function will be defined analogously
to the classical one. Hence, define a new probability function mpW(P ) over the sub-lattice
L(Q) as
mpW(P )=
pW(P )
pW(Q)
, forP 6Q (4.13)
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The measure mpW(P ) is the probability of the event P conditional on the event Q. Note
that mpW( · ) is defined in terms of a more general probability measure pW(P ), which is
in turn defined over the whole set of quantum events L(H) as pW(P )=Tr(WP ). (This is
the only possibility as fixed by Gleason for dimH> 3.)
We now ask whether the function just defined can be extended to all L(H), that is,
whether this new probability measure can be defined over all projectors P which are not
included in Q. It just so happens that, as in the classical case, it can be extended. And,
in addition, also in a unique way.4.3 The following theorem is an existence and uniqueness
result analogue to theorem 2.1 (A proof of it is given in appendix C.)
Theorem 4.1. Existence and Uniqueness. Let Q be any projector in the lattice L(H) of
projectors of a Hilbert space H, dim(H)> 3. Let p( · ) be any probability measure on L(H),
with corresponding density operator W, such that pW(Q) 0. For any P in L(Q) define
mpW(P )=
pW(P )
pW(Q)
(4.14)
where pW(P )=Tr(WP ), as fixed by Gleason’s theorem. Then,
1. mpW( · ) is a probability measure on L(Q)
2. there is an extension PW( · |Q) of mpW( · ) to all L(H)
3. the extended probability PW( · |Q) is unique and, for all P in L(H), is given by the
density operator
WQ=
QWQ
Tr(QWQ)
(4.15)
so that
PW(P |Q)=Tr(WQP )= Tr(QWQP )Tr(QWQ) (4.16)
This expression is referred to as the Lüders rule.
This theorem tells us that if one begins with a probability measure p on the whole event
space (defined through the trace rule by a density operatorW ), and defines a new probab-
ility function mpW for an event P whose range is included in the range of another event Q
as the ratio of the probabilities of each event, then this restricted probability function can
be extended to apply to all quantum events (one makes no restriction on the projectors
to which it applies, in particular, one does not require that the range of projector P be
4.3. See [Beltrametti&Cassinelli, 1981], p.288, [Cassinelli & Zanghí, 1983], [Malley, 2004], pp.13-15.
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included in the range of projector Q), this extension is unique, and it is given by the Lüders
rule.
The uniqueness here derives from the uniqueness built into the trace-density operator
rule of Gleason’s theorem, and would apply to any probability measure on L(Q), not just
the conditional one. Also note that the result depends on the use of Gleason’s theorem
to extract a density operator from the unrestricted probability measure with which we
start. That is, points 2. and 3. depend critically on the initial measure pW( · ) defined
on all projectors of L(H). This is how we get to use Gleason’s theorem: not only to
achieve uniqueness but also to define an extension to all L(H) via the density operator W
that Gleason’s theorem associates with the new probability measure PW( · |Q), namely
WQ=
QWQ
Tr(QWQ)
. If pW , and hence W , were only defined in L(Q), then in some cases one
could not define a density operator on all L(H).4.4
Recall that this was not so in the classical case. Points 1. and 2. of theorem 2.2 on
the extendability of classical probability measures depend only on the probability measure
m( · ) restricted to F(B) (the extended probability measure p(C) = m(C ∩ B) simply
assigns C the probability that corresponds to that part of C which is contained in B,
and zero value to the remaining part.) However, given that points 2. and 3. of theorem
4.2 depend critically on the initial measure pW( · ) defined on the full space, the quantum
analogue of theorem 2.2 is false.
In addition, while in the classical case both the restricted conditional probability
mp(A) =
p(A)
p(B)
and the extended probability Pp(A|B) = p(A∩B)p(B) are defined as a ratio
of two unconditional probabilities, this is not so in the quantum case. The restricted
probability function mpW(P ) =
pW(P )
pW(Q)
is defined in perfect analogy to its classical coun-
terpart. However, the extended function PW(P |Q) = Tr(QWQP )Tr(QWQ) is defined directly in
terms of W since it cannot be defined as the ratio of two probabilities pW . Indeed, when P
and Q do not commute the operator QWQ is not a density operator and hence the quantity
Tr(Q W Q P ) is not a probability. Rather, WQ =
QWQ
Tr(QWQ)
is the density operator that
generates the extended probability function PW(P |Q) through the trace rule Tr(WQP ).
Finally, note that contrary to the function pW (P ∧Q)
pW (Q)
considered in the previous section,
the function PW(P |Q) = Tr(QWQP )Tr(QWQ) is additive, and hence a probability function. In
effect, for P1 and P2 orthogonal projectors and Q ∈ L(H), by additivity of the trace, i.e.
Tr[QWQ (P1+P2)]=Tr(QWQP1)+Tr(QWQP2), we have
PW(P1+P2|Q)=PW(P1|Q)+PW(P2|Q) (4.17)
4.4. For example, a non-trivial probability measures having only the values 0 and 1 in H of dimensionality 2,
cannot be extended to a higher dimensionality space since Gleason’s theorem rules out all discontinuous measures
for dimH>3. Recall our discussion on Gleason’s theorem in section 3.2.
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4.3.2 Quantum Conditional Probability with Respect to an Event
The formal results of theorem 4.1 are standardly invoked to support an interpretation of the
Lüders rule as defining the appropriate notion of conditional probability on the quantum
event structure L(H). The reasoning given is as follows:
‘... as in the classical case, the Lüders rule gives the only probability
measure that, for events P 6Q, just involves a renormalization of the [initial]
generalized probability function [pW ] given by the operator W . This offers
strong grounds for regarding it as the appropriate conditionalization rule for
generalized probability functions on L(H)’ ([Hughes, 1989], p.224, notation
adapted).
Hence the claim is that the Lüders rule
‘is the appropriate rule for conditionalizing probabilities in the non-
Boolean possibility structure of quantum mechanics.’ ([Bub, 1977] p.381)
The proposal is thus that the probabilities defined by the Lüders rule define the notion
of conditional probability in quantum mechanics:
Definition 4.1. Quantum Conditional Probability with Respect to an Event. The
probability given by the Lüders rule for two quantum events P , Q∈L(H)
PW(P |Q)= Tr(QWQP )Tr(QWQ) (4.18)
is the probability of the event P conditional on event Q with respect to the probability
measure pW.
Grounds for thinking of the probabilities dictated by the Lüders rule as the natural
extension of classical conditional probabilities are also taken to appear from their behavior
in two special cases.4.5 Consider first the case when P and Q are compatible. Then the
Lüders rule straightforwardly defines classical conditional probabilities. Indeed if events
P and Q are compatible then the corresponding projection operators P and Q commute
so that PQ=QP =R, where R projects onto the intersection of the subspaces associated
with P and Q, i.e. LP ∩LQ. Inserting this into the Lüders rule, and using the invariance
of the cyclic permutations of the trace operation, we obtain:
PW(P |Q)= Tr(QWQP )Tr(QWQ) =
Tr(WR)
Tr(WQ)
=
p(R)
p(Q)
=
p(LP ∩LQ)
p(LQ)
(4.19)
which is the ratio analysis of classical conditional probability. Commutativity of the pro-
jection operators is thus a sufficient condition for the probability defined by the Lüders
rule to be equal to classical conditional probability as given by the ratio analysis.
4.5. [Hughes, 1989] pp. 224-225 explicitly points this out.
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It has also been claimed that commutativity is a necessary condition for the probability
defined by the Lüders rule to be equal to classical conditional probability.4.6 However, this
does not seem correct. Indeed, given that in some cases joint distributions exist for non-
commuting operators (see section 3.4), it seems possible to equate the probability defined
by the Lüders rule to the classical definition of conditional probability in those cases. And
in these cases, the function Tr(QWQP ) would turn out (presumably) to be equivalent to
the definition of quantum joint probability distribution as given by definition 3.5.
As a second case, or rather as a particular case of the previous one, consider a composite
system with two components 1 and 2; the states of the composite system will be represented
in the tensor-product space H1 ⊗ H2.4.7 Let P1 be a projector on H1 representing a
quantum event associated with system 1, P2 a projector on H2 representing a quantum
event associated with system 2, and W the density operator on H1⊗H2 that represents
the state of the composite system. Here P1 and P2 commute and the joint probability of
P1 and P2 is given by
p(P1, P2)=Tr[W (P1⊗P2)] (4.20)
and the probabilities of the individual events are given by
p(P1)=Tr[W (P1⊗ I2)] and p(P2)=Tr[W (I1⊗P2)] (4.21)
One can then show4.8 that the probabilities dictated by the Lüders rule behave exactly as
in the classical case:
PW(P1|P2)= pW(P1, P2)
pW(P2)
(4.22)
To finish this section, we consider the probability defined by the Lüders rule for a system
in a pure state represented by the vector ψ. We show how (4.18) reduces to
Pψ(P |Q)=
〈
Qψ
||Qψ‖ , P
Qψ
||Qψ‖
〉
(4.23)
where writing ψQ=
Qψ
‖Qψ‖ , we have
Pψ(P |Q)= pψQ(P )= 〈ψQ, P ψQ〉 (4.24)
Indeed, if the initial state of the system is in a pure state ψ, then (4.18) yields WQ =
QPψQ
Tr(QPψQ)
. Now, for any vector φ
(QPψQ) φ=QPψ (Qφ)=Qψ 〈ψ, Qφ〉=Qψ 〈Qψ, φ〉=PQψφ=PψQ′ φ (4.25)
with ψQ
′ =Qψ. In addition,
Tr(QPψQ)=Tr(PQψ)=
∑
j
〈φj, PQψφj〉= 〈Qψ, Qψ〉= ‖Qψ‖2= ‖ψQ′ ‖2 (4.26)
4.6. [Butterfield, 1987] p.219
4.7. For the quantum formalism for composite systems see, for example, [Ballentine, 1998].
4.8. P(P1|P2) = Tr[(I1⊗P2)W (I1⊗P2) (P1⊗ I2)]Tr[W (I1⊗P2)] =
Tr[W (I1⊗P2) (I1⊗P2) (P1⊗ I2)]
Tr[W (I1⊗P2)] =
Tr[W (P1⊗P2)]
Tr[W (I1⊗P2)] =
p(P1, P2)
p(P2)
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Hence, WQ=PψQ′ /‖ψQ′ ‖2. This expression can be further simplified. For any vector φ
WQφ=
PψQ′
‖ψQ′ ‖2
φ=
ψQ
′
‖ψQ′ ‖
〈
ψQ
′
‖ψQ′ ‖
, φ
〉
= ψQ 〈ψQ, φ〉=PψQφ with ψQ=
ψQ
′
‖ψQ′ ‖
(4.27)
So Tr(WQP )=Tr(PψQP ). But Tr(PψQP )= 〈ψQ, P ψQ〉 – see (3.11) – and hence (4.24).
Definition 4.2. Quantum Conditional Probability with Respect to an Event for
Pure States. The probability given by the Lüders rule for two quantum events P ,Q∈L(H)
Pψ(P |Q)=
〈
Qψ
||Qψ‖ , P
Qψ
||Qψ‖
〉
(4.28)
is the probability of the event P conditional on event Q with respect to the probability
measure pψ given by a pure state ψ.
As before, if W = Pψ, for P1 and P2 orthogonal projectors and Q ∈ L(H), additivity
holds for Pψ(P |Q). By linearity of the scalar product, i.e. 〈ψQ, (P1 + P2) ψQ〉 = 〈ψQ,
P1 ψQ〉+ 〈ψQ, P2 ψQ〉, we have
Pψ(P1+P2|Q)=Pψ(P1|Q)+Pψ(P2|Q) (4.29)
4.4 Non-Additivity and Interference
In section 2.4 we showed that classical conditional probability with respect to an event
is characterized both by an existence and uniqueness theorem – theorem 2.1 – and by its
being additive with respect to conditioning events – theorems 2.3 and 2.4. In the previous
section we saw that the quantum analogue of theorem 2.1, namely theorem 4.1, serves to
characterize quantum conditional probability with respect to an event. However, trouble
arises if we try to carry the additivity characterization to a quantum probability space.
Indeed, let {Qi} be a countable orthogonal set of elements of L(H) such that ∑i Qi=
Q, that is, event Q is split into a set of physical events that mutually exclude each other.
Then, unlike the classical case, there is not a unique probability measure on L(H) which
coincides with PW( · |Q) for each Qi. Only if the density operator W commutes with
each Qi, can one single out quantum conditional probabilities that behave classically with
respect to the splittings of the conditioning event.4.9 And hence the probabilities defined
by the Lüders rule are in general non-additive when we consider conditioning with respect
to an event that is the sum of orthogonal events. That is,
PW(P |Q)
∑
i
PW(P |Qi) (4.30)
4.9. [Cassinelli & Zanghí, 1984] theorem 2, p.144.
54 Quantum Conditional Probability
However, defenders of the conditional interpretation of the probabilities defined by the
Lüders rule do not see any problem in this non-additive feature. On the contrary, they
hold that quantum conditional probabilities differ from their classical counterparts exactly
in the way they should. For precisely because of their non-additive character one can
replace classical conditional probabilities by quantum conditional probabilities and obtain
the quantum statistics. Indeed, in (4.30) there appears an extra term which is responsible
for the non-additivity, and which precisely yields the interference of probabilities that is
typical of some quantum situations in which the occurrence of the event Q is not drawn
back to the occurrence of the single events Qi that compose it.
Suppose, for simplicity, that the quantum system is the pure stateW =Pψ, with ψ∈H,
and let Q=
∑
i
Qi, with ‖Qi‖2  0 for all i and QiQj = 0, if i  j. For a pure state, the
probability of event P conditional on Q is given by definition 4.2. Setting Qiψ||Qiψ‖ = ψQi, a
straightforward calculation yields:
PW(P |
∑
i
Qi)=
∑
i
( ‖Qiψ‖
‖Qψ‖
)2
PW(P |Qi)+
∑
i j
‖Qiψ‖ ‖Qjψ‖
‖Qψ‖2
〈
ψQi, P ψQj
〉
(4.31)
Contrary to the classical case, expression (4.31) says that the conditioned state
PW(P |
∑
i
Qi) is not a mixture of the probability measures PW(P |Qi). Rather
PW(P | ∑i Qi) is the sum of two parts: the first part contains the diagonal terms and
is the exact transcription of the classical form (2.27); the second part contains the off-
diagonal terms, which are the typical quantum interference terms, and is responsible of
the fact that the state PW(P |
∑
i
Qi) is not a mixture. Note that for the interference
term to be zero P and Q have to commute in state ψ. If this is the case, then PQiψ=QiPψ
and there exists a common basis of eigenvectors for Q and P so that
〈
ψQi, PψQj
〉
=0.4.10
To conclude, quantum conditioning, when conditioning is taken over the orthogonal
decomposition of the conditioning event, yields interference terms, thus sharply distin-
guishing it from classical conditioning. Precisely because of their non-additive character
one can replace classical conditional probabilities by quantum conditional probabilities and
obtain the quantum statistics. Thus Cassinelli and Zanghí write:
‘... the generalized conditional probability maintains all the character-
izing features of the classical one and, at the same time, it introduces typical
quantum effects. The essential point is that, in the non-commutative case
the «theorem of compound probabilities» [or, equivalently, additivity with
respect to conditioning events,] does not hold’ ([Cassinelli & Zanghí, 1984],
p.244)
4.10. If P and Q commute then
〈
ψQi
, P ψQj
〉
∼ 〈Qiψ, P Qj ψ〉= 〈Qiψ, Qj P ψ〉, and there exists a common
basis of eigenvectors for Q and P so that Pψ∼ ψ. Thus 〈Qiψ, QjPψ〉 ∼ 〈Qiψ, Qjψ〉=0 for i j.
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In the next subsection, we present two concrete physical examples of how the Lüders
rule yields the correct probabilistic predictions when interference effects are present.4.11
4.4.1 Stern-Gerlach Series Experiment
Consider a spin-1 particle and two Stern-Gerlach devices that separate the possible values
of the spin component, viz. − 1, 0, 1, along the x- and y- axis, as given in figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1. A Stern-Gerlach series experiment with interference.
Let Q be the event ‘the x-component is 0 or 1’ and let P be the event ‘the y-component
is +1’. We have Q=Q1+Q2, where Q1 and Q2 are the events ‘the x-component is +1’
and ‘the x-component is 0’, respectively, i.e. Q1=Sx+1 and Q2=Sx0, and P =Sy+1. Then
Pψ(Psy+1|Psx+1 + Psx0) =
( ‖Psx+1 ψ‖
‖(Psx+1+Psx0) ψ‖
)2
Pψ(Psy+1|Psx+1) +(
‖Psx0 ψ‖
‖(Psx+1+Psx0) ψ‖
)2
Pψ(Psy+1|Psx0) +
‖Psx+1 ψ‖ ‖Psx0 ψ‖
‖(Psx+1+Psx0) ψ‖2
Re
〈
Psx+1 ψ
||Psx+1 ψ‖
,
Psy+1
Psx0 ψ
||Psx0 ψ‖
〉
(4.32)
gives precisely the empirical probability of getting the system in the Sy+1 channel after
having passed through the Sx Stern-Gerlach device. Thus, Pψ(P |Q)=Pψ(Sy+1|Sx+1+Sx0)
is interpreted as the probability that ‘the y-component of spin is + 1’ conditional on
the event that ‘the x-component of spin is 0 or 1’. Quantum conditioning as defined by
the Lüders rule thus yields the appropriate interference terms and allows one to replace
classical conditional probabilities by quantum conditional probabilities.
Note, however, that if one were to draw back the occurrence of event Q to the occur-
rence of the single events Qi that compose it, the interference terms would vanish. Indeed,
imagine that the channels emerging from the first Stern-Gerlach apparatus are made totally
independent. That is, consider the experiment given in figure 4.2.
4.11. [Beltrametti & Cassinelli, 1981] pp. 281-285.
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Figure 4.2. A Stern-Gerlach series experiment with no interference.
Then only the first part of (4.32), that is, the quantum transcription of the classical
conditional probability (2.27), would result. In effect
Pψ(Sy+1|Sx+1 + Sx0) =
( ‖Sx+1ψ‖
‖(Sx+1+Sx0)ψ‖
)2
Pψ(Sy+1|Sx+1) +( ‖Sx0 ψ‖
‖(Sx+1+Sx0) ψ‖
)2
Pψ(Sy+1|Sx0) (4.33)
gives the probability of getting the particle in the Sy+1 channel in this experiment. And
hence (4.33) gives the probability that ‘the y-component of spin is +1’ conditional on the
event that ‘the x-component of spin is 0’ or ‘the x-component of spin is 1’.
4.4.2 The Double Slit Experiment
The double-slit experiment provides another physical example of such a situation. In this
experiment the event with respect to which conditioning occurs is the passage of the
particle through the double slit and no attempt is made to verify which slit the particle
has passed through. Let us consider again this experiment. Recall that we showed in the
introduction how an analysis in terms of pro rata conditional probabilities does not provide
an adequate description of the experiment if the two slits are open. Indeed, it yields that
Pp(R|A∪B)= 1
2
Pp(R|A)+ 1
2
Pp(R|B) (4.34)
(for p(A)= p(B) corresponding to the most simple experimental arrangement). In contrast,
an analysis in terms of the Lüders rule does yield the correct probabilistic predictions.
Consider first the experiment with only one slit open. Imagine a free particle traveling
toward the S1 screen in the direction of the x-axis with constant velocity v, which then
reaches the detecting screen S2 (see figure 4.3). A common simplifying approximation is
to treat classically the motion along the x-axis. Let t=0 the instant at which the particle
reaches S1, and t=τ the instant at which it reaches S2; adopt an inertial frame of reference
in which the particle has no velocity along the x-axis. Thus we have just to consider the
position along the y axis.
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Figure 4.3. Reference frame for double slit experiment.
The conditional probability that the y-coordinate of the particle has a value in the
(Borel) set R on the screen S2 at time t= τ , given that it was localized in the interval A
on the screen S1 at time t=0, is given by the Lüders rule as
PW(PR, t= τ |PA, t=0) (4.35)
where W is the state of the incoming particle. We suppose that W is a pure state with
density operator Pψ, and that the y-coordinate of the particle has a non-vanishing prob-
ability of having a value in A at time t=0:
〈ψ,PAψ〉= ‖PAψ‖2 0 (4.36)
Using the expression for quantum conditional probability for pure states given by definition
4.2, we get:4.12
Pψ(PR, t= τ |PA, t=0)= 〈UτψA , PRUτψA〉=
∫
R
|UτψA(y)|2 d y (4.37)
where Uτ is the free evolution operator in L(H) from t=0 to t= τ (i.e. from screen S1 to
S2), and ψA=
PAψ
‖PAψ‖ . Equation (4.37) gives the probability that the particle arrives at the
the region R on the detecting screen when only slit A is open. The claim is that Pψ(PR,
τ |PA, 0) is the probability that the particle arrives at R on S2 conditional on localization
to the range A on S1.
Similarly, if only slit B is open, we have that
Pψ(PR, t= τ |PB , t=0)= 〈UτψB , PRUτψB〉=
∫
R
|UτψB(y)|2 d y (4.38)
4.12. Pψ(PR, t= τ |PA, t= 0) =Tr
([
Uτ
PAPψPA
Tr(PψPA)
Uτ
−1]
PR
)
=
Tr(PAPψPA Uτ
−1PRUτ)
Tr(PψPA)
. Using that PA Pψ PA=
PPAψ, Tr(PψPA)=‖PAψ‖2 and that Tr(PPAψ Uτ−1PRUτ)= 〈PAψ,Uτ−1PRUτPAψ〉, as well as writing ψA= PAψ‖PAψ‖
we get Pψ(PR, t= τ |PA, t=0)= 〈UτψA , PRUτψA〉.
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with ψB =
PBψ
‖PBψ‖ . Equation (4.38) gives the probability that the particle arrives at the
the region R on the detecting screen when only slit B is open. The claim is that Pψ(PR,
τ |PB , 0) is the probability that the particle arrives at R on S2 conditional on localization
to the range B on S1.
Let us now turn to the third experiment in which the two slits are open. We make the
same simplifying assumptions about the motion along x; let Pψ be the density operator
of the initial pure state ψ, and let ‖PA ψ‖2  0, ‖PB ψ‖2  0. We are interested in the
conditional probability that the y-coordinate of the particle has values in the (Borel) set
R of the screen S2 at time t= τ , given that it was localized in the set A∪B of the screen
S1 at time t=0. That is,
Pψ(PR, t= τ |PA∪B , t=0) (4.39)
Noting that A∩B= ∅ and thus that PA∪B=PA+PB, we get4.13
Pψ(PR, t= τ |PA∪B , t=0)=
∫
R
|Uτ (CAψA+CBψB)|2 d y (4.40)
where
CA=
‖PAψ‖
‖(PA+PB) ψ‖ , CB=
‖PBψ‖
‖(PA+PB) ψ‖ (4.41)
Equation (4.40) thus gives the probability that the particle arrives at the the region R on
the detecting screen when both slits are open. Again, the claim is that Pψ(PR, τ |PA∪B ,0)
is the probability of arrival at R on S2 conditional on localization to the range A∪B on S1.
The probability of arrival at R with both slits open can be expressed in terms of the
probabilities of arrival at R with only one slit open as
Pψ(PR, τ |PA∪B , 0)=Pψ(PR, τ |PA, 0)+Pψ(PR, τ |PB , 0)+ I (4.42)
where the interference term I given by
I =2CACBRe
∫
R
UτψA(y) UτψB(y) dy (4.43)
which is different from zero if τ  0.
4.13. First, Pψ(PR, t = τ |PA∪B, t = 0) = Pψ(PR, t = τ |(PA + PB), t = 0) =
Tr
([
Uτ
(PA+PB)Pψ (PA+PB)
Tr[Pψ (PA+PB)]
Uτ
−1]
PR
)
=
Tr[(PA+PB)Pψ (PA+PB) Uτ
−1
PRUτ)
Tr[Pψ (PA+PB)]
. Using that (PA + PB) Pψ (PA +
PB) = P(PA+PB)ψ and that Tr[Pψ (PA + PB)] = ‖(PA + PB)ψ‖2, we have Tr[(PA+PB)Pψ (PA+PB) Uτ
−1PRUτ)
Tr[Pψ (PA+PB)]
=
Tr(P(PA+PB)ψ Uτ
−1PRUτ)
‖(PA+PB)ψ‖2 , which, in turn, is equal to
〈(PA+PB) ψ, Uτ−1PRUτ (PA+PB)ψ〉
‖(PA+PB) ψ‖2 . Now
(PA+PB) ψ
‖(PA+PB) ψ‖ =
‖PAψ‖
‖(PA+PB) ψ‖
PAψ
‖PAψ‖ +
‖PBψ‖
‖(PA+PB) ψ‖
PBψ
‖PBψ‖ = CA ψA + CB ψB, with CA =
‖PAψ‖
‖(PA+PB) ψ‖ , CB =
‖PBψ‖
‖(PA+PB) ψ‖
so that
〈
(PA+PB) ψ
‖(PA+PB) ψ‖ , Uτ
−1
PR Uτ
(PA+PB) ψ
‖(PA+PB)ψ‖
〉
is equal to
〈
CA ψA + CB ψB, Uτ
−1
PR Uτ (CA ψA + CB ψB)
〉
.
And hence Pψ(PR, t= τ |PA∪B, t=0)=
〈
Uτ (CAψA+CBψB) , PRUτ (CAψA+CBψB)
〉
.
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The distribution pattern one obtains for the experiment when both slits are open, i.e.
Pψ(PR, τ |PA∪B , 0), is thus not the sum of the patterns when only one or the other slit
is open, i.e. Pψ(PR, τ |PA, 0) + Pψ(PR, τ |PB , 0), but also contains the interference term
I , which is a peculiar quantum effect and is responsible for the empirical fact that the
probability of finding the particle in R is not the sum of the probabilities that one would
have for each slit separately. Note that the occurrence of the quantum superposition
CAψA+CBψB in (4.40) is here a clear consequence of the calculus of the probabilities by
means of the Lüders rule, and is directly responsible for the existence of the interference
term.
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we have considered the main arguments in favour of the interpretation of
the probability given by the Lüders rule as defining conditional probability with respect
to an event in quantum probability theory. The claim is that PW(P |Q)= Tr(QWQP )Tr(QWQ) , for
P , Q ∈ L(H), is to be interpreted as the probability of the event P conditional on event
Q with respect to the initial probability measure pW . The two main arguments for this
interpretation are, first, that it is the only probability measure over the whole quantum
event structure L(H) which agrees with classical conditional probabilities for compatible
events. And second, that in the cases in which quantum interference effects are present,
the probabilities defined by the Lüders rule differ from their classical counterparts exactly
in the way they should. Precisely because of their non-additive character, one can replace
classical conditional probabilities by quantum conditional probabilities and obtain the
quantum statistics. In the next chapters we evaluate the validity of these arguments.
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Chapter 5
Interpreting Quantum Conditional
Probability I
In the previous chapter we showed why the Lüders rule is standardly taken as defining the
notion of conditional probability with respect to an event in quantum probability theory.
The quantum notion agrees with its classical counterpart when it applies to compatible
events but differs from it when incompatible events are involved. In these cases, it cannot
be interpreted as a classical conditional probability but is rather seen as providing an
extension of this notion appropriate to the quantum context. As such, it presents features
which are different from those of classical conditional probability.
For example, suppose we have a spin 1
2
particle in a state corresponding to a positive
value of spin along the z-axis, i.e. ψs+z. Then, the probability for the event P = Ps+z
corresponding to a positive value of spin along the z-axis, as given by (3.5), is one, i.e.
pψ(Ps+z)= 〈ψs+z, Ps+zψs+z〉= |〈ψs+z |ψs+z〉|2=1 (5.1)
What is the probability for this same event conditional on another event Q such that
pW(Q) 0, say Q=Pφ, with φ= aψs+z+ bψs−z?5.1 Intuitively, it should also be equal to
one. For since the unconditional probability of P is already one, then considering Q, where
pW(Q)  0, should leave this value unaltered. This intuition is preserved by the classical
notion of conditional probability and, in particular, is secured by the ratio analysis. Indeed,
in a classical probability space, if p(A)=1 then any other event B such that its intersection
with A is zero – and hence such that p(B)= 0 – is ruled out. In all other cases – those in
which p(B) 0 – the ratio analysis yields Pp(A|B)= 1.5.2
5.1. For Q=Pφ, φ=aψs+z+ bψs−z (|a|2+ |b|2=1) and ψ=ψs+z, (3.5) yields pψ(Q)= |〈φ|ψs+z〉|2= |a|2. Hence,
pψ(Q) 0 if a 0.
5.2. There are three possible cases:
(i) if B ⊆A then A∩B=B and Pp(A|B)= p(A∩B)p(B) =
p(B)
p(B)
=1.
(ii) if A⊂B then A∩B=A and Pp(A|B)= p(A∩B)p(B) =
p(A)
p(B)
. But given p(A)=1, then p(B)=1 (where the part
of B that is different from A , i.e Ac−Bc, is assigned a zero probability). So Pp(A|B)= 1.
(iii) if A∩B=C  0 then Pp(A|B)= p(A∩B)p(B) =
p(C)
p(B)
. But given p(A)=1, then p(C)= p(B). So Pp(A|B)=1.
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However, this is not so for the probabilities defined by the Lüders rule. The probability
Pψ(Ps+z |Pφ) given by definition 4.2, is not assigned the value one as the unconditional
probability pψ(Ps+z). Rather it can range from 0 to 1 depending on the value of a given
that5.3
Pψ(Ps+z|Pφ)= |a|2 (5.2)
Moreover, the probability Pψ(Ps+z |Pφ) should seemingly not take any value different from
zero, be it one or any other value. For Ps+z and Pφ seem to have nothing in common since
the intersection of their ranges is zero. And hence the conditional probability of Ps+z given
Pφ should be zero.
How do we then understand these new features of the quantum notion of conditional
probability? That is, what does it mean to say that the probability PW(P |Q) defined by
the Lüders rule gives the probability of the quantum event P conditional on the quantum
event Q for incompatible events? Perhaps it may not even be possible to interpret it, after
all, as a conditional probability. For the fact that it agrees with its classical counterpart in
their shared domain of application, i.e. compatible events, does not necessarily guarantee
that outside this domain, i.e. incompatible events, the two notions will have the same
meaning; and this regardless of the fact that the probability defined by the Lüders rule is
the only possible candidate for a quantum notion of conditional probability (recall theorem
4.1). Indeed, when extending concepts, it is important to keep in mind that, while there
may be some similarities between the old and the extended concept, it is critical to evaluate
whether these similarities can provide enough interpretive content so as to justify regarding
the concept in the new domain as an extension or a generalization of the old one.
Hence, the question arises as to whether the probability defined by the Lüders rule can
be interpreted as a genuine extension of the notion of classical conditional probability to
the quantum context. In this chapter we consider this question and thus evaluate whether
the arguments presented in the previous chapter provide enough interpretive content for
its reading as a conditional probability.
In section 5.1 we argue that, if the probability defined by the Lüders rule is to be
understood as a conditional probability for incompatible quantum events, it cannot rely on
the classical notion of commonality in terms of subspace intersection. Rather, one needs
a notion of commonality which can first, cope with the fact that PW(P |Q) is in general
non-zero for events P and Q such that the intersection of their ranges is zero, and second,
5.3. Given ψQ=
Qψ
‖Qψ‖ =
Pφψs+z
‖Pφψs+z‖
= φ, Pψ(P |Q)= 〈ψQ, PψQ〉= 〈φ, Ps+zφ〉= |〈φ|ψs+z〉|2= |a|2.
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determine the particular non-zero value which the Lüders rule actually assigns PW(P |Q).
In section 5.2 we provide such a rationale, although, we argue, the notion of conditional
probability it yields – what we call ‘synchronic projective quantum conditional probability’
– is rather weak and counterintuitive.
Then, in sections 5.3 and 5.4, we consider whether this same rationale can be trans-
lated for the eigenvalues p and q associated with the projection operators P and Q. For,
we argue, that the projective reading, however poor and unsatisfactory, is a physically
adequate interpretation of the probability defined by the Lüders rule only in so far as it
can underwrite a quantum notion of conditional probability in terms of the physically
meaningful values p and q. We show that this is not possible; that is, that the mathematical
notion of quantum conditional probability afforded by the projective reading – a notion
which applies to mathematical projection operators P and Q – does not translate into
a physical notion of quantum conditional probability – a notion which applies to their
corresponding physical values p and q – when P and Q are incompatible projectors. And
hence we conclude that the probability PW(P |Q) defined by the Lüders rule cannot be
understood (from a physically meaningful perspective) as an extension of the notion of
conditional probability to the quantum context.
5.1 A First Look I
Let us begin by considering some requirements which seem to be essential for any condi-
tional probability function to be regarded as such. We write this conditional probability
as P(A|B) but do not commit ourselves to the ratio analysis, the Lüders rule or any
other analysis of this notion; the idea is to characterize the intuitive notion of conditional
probability, irrespective of how the notion should be analyzed. These basic requirements
are the following:
1. The probability of any event given itself must be one, i.e. P(A|A)= 1.
2. The probability of the complement of any event given the event itself must be zero,
i.e. P(Ac|A)= 0.
3. The probability of a necessarily true event T (e.g. the whole event space) given any
event A must be one, i.e. P(T |A)= 1.
4. The probability of a necessarily false event F (e.g. the null event) given any event
A must be zero, i.e. P(F |A)= 0.
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Alan Hájek, considering different intuitions concerning the values of conditional probabil-
ities, writes:
‘1-4 are alike in being extreme cases, and in being not merely true but
necessarily true. That is, all [conditional] probability functions should agree
on them. They are non-negotiable in the strongest sense.’ ([Hájek, 2008] p.4)
It is easy to show that the previous four basic requirements hold for the probabilities
defined by the Lüders rule as PW(P |Q) = Tr(QWQP )Tr(QWQ) . (Of course, they also hold for the
conditional probabilities defined by the standard ratio formula.) In effect,
1. PW(P |P ) = 1: the probability of any event P given itself is one given that
Tr(PWPP )=Tr(PWP ), and hence PW(P |P )= Tr(PWP )Tr(PWP ) =1 for all P ∈L(H).
2. PW(P⊥|P ) = 0: the probability of the orthogonal complement P⊥ of any event is
zero given that PP⊥=0 and hence Tr(PWPP⊥)= 0 for all P ∈L(H).
3. PW(PI |P ) = 1: the probability of the necessarily true event PI, i.e. the identity
event, given any event P is one given that Tr(P W PPI) = Tr(P W P ), and hence
PW(PI |P )= Tr(PWP )Tr(PWP ) =1 for all P ∈L(H).
4. PW(P∅|P )= 0: the probability of the necessarily false event P∅, i.e. the null event,
given any event P is zero given that P P∅ = 0 and hence Tr(P W P P∅) = 0 for all
P ∈L(H).
Note, however, the fact that these requirements hold for the quantum probabilities
PW(P |Q) should come as no surprise. For in all four cases the events involved are compat-
ible and hence the quantum probabilities are identical to classical conditional probabilities.
Indeed, the possible differences between classical and quantum conditional probability
arise precisely for incompatible events, which are the distinctively quantum events. And
it is in these cases that we need to consider how – or whether – quantum conditional
probability can be thought of as a conditional probability.5.4
5.4. Note that this remark also applies to the two special cases we saw in section 4.3.2 in which the probabilities
defined by Lüders rule behave like classical conditional probabilities and which (supposedly) gave additional grounds
for thinking of them as conditional probabilities. Note also that that Fuchs uses the latter case in [Fuchs, 2002a]
pp.34-35 to seemingly show how neatly quantum updating works in the EPR type cases. But this comes as no
surprise given that the projectors are compatible: in a case of commuting operators the Lüders’ rule straightforwardly
becomes Bayesian updating. The challenge is when the operators don’t commute! See section 7.7 for a detailed
discussion of Fuchs’ analysis.
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So let us consider the Lüders rule for incompatible events. Take again the example
of a spin 1
2
particle in state ψs+z. The quantum events P = Ps+z, and Q = Pφ, where
φ = a ψs+z + b ψs−z, are incompatible if a and b are different form zero. As before, the
conditional probability of P given Q should seemingly be zero because these projectors
have nothing in common given the intersection of their ranges is zero. And yet the Lüders
rule yields a value which in general is different from zero, namely
Pψ(P |Q)= |a|2 (5.3)
Only if a or b are zero – in which case P and Q are compatible – will the intuitive
notion of conditionality agree with the probability dictated by the Lüders rule: if a = 0,
Q = Ps−z, P Q = Q P = 0, and hence Pψ(P |Q) = 0; and if b = 0, P = Q = Ps+z and
Pψ(P |Q)=Pψ(P |P )= 1.
However, note that we have so far assumed that if the intersection of the ranges of two
events P and Q is zero, then these events should be regarded as having nothing in common.
But to what extent is this claim really justified? Indeed, in a classical probability space
two events have nothing in common if their intersection is the empty set, i.e. A ∩B = ∅,
in which case their conditional probability P(A|B) is necessarily zero. Thus, the second
basic requirement for a conditional probability function, namely P(Ac|A)= 0, is simply a
particular case of this general fact when B=Ac. In general, when A∩B= ∅, the event B
will be a subset of Ac, i.e B ⊆Ac, and their conditional probability will be zero.
In contrast, in quantum probability theory the fact that the second basic requirement
holds, namely PW(P⊥|P ) = 0, is not a particular case of a more general situation in
which PW(P |Q) = 0 if the intersection of the ranges of P and Q is zero with P = Q⊥.
Rather, PW(P |Q) is in general non-zero for events P and Q such that the intersection
of their ranges is zero; in our example the probability given by equation (5.3) is simply a
particular example of this general fact. Hence, if PW(P |Q) is to be generally understood
as a conditional probability, we cannot appeal to a notion of commonality tied to the
intersection of the ranges of P and Q.
Similarly, consider the intuition that if the probability of an event A is one, then the
probability of that same event given any other event (whose probability is not zero) must
also be one. In classical probability theory this is true because p(A) = 1 automatically
rules out any other event B that has nothing in common with A, i.e. any B such that
A∩B=0. And hence p(A|B)=1 for every possible B. Or equivalently, if the probability
of an event A is one, events B such that A ∩ B = 0 are not ruled out but are assigned a
zero probability. And hence P(A|B)= 0 for B such that p(B)= 0, and P(A|B)= 1 for B
such that p(B) 0.5.5
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However, again, this is not so in quantum probability theory. There can be events P
which are assigned a probability one without this implying that all other events Q such
that the intersection of their ranges with that of P is zero, are assigned a zero probability.
As we have already seen, for a spin 1
2
particle in state ψs+z and events P =Ps+z, Q=Pφ,
where φ= a ψs+z+ b ψs−z, even if pψ(P ) = 1 and P ∧ Q= 0, the probability assigned to
Q, namely pψ(Q)= |a|2, is different from zero for a 0. One cannot, therefore, appeal to
the intuition that if pW(P ) = 1, any event Q such that P ∧ Q = ∅ should be assigned a
zero probability (on account of having nothing in common with P ), and thus ensure that
PW(P |Q)=1 for the Q’s such that P ∧Q ∅. This only holds if P is the identity operator:
in this case there are no Q such that Q ∧ PI = ∅ (because Q ∧ PI = Q for all Q ∈ L(H)
(excluding Q = ∅)); and thus PW(PI |Q) = 1, which is the third basic requirement for a
conditional probability function.
To conclude, if the probability defined by the Lüders rule is to be understood as a condi-
tional probability for general quantum events, one cannot think of a notion of commonality
between projectors in terms of the intersection of their subspaces. One needs a new notion
of commonality which can cope with the fact that PW(P |Q) is in general non-zero for
events P and Q such that the intersection of their ranges is zero. Moreover, not only does
this notion need to explain why one should assign PW(P |Q) a non-zero value; it should
also determine the particular non-zero value which the Lüders rule actually assigns it.
As a final remark, note that the fact that a notion of commonality based on subspace
intersection cannot underwrite a quantum notion of conditional probability was to be
expected. Indeed, this notion corresponds to the definition of conditional probability given
in (4.3) as the ratio pW (P ∧Q)
pW (Q)
, which we showed does not define a probability function over
the quantum event structure L(H) due to its non-additive character.
We also showed that this non-additivity is a direct consequence of the non-Boolean
structure of L(H). Hence, what we did in the above examples was to consider particular
pairs of events P and Q which exhibit this non-Boolean character, namely incompatible
events, and which thus raise difficulties for the interpretation of the ratio pW(P ∧Q)
pW (Q)
as a
5.5. This reading may seem somewhat counterintuitive from a diachronic perspective. For example, if for a
throw of a die the result ‘1’ is assigned a probability one, then ‘1’ is the case and the result ‘2’ cannot occur. Hence,
the probability of ‘1’ given ‘2’ might seem to make no sense. However this is not so; P(1|2) = 0, where p(2) = 0,
can be understood in terms of the counter-factual had ‘2’ been the case – which it has not since p(2) = 0 – then
the probability of ‘1’ given ‘2’ would have been zero. Note that the ratio analysis cannot yield this value for it is
undefined if p(B)=0. This is an instance of the zero denominator problem we considered in appendix B: contingent
propositions – such as B = ‘2’ – may be assigned probability zero, and yet it is legitimate to form conditional
probabilities with them as conditionals.
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conditional probability. In other words, the value we assigned to the conditional probability
of the various pairs of P ’s and Q’s appealed to intuitions based on Boolean relations
between events; this value was thus necessarily in conflict with the value assigned to these
pairs by the Lüders rule, a probability assignment for two events which is tailor-made for
a non-Boolean event structure.
In the next section we look for a new notion of commonality between quantum events,
one which is more appropriate for their non-Boolean structure, and which thus might serve
to underwrite a notion of conditional probability fitting the probabilities defined by the
Lüders rule.
5.2 Quantum Conditional Probability
To consider whether such a notion of commonality exists, let us begin by examining the
probabilities defined by the Lüders rule in a concrete example.
Example 5.1. Incompatible Observables. Suppose a system in a generic state given by
ψ= c1 β1+ c2 β2+ c3 β3 (5.4)
where |c1|2+ |c2|2+ |c3|2=1, and consider two observables given by operators:
A= a1Pα1+ a2Pα2+ a3Pα3 (5.5)
B= b1(Pβ1+Pβ3)+ b2Pβ2 (5.6)
where
α1=
β1+ β2
2
√ , α2= β1− β2
2
√ , α3= β3 (5.7)
Initially state ψ assigns probabilities to the quantum projectors Pαi as in (3.7), i.e.
pψ(Pαi)= 〈ψ, Pαiψ〉= |〈αi|ψ〉|2 (5.8)
Hence,
pψ(Pα1)=
1
2
(|c1|2+ |c2|2)
pψ(Pα2)=
1
2
(|c1|2+ |c2|2)
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pψ(Pα3)= |c3|2 (5.9)
Given the e-e link, each projector Pαi corresponds to a value of observable A, namely the
eigenvalue ai, and we can think of the probabilities pψ(Pαi) as the probabilities for each
value ai. In contrast, not every projector Pβi corresponds to a possible value of observable
B; rather projector Pβ1 + Pβ3 corresponds to the value b1 and projector Pβ2 corresponds
to the value b2. We calculate the probabilities for these two projectors as pψ(Pβi) = 〈ψ,
P βiψ〉= |〈βi|ψ〉|2, i.e.
pψ(Pβ1+Pβ3)= |c1|2+ |c3|2
pψ(Pβ2)= |c2|2 (5.10)
Given the e-e link, theses probabilities are, respectively, interpreted as the probability for
value b1 and for value b2.
The probability assignments dictated by the Lüders rule for Pψ(Pαi|Pβ1 + Pβ3) are
given by definition 4.2 as pψPβ1+Pβ3
(Pαi)= |〈αi|ψPβ1+Pβ3〉|2 with ψPβ1+Pβ3=
c1
|c1|2+ |c3|2
√ β1+
c1
|c1|2+ |c3|2
√ β3, i.e.
Pψ(Pα1|Pβ1+Pβ3)= 12
|c1|2
|c1|2+ |c3|2
Pψ(Pα2|Pβ1+Pβ3)= 12
|c1|2
|c1|2+ |c3|2
Pψ(Pα3|Pβ1+Pβ3)= |c3|
2
|c1|2+ |c3|2 (5.11)
The question we want to consider is how to understand the probabilities Pψ(Pαi|Pβ1+Pβ3)
given in (5.11) as the conditional probabilities of the various events Pαi conditional on
event Pβ1+Pβ3.
Let us begin with an easy case, that of Pψ(Pα3|Pβ1+Pβ3). Given that Pα36 (Pβ1+Pβ3)
– recall α3 = β3 – the probability of Pα3 conditional on Pβ1 + Pβ3 is simply the pro rata
increase of the initial probability of Pα3. Thus, given (5.9) and (5.10), we have that
p[Pα3 given (Pβ1+Pβ3)]=
pψ(Pα3)
pψ(Pβ1+Pβ3)
=
|c3|2
|c1|2+ |c3|2 (5.12)
This value is the same as that prescribed by the Lüders rule in (5.11). Hence Pψ(Pα3|Pβ1+
Pβ3) can be straightforwardly interpreted as the conditional probability of a3 given b1. This
was, however, to be expected, for events (Pβ1 + Pβ3) and Pα3 are compatible, and hence
the probabilities dictated by the Lüders rule are simply classical conditional probabilities.
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Now what about Pψ(Pα1|Pβ1+Pβ3) and Pψ(Pα2|Pβ1+Pβ3)? This is a trickier situation
since it is not prima facie clear what either Pα1 or Pα2 have in common with Pβ1 + Pβ3.
Indeed, the classical intuitions do not work given that the quantum events Pβ1 + Pβ3
and Pα1 or Pα2 are incompatible. If, as in the previous section, we consider that two
events have nothing in common if the intersection of their ranges is zero, then, given
Pαi∧ (Pβ1+Pβ3)=0 i=1,2, the conditional probability of Pαi given Pβ1+Pβ3 is zero. And
we know that this result does no coincide with the probability assigned by the Lüders rule.
However, Pα1, where α1 =
β1+ β2
2
√ , does seem to have something more in common
with Pβ1 + Pβ3 than, say, Pβ2, even if both Pα1 ∧ (Pβ1 + Pβ3) and Pβ2 ∧ (Pβ1 + Pβ3) are
zero. For while Pβ2 and (Pβ1 + Pβ3) are orthogonal5.6 – the vector β2 forms a 90
◦ angle
with the β1-β3 plane – this is not so for Pα15.7 – the vector α1 =
β1+ β2
2
√ forms an angle
with the β1-β3 plane which is different from 90◦. Hence, if we consider that two quantum
events have nothing in common only if they are orthogonal (and not if the intersection
of their ranges is zero), we can account for the fact that Pψ(Pβ2|Pβ1 + Pβ3) = 0 and
Pψ(Pα1|Pβ1+Pβ3) 0. Indeed, given Pβ2 (Pβ1+Pβ3)=0, Pβ2 has nothing in common with
Pβ1+Pβ3, and hence the conditional probability of Pβ2 given Pβ1+Pβ3 is zero, in accordance
with Pψ(Pβ2|Pβ1 + Pβ3) = 0. And, given Pα1 (Pβ1 + Pβ3)  0, Pα1 does have something in
common with Pβ1 + Pβ3, and hence the conditional probability of Pα1 given Pβ1 + Pβ3 is
different from zero, again in accordance with Pψ(Pα1|Pβ1 + Pβ3)  0.5.8 And similarly for
Pα2.
Nevertheless, these intuitions are simply the first step in understanding the probabilities
defined by the Lüders rule as conditional probabilities. We still need to find a rationale
to explain why the Lüders rule assigns Pψ(Pα1|Pβ1+Pβ3) and Pψ(Pα2|Pβ1+Pβ3) precisely
the value 1
2
|c1|2
|c1|2+ |c3|2 . Consider the following one. First, take as the common ‘event’ of
events Pα1 and Pβ1+Pβ3 the ‘projector’ onto the (non-normalized) vector (Pβ1+Pβ3)α1=
1
2
√ β1, i.e. P 1
2
√ β1
. Then assign this common ‘projector’ a new ‘probability’ by means of
the state vector ψ through the standard trace rule, i.e pψ(P 1
2
√ β1
) = Tr(Pψ P 1
2
√ β1
) =
|〈 1
2
√ β1|ψ〉|2 = 12 |c1|2. This ‘probability’ can thus be read as something like the joint or
common ‘probability’ of projectors Pα1 and (Pβ1+Pβ3). Finally, increase this number pro
rata, i.e. divide it by pψ(Pβ1+Pβ3)= |c1|2+ |c3|2, i.e.
p[Pα1 given (Pβ1+Pβ3)] =
1
2
|c1|2
|c1|2+ |c3|2 (5.13)
5.6. Pβ2 (Pβ1+Pβ3)=P∅
5.7. Pα1 (Pβ1+Pβ3)= |β1 + β22√ 〉〈
β1 + β2
2
√ |β1+ β3〉〈β1+ β3|= 1
2
√ |β1+ β2〉〈β1+ β3| 0.
5.8. Note that pψ(Pβ1+Pβ3) 0. Otherwise PW (P |Q) would be zero.
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The probability of a1 conditional on b1 is thus given by (5.13). Which is exactly the value
assigned to Pψ(Pα1|Pβ1+Pβ3) by the Lüders rule. And similarly for Pα2.
More generally, take the definition of quantum conditional probabilities 4.2. By the
invariance of the trace under cyclic permutations,
PW(P |Q)= Tr(QWQP )Tr(QWQ) =
Tr(WQPQ)
Tr(QWQ)
(5.14)
If we now substitute P by Pα1 and write QPα1 Q as PQα1,5.9 i.e. the ‘projector’ onto the
(non-normalized) vector Qα1, we obtain
PW(Pα1|Q)=
Tr(WPQα1)
pW(Q)
=
pW
′ (PQα1)
pW(Q)
(5.15)
Thus, it seems that the probabilities defined by the Lüders rule can be read in general as
conditional probabilities. In effect, (5.15) defines quantum conditional probability ana-
logously to classical conditional probability as given by the ratio analysis. The ‘projector’
PQα1 represents the common quantum ‘projector’ of Q and Pα1 which corresponds to the
classical event A ∩ B. If P is not one-dimensional we cannot manipulate (5.14) to yield
(5.15) and then it is the ‘projector’ QPQ which represents the common ‘projector’ of P
and Q. This ‘projector’ is assigned a ‘probability’ value by means of the trace rule, i.e.
pW
′ (QPQ), and is then increased pro rata, i.e. divided by pW(Q).
We thus have seemingly not only explained why one should assign a non-zero condi-
tional probability to projectors P and Q such that P ∧ Q = 0, but also why it takes the
particular non-zero value the Lüders rule assigns it. Hence, by appealing to a notion of
commonality of quantum projectors based on their projective geometry, it looks like the
probability defined by the Lüders rule can be interpreted as the probability of a quantum
projector conditional on another quantum projector. Note that it is a synchronic notion.
Definition 5.1. Synchronic Quantum Conditional Probability. The probability
given by the Lüders rule for two quantum projectors P , Q∈L(H)
PW(P |Q)= Tr[W (QPQ)]Tr(WQ) =
pW
′ (QPQ)
pW(Q)
(5.16)
is the probability of the projector P conditional on projector Q with respect to the probability
measure pW. The operator QPQ represents the common operator of projectors P and Q.
Let us pause for a moment. Does this notion really yield a notion of conditional prob-
ability? First, notice that when giving the conditional reading of PW(P |Q) = pW
′ (QPQ)
pW(Q)
we say that the common quantum ‘projector’ Q P Q is assigned a ‘probability’ pW
′ (not
pW) by means of the trace rule. And all these quotation marks are not here by accident.
5.9. As in (4.24), for any vector φ: (QPα1Q) φ=QPα1 (Qφ)=Qα1 〈α1, Qφ〉=Qα1 〈Qα1, φ〉=PQα1 φ.
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For the operator Q P Q is not a projector, and hence pW
′ (Q P Q) is not a probability
function. We already pointed out this fact in section 4.3.1: PW(P |Q)= Tr(QWQP )Tr(QWQ) cannot
be defined as the ratio of two probabilities pW because, when P and Q do not commute,
the operator QWQ is not a density operator and hence the quantity Tr(QWQP ) is not
a probability.5.10 And second, why should we take Q P Q, or PQα when P = Pα, as the
common quantum ‘projector’? It seems to be a blatantly ad hoc manoeuvre.
The first objection to the notion of quantum conditional probability does not seem
conclusive, for the function Tr(W Q P Q) is not a probability function only in the sense
that it is not normalized. Indeed, it is non-negative, it takes values which are smaller than
one and, moreover, it is additive, which, as we have already emphasized, is the substantial
requirement for a probability function. Hence, it does not seem so inadequate to regard
the function Tr(WQPQ) as giving the probability of QPQ. The second objection cannot,
however, be so easily dismissed.
Indeed, one could bite the bullet and simply stipulate that QPQ is by definition the
common ‘projector’ of P and Q in the projective lattice L(H). This option, however,
would not yield a very satisfactory notion of commonality between projectors and would
thus provide a somewhat feeble notion of conditional probability. Moreover, it seems coun-
terintuitive to regard Q P Q as the common ‘projector’ of Q and P . For in PW(P |Q)
the common ‘projector’ is the operator Q P Q, while in PW(Q|P ) it is P Q P , which
are in general different from each other. And yet, why should they be different if they
are both supposed to represent what P and Q have in common? The operator Q P Q,
therefore, cannot be so straightforwardly taken as the common quantum ‘projector’ for the
probability of P conditional on Q.
And thus it seems that, after all, definition 5.1 does not provide an adequate notion of
quantum conditional probability. Contrary to the standard view, the probabilities defined
by the Lüders rule do not seem to acquire a precise meaning, in the sense of conditional
probabilities, when quantum mechanics is interpreted as a generalized probability space.
Some caution seems to be, however, recommended. Indeed, the claim that QPQ does
not adequately represent the common operator of P and Q, solely rests on our intuitions.
And one could easily reply that these are not reliable when considering projection operators
which have a non-Boolean structure. Hence, one cannot conclude that the quantum notion
conditional probability as given by definition 5.1 does not provide an understanding of why
the probability defined by the Lüders rule should be read as a conditional probability. It
5.10. In the case of Q P Q = PQα we can easily check this: PQα is not a projection operator given that it is
not idempotent: (PQα)
2
 PQα since Qα is in general not a normalized vector. Indeed, PQα= |Qα〉〈Qα| and thus
(PQα)
2= 〈Qα|Qα〉|Qα〉〈Qα| |Qα〉〈Qα|=PQα.
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does provide one, although one which is rather poor – it needs to stipulate that the common
projector of P and Q is Q P Q – and counterintuitive –it takes Q P Q as the common
quantum ‘projector’ for the probability of P conditional on Q, and PQP as the common
quantum ‘projector’ for the probability of Q conditional on P , something for which it
provides no understanding.
5.3 No Physical Quantum Conditional Probability
Nevertheless, the crucial question still remains to be raised: does the notion of quantum
conditional probability given by definition 5.1 provide a notion of conditional probability
for the values of physical quantities of a quantum system? Indeed, it applies directly
to projection operators on a Hilbert space H (we thus henceforth refer to this notion
as synchronic projective quantum conditional probability) but theses are only physically
meaningful through their associated eigenvalues. Hence, the projective reading, however
poor and unsatisfactory, is a physically adequate interpretation of the probability defined
by the Lüders rule only in so far as it can underwrite a quantum notion of conditional
probability in terms of physically relevant values. That is, a reading of PW(P |Q) as the
probability for value p – the eigenvalue associated with P – conditional on value q – the
eigenvalue associated with Q.
However, we now argue that this is not possible; that is, that the mathematical notion
of quantum conditional probability afforded by the projective reading – a notion which
applies to mathematical projection operators P and Q – does not translate into a physical
notion of quantum conditional probability – a notion which applies to their corresponding
physical values p and q – when P and Q are incompatible projectors. And hence we
conclude that the probability PW(P |Q) defined by the Lüders rule cannot be understood,
from a physically meaningful perspective, as an extension of the notion of conditional
probability to the quantum context.
Consider again example 5.1. We argued that Pα1 has more in common with Pβ1+Pβ3
than Pβ2 – even if both Pα1∧ (Pβ1+Pβ3)= 0 and Pβ2∧ (Pβ1+Pβ3)= 0 – because whereas
the vector β2 forms a 90◦ angle with the plane β1-β3, the vector α1=
β1+ β2
2
√ forms an angle
with the plane β1-β3 which is different from 90◦. Thus the projection of β2 onto β1-β3 is
zero while the projection of α1 onto β1-β3 is different form zero. And hence Pβ2 is seen as
having nothing in common with Pβ1+Pβ3, while Pα1 does have something in common with
Pβ1+Pβ3. In addition, to explain why the Lüders rule assigns a particular number to the
conditional probability of P given Q, it was crucial to take the ‘projector’ QPQ (PQα if
P is the one-dimensional projector Pα) as the common quantum event.
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But how can these rationales, which are crucial in understanding the notion of quantum
conditionality for projection operators, even get off the ground for scalar values such as the
eigenvalues associated with these projectors? Indeed, the notion of commonality between
projectors and the notion of common ‘event’ QPQ relies critically on the projective geo-
metry of a Hilbert spaceH. This geometry has a non-Boolean structure which, as Gleason’s
theorem dictates, determines the probabilistic structure that can be defined over it. And
the problem is that, this event structure, and the ensuing quantum probabilistic structure,
do not allow the probability PW(P |Q) defined by the Lüders rule to be interpreted as the
probability of value p conditional on value q.
First, the event ‘p and q’ cannot always be represented in terms of the projection
operators P and Q when the projectors are incompatible; that is, the projector P ∧ Q
cannot always be understood as the event ‘p and q’. And second, in the cases in which such
a correspondence does exist, the probability assigned to the event P ∧Q does not always
correspond to the probability assigned to the common operator of P and Q employed by
the projective notion of quantum conditional probability, i.e. QPQ. Thus, the probability
PW(P |Q) defined by the Lüders rule cannot be understood as the pro rata increase of the
probability of ‘p and q’; and hence, it cannot be interpreted as the probability of value p
conditional on value q. Only if P and Q are compatible projectors do all these notions line
up – ‘p and q’ can be represented by the projector P ∧ Q, which in turn is equivalent to
the common operator QPQ – and the probability PW(P |Q) can be read as the pro rata
increase of ‘p and q’.
Let us see this in detail by considering some examples. We start with an example
involving compatible observables A and B, and we show how one can derive the probab-
ilities defined by the Lüders rule by thinking of them as conditional probabilities for the
possible values of A and B.
Example 5.2. Compatible Observables5.11. Let ψ be the state of a system represented
by a state in a three dimensional Hilbert space H, spanned by one-dimensional vectors α1,
α2, α3. Consider the operators
A= a1Pα1+ a2Pα2+ a3Pα3,witha1 a2 a3 (5.17)
B= b1Pα1+ b2(Pα2+Pα3),with b1 b2 (5.18)
where Pαi projects onto the αi 1-D subspace. For instance, if we are considering a spin 1
system, A could be the observable for spin in the z direction Sz, with a1= 0, a2= 1, and
a3=− 1; and B would then be the observable A2, i.e. (Sz)2, with b1=0 and b2=1. Clearly
A and B are compatible, i.e. AB=BA.
5.11. This example is taken from [Teller, 1983], p.414.
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If the initial state is given by the vector
ψ= c1α1+ c2α2+ c3α3 (5.19)
where |c1|2+ |c2|2+ |c3|2=1, the probabilities for the events Pαi are given by
pψ(Pαi)= |ci|2 (5.20)
The Lüders rule yields the following values for Pψ(Pαi|Pα1)5.12
Pψ(Pα1|Pα1)= 1
Pψ(Pα2|Pα1)= 0
Pψ(Pα3|Pα1)= 0 (5.21)
and Pψ(Pαi|Pα2+Pα3)5.13
Pψ(Pα1|Pα2+Pα3)= 0
Pψ(Pα2|Pα2+Pα3)= |c2|
2
|c2|2+ |c3|2
Pψ(Pα3|Pα2+Pα3)= |c3|
2
|c2|2+ |c3|2 (5.22)
Can these probabilities be interpreted as conditional probabilities for the physical values
of A and B for a spin-1 particle? We begin with the unconditional probabilities assigned
to the various ai and bi’s. First, since the e-e link assigns each Pαi the eigenvalue ai, the
probabilities pψ(Pαi) can be directly understood in terms of the probabilities of the possible
values of observable A. And hence
pψ(Pαi)= p(ai)= |ci|2 (5.23)
In contrast, Pα2 and Pα3 are not each associated a particular value of B; rather the e-e
links assigns the quantum event (Pα2 + Pα3) the value b2. Thus, the probabilities for the
possible values of B are
p(b1)= pψ(Pα1)= |c1|2
p(b2)= pψ(Pα2+Pα3)= pψ(Pα2)+ pψ(Pα3)= |c2|2+ |c3|2 (5.24)
Turn now to the interpretation of the probabilities Pψ(Pαi|Pα1) given in (5.21). Since A
and B are compatible, it should be possible to interpret Pψ(Pαi|Pα1) as the probability
that observable A takes the value ai conditional on B taking the value b1, i.e. P(ai|b1).
This is particularly simple to see in the case of A= Sz, with a1= 0, a2=1, a3=− 1, and
B=(Sz)2, with b1=0 and b2=1. In effect, if the particle’s squared value of spin along the
5.12. Pψ(Pαi|Pα1)= pψPα1(Pαi)= 〈ψPα1, PαiψPα1〉= |〈αi|α1〉|2.
5.13. Pψ(Pαi|Pα2 + Pα3) = pψPα2+Pα3(Pαi) = 〈ψPα2+Pα3, Pαi ψPα2+Pα3〉 = |〈αi|ψPα2+Pα3〉|2 with ψPα2+Pα3 =
(Pα2 +Pα3) ψ
‖(Pα2 +Pα3) ψ‖
=
c2
|c2|2 + |c3|2
√ α2+ c3|c2|2 + |c3|2√ α3.
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z-axis is zero, i.e. b1=(sz0)
2=0, then its value of spin along the z-axis has to be zero, i.e.
a1= sz0=0, but cannot be one nor minus one, i.e. not a2= sz+1=+1 nor a3= sz−1=− 1.
The probability of a1 conditional on b1 should thus be one, i.e.
p(a1 given b1)= 1 (5.25)
which is precisely the value the Lüders rule assigns Pψ(Pα1|Pα1). And the probability of
a2 conditional on b1, and of a3 conditional on b1, should be zero, again in accordance with
the value the Lüders rule assigns Pψ(Pα1|Pα2) and Pψ(Pα1|Pα3).
Consider next the probabilities Pψ(Pαi|Pα2+Pα3) given in (5.22). Again, since A and
B are compatible, it should be possible to interpret Pψ(Pαi|Pα2+ Pα3) as the probability
that observable A takes the value ai conditional on B taking the value b2, i.e. P(ai|b2). In
effect, using the spin example, if the particle’s squared value of spin along the z-axis is one,
i.e. b2= (sz)2= 1, then its value of spin along the z-axis can either be one or minus one,
i.e. a2= sz+1 and a3= sz−1, but not zero, i.e. not a1= sz0. The probability of a1 conditional
on b2 should thus be zero
p(a1 given b2)= 0 (5.26)
which is precisely the value the Lüders rule assigns Pψ(Pα1|Pα2 + Pα3). In contrast, the
probability of a2 conditional on b1, and that of a3 conditional on b1, should not be zero;
rather their conditional-on-b2 probability should simply be the pro rata increase of their
unconditional probability. That is,
p(a2 given b2)=
pψ(a2)
pψ(b2)
=
|c2|2
|c2|2+ |c3|2
p(a3 given b2)=
pψ(a3)
pψ(b2)
=
|c3|2
|c2|2+ |c3|2 (5.27)
Again these values are the same as those assigned by the Lüders rule to Pψ(Pα2|Pα2+Pα3)
and Pψ(Pα3|Pα2+Pα3).
Hence, for compatible observables A and B, one can derive the probabilities defined by
the Lüders rule by thinking of them as conditional probabilities for the possible values of A
and B. As we pointed out in section 3.4, commuting observables act like random variables
whose stochastic properties can be found using classical probability theory. The probability
for the joint occurrence of values ai and bj, i.e. p(ai∩ bj), corresponds to the probability
for the corresponding projection operators, i.e. p(Pai∧Pbj); and, for commuting projectors,
Pai∧Pbj is simply the product PaiPbj, which is also equal to the common quantum event
employed by the Lüders rule, i.e. PbjPaiPbj. Thus, the probabilities defined by the Lüders
rule are straightforwardly classical conditional probabilities.
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Turn now to consider incompatible observables; in this case, one cannot derive the
probabilities defined by the Lüders rule by thinking of them as conditional probabilities
for the possible values of A and B. Consider, for instance, in example 5.1, the probability
PW(Pαi|Pβ1 + Pβ3). Even if the relation ‘ai and b1’ can be understood as the relation
of conjunction between the associated projectors of these eigenvalues, i.e. Pαi ∧ (Pβ1 +
Pβ3) (we elaborate on this in section 5.4.2), the probability assigned to this event does
not correspond to the ‘probability’ assigned to the common operator employed by the
projective notion of quantum conditional probability, i.e. (Pβ1+Pβ3)Pαi (Pβ1+Pβ3).
In effect, the probability of the projector associated with ‘ai and b1’, i.e. Tr[Pαi ∧
(Pβ1 + Pβ3)], is not equivalent to the ‘probability’ of the common projector employed by
the Lüders rule, i.e. Tr[(Pβ1 + Pβ3) Pαi (Pβ1 + Pβ3)]. This is due to the fact that, since
Pαi does not commute with Pβ1 nor with Pβ3, the projector Pαi ∧ (Pβ1 + Pβ3) is not
equal to the projector Pαi Pβ1 + Pαi Pβ3 (for i = 1, 2); and thus, its trace is not equal to
Tr[PαiPβ1+PαiPβ3], which is precisely the ‘probability’ of the common projector employed
by the Lüders rule. Indeed, by the cyclic property of the trace and the fact that the Pβi’s
are orthogonal, Tr[(Pβ1+Pβ3)Pαi (Pβ1+Pβ3)]=Tr[Pβ1PαiPβ1+Pβ1PαiPβ3+Pβ3PαiPβ1+
Pβ3PαiPβ3]=Tr[PαiPβ1
2 +PαiPβ3
2 ]=Tr[PαiPβ1+PαiPβ3]. Thus, PW(Pαi|Pβ1+Pβ3) cannot
be understood as the pro rata increase of the probability of ai and b2, and, therefore, it
cannot be interpreted as the probability of value ai conditional on b2.
Moreover, sometimes the projector P ∧Q cannot even be understood as (the standard)
conjunction of the associated eigenvalues, i.e. ‘p and q’, let alone be equal to the common
operator Q P Q. For instance, as in section 4.4, consider the case in which Q is the sum
of two orthogonal projection operators Q1 and Q2, i.e. Q = Q1 + Q2, where both Q1
and Q2 are associated distinct eigenvalues q1 and q2. Then, it turns out that projector
P ∧Q=P ∧ (Q1+Q2), although (somehow) understandable as the event ‘p and q1 or q2’,
cannot be read as the event ‘p and q1 or p and q2’ (we elaborate on this in section 5.4.2).
Thus, when projector Q is decomposed into the sum of the orthogonal projectors Qi, i.e.
Q =
∑
i
Qi, or, in other words, the event represented by Q is split into a set of physical
events that mutually exclude each other, the situation is even worse for the interpretation
of the probability PW(P |Q) as a conditional probability in terms of physical values.
To conclude, the probability PW(P |Q) defined by the Lüders rule cannot be read
as the probability of the physical value p conditional on the physical value q associated
with projectors P and Q (for P and Q incompatible events). It can only be interpreted
as a conditional probability at a formal or mathematical level for projection operators –
and then, only under a weak and counterintuitive construal of such a notion. To assign a
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number to two values of incompatible quantities one has to introduce a special rule such
as the Lüders rule. One might then call this an ‘extension’ of conditional probability, but
it is really a different concept that bears no resemblance with conditionality at any level
that is not purely formal.
The uniqueness argument of section 4.3 can only underwrite this formal notion, but
is mute as to its interpretation for physical values. Even if the probabilities defined by
the Lüders rule are co-extensive with classical conditional probabilities in their shared
domain of application, this formal argument does not provide any interpretive content so
as to justify regarding them as an extension or a generalization of classical conditional
probabilities to the quantum context at a physical level. Thus, although the premises of the
uniqueness argument are correct, its interpretive conclusion only follows at a formal level.
That is, it is a valid argument at a formal level – although with important reservations for
the formal notion it secures is rather poor and counterintuitive – but is invalid at physically
meaningful level.
Similarly, the argument of section 4.4 based on the non-additive character of the prob-
abilities defined by the Lüders rule, can also only work at a formal level. In addition,
precisely because of this non-additivity with respect to conditioning events, the event ‘p
and q1 or q2’ cannot be represented in terms of the projection operators P and Q as the
projector P ∧ (Q1+Q2), thus making their interpretation as conditional-on-physical-values
probabilities even more difficult. (Because not only is P ∧ (Q1 + Q2) not equivalent to
the common projector employed by the Lüders rule, but P ∧ (Q1 + Q2) cannot even be
interpreted as p and q1 or q2).
5.4 Disengaging Formal and Interpretive Features
Our claim that the probabilities defined by the Lüders rule cannot be interpreted as con-
ditional probabilities for physical values relies crucially on the premise that formal and
interpretive aspects need to be kept distinct when considering the meaning or interpret-
ation of a concept. And hence, the claim that the projective reading, even if poor and
counterintuitive, is a physically adequate interpretation of the probability defined by the
Lüders rule as a conditional probability only in so far as it translates to a reading in terms
of physically relevant values. In general, even if formal features are a good guide when
extending established concepts to new contexts, formal features alone can never justify that
the formally extended concept is also conceptually extending the notion to the new domain.
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This need to disengage formal and interpretive features is even more critical when
extending concepts to the quantum domain. We here consider the case of the so-
called ‘logic’ of quantum mechanics which provides a particularly illuminating illustra-
tion of this fact. Similarly to quantum ‘conditional probability’, although the ‘logical’
relations between quantum events are in many ways formally analogue to ordinary logical
relations between classical events, their meaning is so different from that of the latter,
that quantum ‘logical’ notions cannot be interpreted as extensions of our ordinary (phys-
ically meaningful) logical notions. This will further shed light on the difficulties to interpret
the probabilities defined by the Lüders rule as quantum conditional probabilities.
5.4.1 Quantum Logic
As we saw in chapter 3, in the quantum event structure L(H) one can define algebraic
relations between the projection operators representing quantum events which are the
counterparts of set-union, set-intersection, and set-complementation. These are, respect-
ively, the orthogonal projection onto the closed subspace spanned by the ranges of P and
Q, i.e. P ∨ Q; the orthogonal projection onto the intersection of the ranges of P and Q,
i.e. P ∧ Q; and the orthogonal projection onto the complement of the closed subspace
spanned by the range of P , i.e. P⊥= I −P . Many of the relations between the quantum
algebraic relations are similar to those between the classical one. For example, just as
(Ac)c=A holds for set-complementation, (P⊥)⊥=P holds for subspace-complementation;
or just as A∪Ac=S in F(S), P ∨P⊥= I in L(H); or similarly to (A∩Ac)c=S, we have
(P ∧P⊥)⊥= I.
Now, in classical logic, the logical relations between events (or propositions repres-
enting those events) correspond naturally to the algebraic relations between the subsets
that represent those events. To the disjunction of events ‘or’, there corresponds the set-
union (A ∪ B); to the conjunction of events ‘and’, there corresponds the set-intersection
(A ∩ B); and to the negation of events ‘not’, there corresponds the set-complementation
(Ac). The suggestion is, thus, that, given the similarities between the classical and the
quantum algebraic relations, the algebraic relations in L(H) correspond to ‘quantum logical
relations’, where it is assumed that these provide some kind of extension of our ordinary
logical notions in the quantum context. Thus, the algebraic relation ‘∨ ’ between quantum
projectors is interpreted as the quantum logical ‘or’ for quantum events. Similarly, the
algebraic relation ‘∧ ’ is taken to correspond to the quantum logical ‘and’, and ‘⊥ ’ is read
as the quantum logical ‘not’.5.14
5.14. [Putnam, 1969]
78 Interpreting Quantum Conditional Probability I
However, just as with quantum ‘conditional probability’, these analogies turn out to
hold only at a purely formal level. That is, the algebraic relations ‘ ∨ ’, ‘ ∧ ’, and ‘ ⊥ ’
for quantum projectors cannot be understood, respectively, as generalized or extended
notions of the ordinary logical concepts of disjunction (‘or’), conjunction (‘and’) – when the
algebraic relation ‘∧ ’ appears in an expression along with relations ‘∨ ’ and/or ‘⊥ ’ – and
negation (‘not’) from any physically meaningful perspective. And hence, for example, even
if formally one has (P⊥)⊥=P , one should not interpret this equation as double negation;
nor should one interpret P ∨P⊥ or (P ∧P⊥)⊥ as the logical laws of excluded middle and
non-contradiction respectively.
5.4.1.1 A Toy Model
[Arthur Fine, 1972] argues for this conclusion by constructing the analogue to quantum
logic for a simple, two-dimensional system. In this logic it is clear that the meaning of the
algebraic relations differs substantially from the meaning of the ordinary logical relations.
And hence, the conclusion that the former cannot be regarded as extensions of the latter.
These conclusions then carry over to quantum logic. Let us consider this toy model.
Consider the location of a certain point P on a given circle C. Suppose that for the
location of P there are three accessible regions: (1) the center of the circle, (2) the entire
area of the circle and (3) any diameter of the circle. Any sentence of the form ‘P is on X’,
where X is one of the accessible regions, corresponds to an elementary sentence. The idea
is to construct a logic from the elementary sentences by introducing sentential connectives
and truth conditions.
Let us first introduce the binary connective ‘∧ ’ such that for elementary sentences ‘P
is on X ’ and ‘P is on Y ’, the conjunction
‘P is on X ’ ∧ ‘P is on Y ’ ≡ ‘P is on Z’
where Z describes the region of the circle that is the intersection of the X and Y regions.
One can readily verify that the intersection of two accessible regions is again an accessible
region and, therefore, that conjunction is well-defined. The functor ‘ ∧ ’ is just the usual
sentential conjunction with regard to the interpretation of sentences as locating the particle
on the circle.
It is also the usual conjunction with regard to truth conditions. In effect, each possible
location L for the particle P that is on the circle but not at the center yields an assignment
of truth values according to the prescription:
‘P is on X ’ is true under L iff under L, P is on X.
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Hence the sentence ‘P is on the center of the circle’ is false under all truth assignments
(and will play the role of ‘the false’ in this system.) And the semantic rule for conjunction
is thus defined as follows. If φ, ψ are elementary sentences, an assignment L of truth values
to the elementary sentences automatically assigns truth values to conjunctions according
to the rule
‘φ∧ ψ’ is true under L iff ‘φ’ and ‘ψ’ are true under L
The functor ‘∧ ’ is thus also the usual conjunction with regard to truth conditions. Note
that the semantic notions of validity and logical equivalence are defined as usual
φ is valid iff φ is true under all assignments of truth values
φ is logically equivalent to ψ iff φ and ψ have the same truth value under all
assignments
The situation with negation is, however, quite different. If one wanted to introduce the
usual negation, then one should introduce a unary functor ‘∼ ’ as
∼ (P is on X) ≡ P is in the circle but not on the regions described by X
The problem with the ‘∼ ’ definition of negation is that the set of elementary sentences is
not closed under it. For example, if X describes a diameter, then ∼ (P is on X) describes
the circle minus a diameter, which is not an accessible region. For the elementary sentences
to be closed under negation ‘ ∼ ’ one can either expand the list of accessible regions so
as to include with each region on the list its complement relative to the circle (and then
introduce ordinary negation as above), or retain the previous list of accessible regions by
introducing a unary functor under which the elementary sentences are closed. The new
functor will, therefore, be different from the ordinary sentential negation.
Consider the second option and define the unary functor ‘¬’ as
¬(P is on X) ≡ P is on X⊥
where if R is the region described by X, then X⊥ describes (1) the center of the circle
if R is the whole circle, (2) the whole circle if R is the center of the circle, and (3) the
diameter perpendicular toR if R is a diameter. Note that ‘¬’ satisfies the desired involutary
property, namely ¬(¬P ) = P . Also, an assignment L of truth values to the elementary
sentences automatically assigns truth values to ¬φ according to the rule
If ‘φ’ is true under L, then ‘¬φ’ is false under L
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However, contrary to conjunction, the functor ‘¬’ is not the usual logical negation. Both
with regard to the interpretation of sentences as locating the particle on the circle and with
regard to truth conditions.
First, to deny that point P is in diameter X is not to assert that it is in the diameter
perpendicular to X , as ‘negation’ ¬ prescribes. Indeed, the point could be anywhere in
the circle! Second, whereas the above semantic rule holds for ‘negation’ ‘¬’, its converse
– while true for ordinary negation – does not hold here. For example, suppose that the
assignment L derives from P being on diameter X. If φ is the sentence ‘P is on Y ’, where
Y describes a diameter not perpendicular to the X diameter, then both ‘P is on Y ’ and ‘P
is on Y ⊥’ are false under L; that is, both ‘φ’ and ‘¬φ’ are false under L. The trouble arises
because if it is false that P is on a certain diameter, it does not follow that P is on the
perpendicular diameter. Thus, even though the set of elementary sentences is closed under
functor ‘¬’, it is not ordinary negation nor an extension of it.
Finally, given conjunction and negation, one can introduce disjunction by the De
Morgan Laws
(φ∨ ψ) ≡ ¬(¬φ∧¬ψ)
The semantics forced on disjunction by this definition are as follows:
If ‘φ’ is true under L or ‘ψ’ is true under L, then ‘φ∨ ψ’ is true under L
The converse, however, does not hold, that is, the disjunction can be true although neither
disjunct is true. For example, if φ, ψ locate P in distinct diameters, then the disjunction
(φ∨ ψ) is true under all assignments of truth values, since it merely says that P is some-
where on the circle. And under an assignment in which P is on neither of the mentioned
diameters, each disjunct will be false, whereas the disjunction as a whole will be true. Also
notice that if φ, ψ locate P in distinct diameters, the conjunction (φ ∧ ψ) is false under
all assignments, since it would place P on the center of the circle. Thus, the algebraic
relation ‘∨ ’ cannot be understood as disjunction nor as an extension of it.
To finish, let us look at the distributive law. Suppose φ1, φ2, φ3 locate P on distinct
diameters R1, R2, R3 respectively. The conjunction (φ1 ∨ φ2) ∧ φ3 locates P on R3 while
the disjunction (φ1∧ φ3)∨ (φ2∧ φ3) locates P on the center of the circle. Thus the latter
disjunction is false under every assignment of truth values while the former conjunction is
true under the assignment where P is on R3. Hence
(φ1∨ φ2)∧ φ3 (φ1∧ φ3)∨ (φ2∧ φ3) (5.28)
5.4 Disengaging Formal and Interpretive Features 81
and the distributive law does not hold in this ‘circular logic’. The distributive law fails
due to the oddities of disjunction, which in turn derive from the nonstandard ‘negation’
‘¬’. But given that the latter differs in meaning (with regard to both interpretation and
truth conditions) form ordinary negation, the failure of the distributive law for this system
does not illustrate how the ordinary law of distributivity might be false. To assert the
distributive law in this circular logic is not to assert the ordinary distributive law at all.
5.4.1.2 Quantum Logic
Similarly to the definition of ‘negation’ ‘¬’ in the ‘circular logic’, quantum logic also chooses
the second option when defining quantum ‘negation’, or nequation, as Fine calls it, where
the ‘q’ reminds us of quantum theory and the difference in spelling helps us to keep in
mind the difference between negation and nequation. The features of ‘circular logic’ hence
have their corresponding analogues in quantum ‘logic’. Let us consider them.
In quantum logic the elementary sentences are of the form ‘observable A takes a value
in the Borel set b’ – what we have been calling quantum events PA(b). For operators with
discrete spectrum, the elementary sentences are of the form ‘observable A takes a value
ai’, where ai is an eigenvalue of the operator A, and are represented by the projector Pai
A.
(Note that the sentences or events are referred to a fixed system.) The assignments of truth
values are simply the various states ψ of the system.5.15 Indeed, for an elementary sentence
Pai and state ψ
Pai is true under an assignment Vψ (i.e. in state ψ) iff ψ is an eigenstate of Pai 5.16
The unary functor ⊥ is defined on the quantum event P ∈L(H) as
P⊥ ≡ orthogonal projection onto the complement of the closed subspace spanned
by the range of P
An assignment Vψ of truth values to the elementary sentences automatically assigns truth
values to the nequation of Pai, i.e. (Pai)
⊥, according to the rule
If ‘Pai’ is true under Vψ, then ‘(Pai)
⊥’ is false under Vψ
Similarly to ‘¬’ in the ‘circular logic’, nequation ‘ ⊥ ’ cannot be interpreted as logical
negation nor an extension of it. For example, consider a two dimensional Hilbert space and
an observable A with a discrete and non-degenerate spectrum A= a1Pa1+ a2Pa2. For Pa1
5.15. For ease of exposition we will stick to pure states ψ and operators with discrete spectrum.
5.16. We use Vψ to note an assignment of truth values rather than Lψ, which can be confused with subspace Lψ.
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and Pa2 (which are orthogonal projectors), nequation prescribes that to deny that event
Pa1, i.e. observable A takes value a1, is the case is to assert that event Pa2, i.e. observable
A takes value a2, is the case. But again this is crazy. For the event could be any of the
possible combinations of Pa1 and Pa2, i.e. c1Pa1+ c2Pa2 with b 0 and |c1|2+ |c2|2=1, in
which case A would simply take no value for state ψ.
Moreover, whereas the above semantic rule holds for nequation ‘⊥ ’, its converse – while
true for ordinary negation – does not hold here. For example, suppose that the assignment
Vψ derives from A taking no value, e.g. ψ= c1α1+ c2α2, with c1 and c2 different from zero.
If Paj is the sentence ‘A takes value aj’, then both ‘A takes value aj’ and ‘A takes a value
ai different form aj’ are false under Vψ (because ψ is not an eigenstate of either). That
is, both ‘Paj’ and ‘(Paj)
⊥’ are false under Vψ and thus the semantic rule ‘if ‘(Pai)⊥’ is true
under Vψ, then ‘Pai’ is false under Vψ’ does not hold. The trouble arises because nequation
of (Pψ), i.e. it is false that A takes no value, implies (Pψ)⊥, i.e. A takes no value, and not
Pai, i.e. A takes a determinate value (any of the eigenvalues of A), as it would intuitively
do if it could be interpreted as negation.
If one wanted to introduce ordinary negation, then one would define the negation
of ‘A takes the value ai’ as the assertion that ‘either A takes no value or it takes a value
corresponding to an eigenvalue different from ai’. This negation is true under an assignment
Vψ just in case ψ is either not an eigenstate of A, i.e. ψ is a superposition of eigenstates
of A with distinct eigenvalues, or ψ is an eigenstate of A but with eigenvalue different
from ai, i.e. ψ lies in the subspace (Lai)
⊥ orthogonal to the space spanned by Pai. Thus
the negation of ‘A takes the value ai’ is true under Vψ iff either ψ is a superposition of
eigenstates of A with distinct eigenvalues, or Vψ lies in (Lai)
⊥.
Both alternatives of defining negation are perfectly meaningful and experimentally
verifiable. Nevertheless, as we have seen, quantum logic does not use this last negation. It
instead focuses on only one of the alternatives above and takes the quantum ‘negation’ to
be nequation, and thus takes the ‘negation’ of ‘A takes the value ai’ to be ‘A takes a value
corresponding to an eigenvalue different from ai’, which is true under Vψ just in case ψ lies
in (Lai)
⊥. Notice that nequation corresponds to negation for compatible observables, but
is completely different from it for incompatible events. Indeed, the nequation of ‘A takes
no value under Vψ’, i.e. (Pψ)⊥, is also ‘A takes no value under Vψ’, and thus has nothing
to do with negation. Hence, similarly to quantum conditional probability, the fact that
nequation is co-extensive with negation in their shared domain of application, does not
guarantee that outside that domain the nequation can be regarded as an extension or a
generalization of negation.
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Conjunction is defined in quantum ‘logic’ analogously to that of the ‘circular logic’:
‘Pai∧Paj’ is true under Vψ iff ‘Pai’ and ‘Paj’ are true under Vψ.
As we can see, the functor ‘∧ ’ is just the ordinary relation ‘and’. Disjunction is also defined
in quantum ‘logic’ analogously to disjunction in the ‘circular logic’:
If ‘Pai’ is true under Vψ or ‘Paj’ is true under Vψ, then ‘Pai∨Paj’ is true under Vψ
and thus presents analogue problems for its interpretation as an extension of the logical ‘or’.
Indeed, the converse of this semantic rule for disjunction does not hold; that is, the disjunc-
tion can be true although neither disjunct is true. For example, for an assignment of truth
values Vψ with ψ= c1α1+ c2α2 and observable A= a1Pa1+ a2Pa2, the disjunct Pa1∨Pa2
is true in ψ (because ψ is an eigenstate of PI), while neither Pa1 nor Pa2 are true in ψ
(because if both c1 and c2 are different from zero ψ is not an eigenstate of Pa1 nor Pa2).
And hence, for the system in state ψ, A does not take value a1 nor does it take value a2,
yet A does take some value. This certainly precludes understanding disjunction ‘∨ ’ as an
extension of the logical relation ‘or’.
Another particularly relevant example is the following. For incompatible quantities
A and B, the conjunction Pai∧Pbj is false under all truth assignments. For example, for
a spin 1
2
particle and an assignment of truth values Vψ with ψ = c1 ψs+z + c2 ψs−z, the
conjunct Ps+z ∧ Ps+x is false for any c1, c2. And hence the spin 12 particle can never take
both a positive value of spin along the z-axis and a positive value of spin along the x-axis.5.17
This is the famous non-simultaneity of incompatible observables (in this example Sx and
Sz). Similarly, the non-simultaneity of position and momentum of a quantum mechanical
particle, i.e. the non-localizability of such a particle in arbitrarily regions of both position
and momentum, is a consequence of the fact that the conjunction Pδx∧Pδp is false under
all truth assignments.
5.4.2 Quantum Conditional Probability
In section 5.3 we argued that the quantum probabilities defined by the Lüders rule are con-
ditional probabilities for values of physical quantities only if the quantities are compatible.
Our discussion on quantum logic helps us understand why Pψ(Pαi|Pα2+Pα3) in example
5.2, for A and B compatible quantities, can be so interpreted, and why Pψ(Pαi|Pβ1+Pβ3)
5.17. Notice these two examples are analogue to the two particular cases we considered at the end of section
5.4.1.1.
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in example 5.1, for A and B incompatible quantities, cannot . Briefly, even though both
[Pαi ∧ (Pα2 + Pα3)] in example 5.2 and Pαi ∧ (Pβ1 + Pβ3) in example 5.1 correspond,
respectively, to ‘A takes the value ai and B takes the value b2’ and ‘A takes the value
ai and B takes the value b1’, where ‘and’ is the ordinary conjunction relation, the latter
event is false under all truth assignments and thus cannot serve as the common quantum
projector to which a rationale for why the probability defined by the Lüders rule for Pαi
and Pβ1+Pβ3 is non-zero could resort to.
In more detail, consider first the example with incompatible observables. The event
Pαi∧ (Pβ1+Pβ3) corresponds to ‘A takes the value ai and B takes the value b1’, with ‘and’
the ordinary logical relation. However, it is false under all truth assignments Vψ since there
is no state ψ which is an eigenstate of both Pαi and (Pβ1+Pβ3). Hence the probability of
ai conditional on b1 should be zero for all ψ, which we know is not what the Lüders rule
prescribes. Thus the probabilityPψ(Pαi|Pβ1+Pβ3) cannot be understood as the probability
of ai conditional on b1. Only if either c1 or c3 are zero, will the Lüders rule also assign
a zero value to this probability and will one be able to understand it as a conditional
probability. Indeed, if c1=0, p(a1)= 0 and thus p(a1|b1) = 0; and if c3=0, p(a3)= 0 and
thus p(a3|b1)= 0.
Turn now to the example with compatible observables. Event [Pαi ∧ (Pα2 + Pα3)]
corresponds to ‘A takes the value ai and B takes the value b2’ – ‘ai and b2’ in short –
where ‘and’ is the ordinary conjunction relation. But now, depending on the truth value
assignment Vψ, ‘ai and b2’ will either be true – in which case it will be assigned a probability
one – or be false – in which case it will be assigned a zero probability, or have no determinate
truth value – in which case its probability will be in the open interval (0, 1). Increasing
pro rata these joint probabilities yields the same value as that of Pψ(Pαi|Pα2+Pα3).
Indeed, if ai= a1 then ‘a1 and b2’ is false under all truth assignments Vψ because there
is no ψ which is an eigenstate of both Pα1 and (Pα2 + Pα3). Hence, p(a1 and b2) = 0 and
p(a1|b2) = 0. Second, if ai= a2, then ‘a2 and b2’ can either be true, false or indeterminate
depending on the truth value assignment Vψ. It is false only under a truth assignment Vψ
for which ψ = 0 (c1= c2= c3= 0), in which case p(a2|b2) = 0. It is true if ψ = α2 (c2= 1)
since α2 is an eigenstate of both Pα2 and (Pα2 + Pα3), and hence p(a2|b2) = 1. Under all
other truth value assignments, ‘a1 and b2’ is not either true nor false but rather will not
take a determine value since ψ cannot be an eigenstate of both Pα2 and (Pα2 + Pα3). In
this case its probability will be determined by the trace rule as Tr[W (Pα2∧ (Pα2+Pα3))]=
Tr(WPα2)= pψ(a2). And increasing this value pro rata, we get P(a2|b2)= |c2|
2
|c2|2+ |c3|2 . (Note
that the same reasoning applies when ai= a3.)
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Lastly, consider the case in which Q is the sum of two orthogonal projection operators
Q1 and Q2, i.e. Q=Q1+Q2, where both Q1 and Q2 are associated distinct eigenvalues q1
and q2. For example, as in section 4.3.1, take a spin-1 particle and let Q1 and Q2 be the
events ‘the x-component is + 1’ and ‘the x-component is 0’, respectively, i.e. Q1= Psx+1
and Q2 = Psx0. And let P be the event ‘the y-component is + 1’, i.e. P = Psy+1. Recall
that the probability defined by the Lüders rule in this case is given by
Pψ(Psy+1|Psx+1 + Psx0) =
( ‖Psx+1 ψ‖
‖(Psx+1+Psx0) ψ‖
)2
Pψ(Psy+1|Psx+1) +(
‖Psx0 ψ‖
‖(Psx+1+Psx0) ψ‖
)2
Pψ(Psy+1|Psx0) +
‖Psx+1 ψ‖ ‖Psx0 ψ‖
‖(Psx+1+Psx0) ψ‖2
Re
〈
Psx+1 ψ
||Psx+1 ψ‖
,
Psy+1
Psx0 ψ
||Psx0 ψ‖
〉
(5.29)
The question is whether Pψ(Psy+1|Psx+1+Psx0) can be interpreted as the probability that
the y-component of spin is + 1 conditional on the x-component being + 1 or 0, i.e. the
probability of physical value ‘sy+1’ conditional on physical value ‘sx+1 or sx0’.
The problem here is two-fold. First, the event ‘the y-component of spin is +1 and the x-
component of spin is +1 or 0’, i.e. the event ‘sy+1 and sx+1 or sx0’, cannot be represented as
Psy+1∧ (Psx+1∨Psx0). And second, even if Psy+1∧ (Psx+1∨Psx0) could be so understood, the
probability assigned to it does not correspond to the probability assigned to the common
operator of P and Q employed in the Lüders rule, i.e. QPQ. Thus, its probability would
not be equal to that given by (5.29). Hence, Pψ(Psy+1|Psx+1+Psx0) cannot be interpreted
as the probability that the y-component of spin is + 1 conditional on the x-component
being +1 or 0.
Consider the first problem is some more detail. The fact that ‘sy+1 and sx+1 or sx0’,
cannot be represented as Psy+1 ∧ (Psx+1 ∨ Psx0) is due to the fact that the algebraic
relations ‘ ∨ ’ and ‘ ∧ ’ in this expression cannot be understood, respectively, as ordinary
disjunction and conjunction (nor as extensions of these notions). Indeed, Psy+1∧ (Psx+1∨
Psx0) can seemingly be read as ‘sy+1 and sx+1 or sx0’, because ‘∧ ’ defines the usual notion
of conjunction, and ‘∨ ’ applies here to two orthogonal and, therefore, compatible events.
However, if Psy+1 ∧ (Psx+1 ∨ Psx0) could really be thus read, then its reading as ‘sy+1
and sx+1 or sy+1 and sx0’ should also be possible. For otherwise ‘ ∧ ’ and ‘ ∨ ’ could not
be interpreted as the logical relations of conjunction and disjunction. And the problem
is that Psy+1 ∧ (Psx+1 ∨ Psx0) cannot be read as ‘sy+1 and sx+1 or sy+1 and sx0’ because,
given that Psy+1 and Psx+1 and Psx0 are incompatible, Psy+1 ∧ (Psx+1 ∨ Psx0) is not equal
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to (Psy+1 ∧ Psx+1) ∨ (Psy+1 ∧ Psx0). Thus even if the algebraic relation ‘ ∨ ’ applies to
two orthogonal and, therefore, compatible, events in Psy+1 ∧ (Psx+1 ∨ Psx0) it cannot be
understood as ordinary disjunction nor as an extension of it.5.18 Once again, we see that,
when incompatible events are involved, the conceptual difficulties associated with the non-
Boolean character of the quantum event structure arise.
To sum up, for incompatible quantities P and Q, the event ‘p and q’ cannot always
be represented in terms of the projection operators P and Q as P ∧ Q, and in the cases
in which such a correspondence does exist, the probability assigned to the event P ∧ Q
does not correspond to the probability assigned to the common operator of P and Q
employed by the projective notion of quantum conditional probability, i.e. QPQ. Thus,
the probability PW(P |Q) defined by the Lüders rule cannot be understood as the pro
rata increase of the probability of ‘p and q’; and hence, it cannot be interpreted as the
probability of value p conditional on value q for P and Q incompatible quantities.
There is thus no physically meaningful quantum notion of conditional probability.
Only at mathematical level, in which we cannot appeal to Boolean intuitions, does it seem
possible to interpret the probabilities defined by the Lüders rule as such.
5.5 A new concept?
As we have shown, when extending a concept into a new domain, it is not sufficient to
show that there are some formal analogies between the old and the extended concept. In
addition, it is essential to evaluate whether these analogies can provide enough interpretive
content so as to justify regarding the concept in the new domain as an extension or a
generalization of the old one. In the case of the probabilities defined by the Lüders rule
we have argued that the formal analogies do not provide enough interpretive content so as
to justify regarding them as an extension or a generalization of classical conditional prob-
abilities to the quantum context from a physically meaningful perspective; they can only,
and with great difficulty, be interpreted as extensions of classical conditional probabilities
at a purely formal level.
5.18. This same conclusion can also be reached in the following way. The disjunct Psx+1 ∨ Psx0 is true in
ψ = c+1 ψsx+1 + c0 ψsx0 + c−1 ψsx−1 (because ψ is an eigenstate of PI), while neither Psx+1 nor Psx0 are true in ψ
(because if both c+1 and c0 are different from zero, ψ is not an eigenstate of Psx+1 nor of Psx0). And hence, for the
system in state ψ, Sx does not take value + 1 nor does it take value 0, yet Sx does take some value, something
which certainly precludes understanding ‘∨ ’ as logical disjunction.
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But a question remains. Does the Lüders rule define any concept which can be under-
stood from a physically meaningful perspective? After all, quantum theory is not just a
formal mathematical theory, but a theory which purportedly describes the physical world.
To try to answer this question we first need to make a small detour and consider how
measurement was introduced into quantum theory in the attempt to make it a little more
comprehensible.
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Chapter 6
Orthodox Quantum Theory
We have so far been concerned with the conceptual understanding of quantum probability
theory. This theory is a perfectly consistent mathematical theory. The problem is that it
is not at all clear how to get from it to a consistent and satisfactory physical theory. In
this chapter we present in some detail how the orthodox account of quantum mechanics
manages to get a consistent, though not very satisfactory physical theory if one wants to
interpret it as something more than a mere algorithm for generating the statistical predic-
tions of the outcomes of measurements. A central element of the orthodox interpretation
is its adherence to the so-called Projection (or Collapse) Postulate which prescribes that
every measurement, represented by some suitably chosen observable, leads to non-unitary
reduction of the total state vector to an eigenstate of the measured observable.
In section 6.1 we present the so-called quantum measurement problem, namely the
problem of reconciling the fact that quantum mechanics predicts no definite outcomes
for measurements and the fact that (we perceive) measurements do have definite out-
comes. Then, in section 6.2, we present how the orthodox account, as presented by [von
Neumann, 1932], solves this problem by changing the dynamics of quantum mechanics
when measurements are performed: states always evolve in accordance with the linear
dynamics of the Schrödinger equation except when measurements are performed, for which
a nonlinear collapse dynamics, explicitly probabilistic, takes over. Under this view, when
a measurement of a physical observable is performed upon a system, the system’s state
will instantaneously, and non-linearly, ‘jump’ or ‘collapse’, with a certain probability, to
one of the eigenstates of the observable being measured. This is the so-called ‘Projection
Postulate’, which ensures that after the measuring interaction the measurement device
does have a definite outcome.
The Lüders rule appears in the orthodox interpretation of quantum mechanics as the
generalized version of the Projection Postulate. It determines uniquely the state of the
system after a measurement of a certain physical quantity with degenerate eigenvalues.
This new density matrix W can then be used to calculate probability assignments for
subsequent measurements. Hence, as we discuss in section 6.3, it seems that the probability
given by this new density operator can be interpreted as the probability of a measurement
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outcome of the second measurement conditional on a measurement outcome of the first one.
We refer to this interpretation of the probability defined by the Lüders rule as ‘conditional-
on-measurement-outcome probability’.
Then, in section 6.4, we distinguish this conditional-on-measurement-outcome prob-
ability from another type of (purportedly) conditional probability which also arises in the
context of quantum measurements. Indeed, it is not uncommon to hear that all quantum
probabilities are conditional probabilities for measurement outcomes conditional on meas-
urements. However, we argue that these conditional-on-measurement probabilities are not
really conditional probabilities. Finally, in section 6.5, we argue that the orthodox inter-
pretation, with its reliance on the Projection Postulate, does not provide an adequate
interpretation of quantum theory unless one thinks of quantum theory instrumentally.
6.1 The Consistency – or Measurement – Problem
As we have seen, in quantum mechanics each system is associated to a Hilbert space H and
the state of a system is represented by a density operator W defined on H. Observables
are represented by Hermitian operators acting on H, where their possible values are given
by the spectrum of the operator which represents them. The evolution in time of a system
which begins in state Wt0 at the initial time t0 is given by the time-evolution unitary
operator Ut−t0 = e
−iH (t−t0), where H is the Hamiltonian operator for a given system,
according to the equation
Wt=Ut−t0Wt0Ut−t0
−1 (6.1)
If the system’s state is a pure state represented by the vector ψt, then (6.1) may be written
as
dψt
d t
=− i ~Hψt (6.2)
This expression of the dynamical equation for quantum systems is usually referred to as
the Schrödinger equation. The dynamics given by (6.1) or (6.2) is linear and deterministic.
A problem arises if we attempt to describe measurement interactions by a unitary
operator for, as we now show, measurements then generally turn out to not have definite
outcomes. However, it is an empirical fact that measurements do have definite outcomes
(or, at the very least, we perceive definite outcomes at the conclusion of a measurement).
The difficulty of reconciling these two facts, i.e. that quantum mechanics predicts no
definite outcomes for measurements and that (we perceive) measurements do have definite
outcomes, is generally known as the ‘measurement problem’. Let us consider this problem
in some detail.
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A familiar idealization of the measurement process amounts to supposing that meas-
uring instruments are non-destructive. This means that when a measurement is performed
the physical system and the measuring instrument, initially separated, will first form a
compound system, both preserving their own identity during the mutual interaction, and
then, become separated again after a certain time. This enables one to ascribe both the
system and the measuring instrument a final state after the measurement. It is important to
realize that many actual measurements instruments violate this idealization: for example, a
photon spectrometer measures the energy of a photon by absorbing it and hence destroying
it by the very act of measurement.
A further idealization is that of an ideal measurement. To establish a correlation
between the values of a certain property of the system and the values of another prop-
erty of the measuring device requires some sort of interaction between the system and
the measuring apparatus. For some measuring interactions one can suppose that the mag-
nitude of the interaction can be made so small that the system’s state remains totally
unaffected. An ideal measurement is precisely a measurement in which the state of the
system remains unchanged after the measurement interaction.
Quantum theory would initially describe a measurement interaction as any other phys-
ical interaction by first, ascribing a quantum state to the measuring device and then,
treating the interaction between the system and the measuring device as a quantum
interaction, i.e. one that obeys the Schrödinger equation or, more generally, one that
is described by a unitary operator. Let us see how an ideal measurement works in the
quantum context. We employ pure states and observables with discrete spectrum to keep
the formulation simple.
Suppose that a quantum system begins in the state α1, an eigenvector of observable A
with eigenvalue a1. We perform an ideal measurement of A: the measuring device begins
in a ready-to-measure state M0, i.e. an eigenstate of an observable M , and after the
measurement is perfectly correlated with the value of A possessed by the system:
α1M0 α1M1 (6.3)
where M1 is the state of the apparatus that indicates the value of a1. The interaction in
(6.3) can be rewritten in terms of a unitary time evolution operator U(t) as Ut(α1M0) =
α1 M1. Since the states before and after the interaction are simultaneous eigenstates of
A⊗ I and I ⊗M , the eigenstate-eigenvalue link allows an ascription of the value a1 to the
system, both before and after the interaction, and of the value m0 to the measuring device
before the measurement, and m1 after the measurement.
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Similarly, if the system begins in the state α2, then the interaction of the system with
the measuring device will be:
α2M0 α2M2 (6.4)
and the e-e link allows an ascription of the value a2 to the system, both before and after
the interaction, and of the value m0 to the measuring device before the measurement, and
m2 after the measurement. Similarly, (6.4) can be rewritten in terms of a unitary time
evolution operator U(t) as Ut(α2M0)=α2M2.
So far so good. But consider what happens now if the system is in a superposition of
the states α1 and α2, i.e. ψ=c1α1+ c2α2. This interaction, given that physical interactions
are described by some unitary operator which is linear, is 6.1
ψM0=(c1α1+ c2α2)M0 c1α1M1+ c2α2M2 (6.5)
The initial state ψ, although not an eigenstate of A⊗ I , was an eigenstate of I ⊗M . But
the final state c1α1M1+ c2α2M2 is not an eigenstate of either A⊗ I or I ⊗M ; indeed, the
measurement interaction has left the joint system still in a non-eigenstate of A⊗ I and has
changed the joint system into a non-eigenstate of I ⊗M . Hence, after the measurement
interaction, the eigenstate-eigenvalue link, implies that no single, definite state, and hence
no definite outcome, can be attributed to the measuring device.6.2 So how is it then that at
the conclusion of a measurement we always observe a definite outcome? This is the famous
measurement problem of quantum mechanics.6.3
The foundations and philosophy of quantum mechanics literature is loaded with articles
considering this problem and trying to provide adequate answers to it. The different solu-
tions proposed give rise to the myriad of interpretations of quantum mechanics. We here
only consider the orthodox (textbook) interpretation with its famous collapse or projection
postulate. To name a few others: the relative-state interpretations, introduced by [Everett,
1957] and further developed as ‘many-worlds’ and ‘many-minds’ interpretations, propose
alternative readings of the formalism of standard quantum mechanics; the class of modal
6.1. Indeed, by linearity of the time evolution operator U(t), we have that Ut[(c1α1+c2α2)M0]=Ut (c1α1M0)+
Ut (c2α2M0)= c1α1M1+ c2α2M2.
6.2. Note that no single, definite state, and hence no definite outcome, can be attributed to the system either,
both before and after the measurement. This also presents an interpretive problem. However, given that the systems
which quantum mechanics describes are generally too small to be observed by ‘ordinary’ means (although not all
those which it presumably describes are small!; see section 6.5), this issue becomes more pressing for macroscopic
systems such as measuring devices.
6.3. The ‘measurement problem’ is actually a more complex problem which contains two separate questions,
namely, why we perceive a single outcome for the determinate variable –this is the problem we have presented and
is referred to as ‘the problem of outcomes’ – and why a particular quantity (usually position) is always selected as
the determinate variable. The latter is known as ‘the preferred-basis problem’. For a more detailed exposition see,
for example, [Schlosshauer & Fine, 2007], [Maudlin, 1995].
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interpretations, first suggested by [van Fraassen, 1991], modify the rules that connect
the formalism to the actual physical properties (they reject the ‘rule of silence’); physical
collapse theories like the Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber (GRW) approach [GRW, 1986] change
the dynamics and postulate new physical mechanisms; and the de Broglie-Bohm pilot-wave
theory, is a highly nonlocal hidden-variable interpretation [Bohm, 1952] which changes the
state space by introducing additional variables – the so-called ‘hidden variables’ – and also
introduces additional governing equations.
6.2 The Projection Postulate
6.2.1 Von Neumann’s Projection Postulate
The orthodox account, as presented by [von Neumann, 1932] (pp. 347-349), solves the
measurement problem by changing the dynamics of quantum mechanics and postulating
the existence of ‘collapses’: states always evolve in accordance with the linear dynamics of
the Schrödinger equation except when measurements are performed, for which a nonlinear
collapse dynamics, explicitly probabilistic, takes over. Under this view, when a measure-
ment of a physical observable A is performed upon a system in state ψ, the system’s state
will instantaneously, and non-linearly, ‘jump’ or ‘collapse’ to one of the eigenstates αi
of the observable being measured. This ensures that after the measuring interaction the
measurement device will have a definite outcome: ψ will collapse to a particular eigenstate
αi of A – rather than remain a superposition of the different αi’s – and hence ψM0 will
evolve to a particular αiMi.
The orthodox account further postulates that the probability with which the state’s
system collapses onto each particular αi after the measurement of observable A is per-
formed is given by the Born rule, namely,
pψ(ai)= |〈αi, ψ〉|2 (6.6)
where ai is the eigenvalue associated with the eigenvector αi. This rule can be more
generally expressed in terms of the projection operator Pai onto the subspace αi as
pψ(ai)= 〈ψ,Paiψ〉 (6.7)
Or, even more generally, in terms of the density operator W =Pψ, as
pW(ai)=Tr(WPai) (6.8)
This new kind of time evolution, which is explicitly probabilistic, is the content of the
projection postulate.
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Proposition 6.1. von Neumann’s Projection Postulate. Upon a measurement of an
observable A=
∑
i
aiPai on a system in state W, the state of the system ‘collapses’ to the
state W ′, where
W ′=Pai (6.9)
for some eigenvalue ai of A. The probability that the state collapses to Pai is
pW(ai)=Tr(WPai) (6.10)
Note that (6.10) is the general expression for a probability function we saw in section
3.2. But within the orthodox approach it is interpreted in a very specific way, namely as
the probability for finding measurement result ai when a measurement of observable A is
performed on a system in state W . Also note that the orthodox interpretation changes
radically the classical way of conceiving measurements: they are not ideal processes for
merely learning something; they are invariably processes which drastically change the
measured system, (in addition to being unlike any other interactions since they are not and
cannot be represented by a unitary time evolution operator – more on this in section 6.5).
The projection postulate is usually justified because it ensures repeatability of meas-
urement results. That is, it guarantees that when we repeat a measurement, the result of
the second measurement always matches the result of the first. The projection postulate
is certainly sufficient to guarantee this matching. In effect, according to it, a measure-
ment must necessarily change the state of the measured system – it makes it ‘collapse’,
it makes it ‘jump’ – from whatever it may have been just prior to the measurement into
an appropriate eigenstate of the measured observable operator, namely the eigenstate
whose eigenvalue matches the outcome of the measurement. After the measurement, the
system remains in that particular eigenstate so that the probability of finding that same
measurement result upon a second measurement at a later time is 1.
Von Neumann’s postulate only determines uniquely the final state of the system if ai
is a non-degenerate eigenvalue of A, for in this case the corresponding eigenspace is one-
dimensional and the final state is the projection operator Pai; but when ai is degenerate, so
that the corresponding eigenspace is at least two dimensional, the final state of the system
is left undetermined. If one tries to generalize von Neumann’s postulate in the obvious way,
namely as prescribing a state change fromW to
Pai
TrPai
, where Pai is the projection operator
onto the eigenspace of dimension greater or equal to two associated with ai,6.4 the resulting
change does not satisfy the repeatability requirement for degenerate eigenvalues. Indeed the
von Neumann measurement interaction represents a degeneracy-breaking measurement: it
6.4. Pai appears divided by its trace Tr(Pai) because only when a projection operator projects onto a 1-
dimensional space is it of trace one and hence a density operator.
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makes a particular selection of eigenstates within each degeneracy subspace and thus does
not leave the degenerate eigenspaces invariant.
6.2.2 Lüders’ Projection Postulate
To overcome this problem, and thus be parallel with the requirement that the measurement
of a non-degenerate eigenvalue be repeatable, [Lüders, 1951] proposed that the change of
state upon measurement of an observable A when the eigenvalue ai is found, be from W
to Wai=
PaiWPai
Tr(PaiW )
. This measurement interaction distinguishes the eigenstates belonging
to each eigenvalue from those belonging to any other eigenvalue, but all those belonging
(degenerately) to a single eigenvalue are left indistinguishable.
Proposition 6.2. Lüders’ Projection Postulate. Upon a measurement of an observable
A=
∑
i
aiPai on a system in state W, the state of the system ‘collapses’ to the state Wai,
where
Wai=
PaiWPai
Tr(PaiW )
(6.11)
for some eigenvalue ai of A. The probability that the state collapses to Wai is
pW(ai)=Tr(WPai) (6.12)
If A does not have a purely discrete spectrum and if the observed value is in a subset b of
the spectrum of A, then formula (6.11) admits the obvious generalization:
WA(b)=
PA(b)WPA(b)
Tr(WPA(b))
(6.13)
We briefly note that for continuous observables the Lüders rule violates the condition that
repeated measurements should be stable. It appears that the only fix for this is to alter
the notion of conditional expectation.6.5
To gain a better understanding of how the Lüders’ projection postulate works, let us
consider the case in which the initial state of the system is in a pure state ψ. In this case,
(6.11) reads:
Pψ
PaiPψPai
Tr(PψPai)
(6.14)
This expression can be simplified as follows. Let Pai ψ = ψai
′ be the non-normalized pro-
jection of ψ onto the subspace spanned by the eigenvectors associated with the eigenvalue
ai. For any vector φ, we have that
(PaiPψPai )φ=PaiPψ (Paiφ)=Paiψ 〈ψ,Paiφ〉=Paiψ 〈Paiψ, φ〉=PPaiψφ=Pψbi′ φ (6.15)
Since this holds for any φ, the numerator of (6.14) is PaiPψPai=Pψai
′ . In addition,6.6
Tr(PψPai)=Tr(PaiPψPai)=Tr(PPaiψ)= 〈Paiψ, Paiψ〉= ‖Paiψ‖2= ‖ψai′ ‖2 (6.16)
6.5. See [Valente, 2007] and references therein.
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Thus the change of state given by (6.14) is equivalent to the change
Pψ
Pψai
′
‖ψai′ ‖2
,with ψai
′ =Paiψ (6.17)
But
Pψai
′
‖ψai′ ‖2
= Pψai, with ψai =
ψai
′
‖ψai′ ‖
. Indeed, similarly to how we derived (6.15), for any
vector φ, we have
Pψai
′
‖ψai′ ‖2
φ=
ψai
′
‖ψai′ ‖
〈 ψai
′
‖ψai′ ‖
, φ〉= ψai 〈ψai, φ〉=Pψaiφ (6.18)
Hence, the Lüders’ projection postulate for pure states prescribes that when a measurement
of observable A is performed on a system in state Pψ and the observed value is ai, its state
Pψ changes to Pψai or, equivalently, its state changes from ψ to the normalized projection
of ψ onto the subspace spanned by the eigenvectors associated with the eigenvalue ai, i.e.
ψ ψai=
ψai
′
‖ψai′ ‖
,with ψai
′ =Paiψ (6.19)
Proposition 6.3. Lüders’ Projection Postulate for Pure States. Upon a meas-
urement of an observable A=
∑
i
aiPai on a system in state ψ, the state of the system ‘col-
lapses’ to the state ψai for some eigenvalue ai of A, namely,
ψai=
Paiψ
‖Paiψ‖
=
ψai
′
‖ψai′ ‖
(6.20)
where ψai is the normalized projection of ψ onto the eigenspace belonging to ai.
The probability that the state collapses to ψai is given by
pψ(ai)= |〈αi, ψ〉|2 (6.21)
where αi is the eigenstate associated to the eigenvalue ai.
The general version of Lüders’ projection postulate given by proposition 6.2 can be
recovered from its version for pure states given by proposition 6.3 by adding the assumption
that the non-pure initial states of the system are affected by the measuring instrument in
such a way that the convex structure is preserved.
We draw this section to an end by seeing how examples 5.1 and 5.2 are seen from the
perspective of orthodox quantum mechanics.
Example 6.1. Incompatible Observables. In example 5.1 we considered a system in
state ψ=c1β1+c2 β2+c3β3, where |c1|2+ |c2|2+ |c3|2=1, and two incompatible observables
A= a1Pα1+a2Pα2+ a3Pα3 and B= b1(Pβ1+Pβ3)+ b2Pβ2, where α1=
β1+ β2
2
√ ; α2=
β1− β2
2
√ ;
α3= β3.
6.6. Tr(PPaiψ)=
∑
j
〈φj , PPaiψφj〉=
∑
j
〈φj, Paiψ〉 〈Paiψ , φj〉= 〈Paiψ,Paiψ〉.
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Suppose that we perform an ideal first-class measurement of observable B and find
result b1. Then the Lüders projection postulate (proposition 6.3) tells us that the new state
will be given by the normalized projection of ψ onto the subspace spanned by β1 and β3,
namely
ψb1=
c1
|c1|2+ |c3|2
√ β1+ c1|c1|2+ |c3|2√ β3 (6.22)
as is illustrated in figure 6.1.
Figure 6.1. Lüders’ Projection Postulate for Incompatible Observables
Example 6.2. Compatible Observables. In example 5.2 we considered a system in
state ψ= c1 α1+ c2 α2+ c3 α3 and two commuting operators A= a1Pα1+ a2 Pα2 + a3Pα3,
and B= b1Pα1+ b2(Pα2+Pα3).
Imagine we perform an ideal first-class measurement of observable B, getting result
b2. The Lüders projection postulate (proposition 6.3) then tells us that the resultant state
after this measurement is ψb2, that is the (normalized) projection of ψ onto the α2 − α3
plane. The post-measurement state will thus be given by
ψb2=
c2
|c2|2+ |c3|2
√ α2+ c3|c2|2+ |c3|2√ α3 (6.23)
Note that the Lüders projection postulate rule is only one rule among many possibilities
specifying the state of the system after the measurement interaction. Another rule might,
for example, specify that, after a measurement of observable B in which one finds result
b2, in the situation described in example 6.2, the resultant state lies halfway between ψb2
and α2 or α3, or whichever is nearer to ψb2. The fact that the Lüders projection postulate
yields ψb2 as given by (6.23) is the correct post-measurement state is, as we saw, to ensure
repeatability of measurement results. Indeed, the Lüders projection postulate is chosen
precisely because it leaves indistinguishable all the eigenstates belonging (degenerately) to
a single eigenvalue.
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6.3 Conditional-on-Measurement-Outcome Probability
Von Neumann and Lüders’ projection postulates allow one to specify uniquely the state
of the system after a measurement of a quantity with a given result. The new density
matrix can then be used to calculate probability assignments for subsequent measurements.
(Henceforth we will only discuss Lüders’s projection postulate given that it generalizes von
Neumann’s for degenerate eigenvalues.)
In effect, imagine we first measure an observable A on a system in state W and obtain
measurement result ai; subsequently, we measure a second observable B. The probability
to find the value bi upon measuring B will then be given by the trace rule using the
density operatorWai after the measurement of A given by the Lüders projection postulate
(proposition 6.2), i.e.
pWai(bi)=Tr(WaiPbi)=
Tr(PaiWPaiPbi)
Tr(PaiW )
(6.24)
Thus in these cases it appears to be meaningful to speak of the probability distribution of
a physical quantity (B) given the result (ai) of a previous measurement of another physical
quantity (A).
The Lüders rule thus seems to allow the introduction and interpretation, within
quantum theory, of the concept of conditional probabilities: it seems possible to interpret
the probability given by (6.24) as the probability of measurement outcome bi conditional
on measurement outcome ai. This interpretation leads naturally to writing (6.24) as
pWai(bi)=PW(bi|ai)=
Tr(PaiWPaiPbi)
Tr(PaiW )
(6.25)
When considering conditional probabilities we usually talk of the probability of an event
a given another event b – rather than that of b given a. Thus, we henceforth exchange
the order of the bi and ai’s in (6.25), with the resultant change in the order in which
the measurements are performed: first a measurement of B and then a measurement
of A. We refer to this interpretation of (6.25) as Conditional-on-Measurement-Outcome
interpretation.
Definition 6.1. Conditional-on-Measurement-Outcome Probability. When an
observable B is measured on a system in state W, followed by a second measurement of
an observable A, the probability
PW(ai|bi)=PWbi(ai)=
Tr(PbiWPbiPai)
Tr(PbiW )
(6.26)
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is the probability of measurement outcome ai conditional on measurement outcome bi.
If the system is in a pure state ψ, then the probability (6.28) can be expressed as
Pψ(ai|bi)= pψbi(ai)= |〈αi, ψbi〉|2 (6.27)
with ψbi=
Pbiψ
‖Pbiψ‖
.
Consider these probabilities in example 6.1. With the new state vector prescribed by the
Lüders rule after a measurement of observable B with measurement outcome b1, i.e. ψb1=
c1
|c1|2+ |c3|2
√ β1+ c1|c1|2+ |c3|2√ β3, one can calculate the probabilities assigned to subsequent
measurements. If one performs a measurement of observable A, the probabilities to find
the results ai are given by pψb1(ai)= |〈αi|ψb1〉|2, namely,
pψb1(a1)=Pψ(a1|b1)=
1
2
|c1|2
|c1|2+ |c3|2
pψb1(a2)=Pψ(a2|b1)=
1
2
|c1|2
|c1|2+ |c3|2
pψb1(a3)=Pψ(a3|b1)=
|c3|2
|c1|2+ |c3|2 (6.28)
These probabilities thus seem to allow a conditional-on-measurement-outcome probab-
ility interpretation. Indeed, Pψ(ai|b1) is read as the probability of finding measurement
outcomeai when observable A is measured upon a system in state ψ, conditional on having
found measurement outcome b1 upon a previous measurement of observable B.
Similarly, in example 6.2, using the new state vector prescribed by the Lüders rule after
a measurement of observable B with measurement outcome b2, i.e. ψb2=
c2
|c2|2+ |c3|2
√ α2+
c3
|c2|2+ |c3|2
√ α3, one can calculate the probabilities assigned to subsequent measurements.
If one performs a measurement of observable A, the probabilities to find the results ai are
given by pψb2(ai)= |〈αi|ψb2〉|2:
pψb2(a1)=Pψ(a1|b2)= 0
pψb2(a2)=Pψ(a2|b2)=
|c2|2
|c2|2+ |c3|2
pψb2(a3)=Pψ(a3|b2)=
|c3|2
|c2|2+ |c3|2 (6.29)
Pψ(ai|b2) is, in accordance with definition 6.1, interpreted as the probability of finding
measurement outcome ai when observable A is measured upon a system in state ψ,
conditional on having found measurement outcome b2 upon a previous measurement of
observable B.
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At this point we do not evaluate whether the conditional-on-measurement-outcome
interpretation is an adequate interpretation of the probabilities defined by the Lüders
projection postulate – we discuss this issue at length in the next chapter. What we want
to do now is to clearly distinguish the conditional-on-measurement-outcome probability
from another type of (purportedly) conditional probability which also arises in the context
of quantum measurements.
6.4 Conditional-on-Measurement Probability
It is not uncommon to hear that all quantum probabilities are conditional probabilities
since they are given by the Born rule and this rule yields conditional probabilities for par-
ticular measurement outcomes conditional on measurements.6.7The projection postulate of
the orthodox interpretation, in both its von Neumann and Lüders’ version, does indeed lead
to this reading: pW(ai)=Tr(WPai) is interpreted as the probability of measurement result
ai conditional on a measurement of observable A on a system in state W ). The quantum
probabilities under the Orthodox account of quantum mechanics are thus interpreted as
probabilities for measurement outcomes conditional on measurements performed. We refer
to this interpretation of the quantum probability pW(ai) = Tr(W Pai) as the conditional-
on-measurement interpretation (and not conditional-on-measurement-outcome).
Definition 6.2. Conditional-on-Measurement Probability. When an observable A
is measured on a system in state W, the probability
pW(ai)=Tr(WPai ) (6.30)
is the probability of measurement outcome ai conditional on a measurement of observable A.
But is the conditional-on-measurement probability just defined really a conditional
probability? This probability seems, if at all, a very strange species of conditional probab-
ility. For it is evidently not a probability for an event given another event, nor, in particular,
for a measurement outcome conditional on another measurement outcome. These con-
ditional-on-measurement probabilities really seem to be unconditional probabilities for
finding certain measurement outcomes when measurements are performed. One can stretch
the use of ‘conditional’ and say that these probabilities are probabilities ‘conditional’
on performing measurements. But this reading seems to retain little of the notion of
conditionality.
6.7. For example, Hájek says ‘Quantum mechanics apparently tells us that certain chances, conditional on free
acts, are defined, and it even purports to tell us their values. For example, it tells us that the chance that a certain
particle is measured to be spin-up, given that it is measured for spin in a given direction, is 1/2.’ ([Hájek, 2003a],
p-305)
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Indeed, there seems to be an important distinction between the role of ‘background
conditions’ which specify the conditions in effect at the assessment of the probability
function – in this case, the measurement procedure – and the propositions that can really
be conditioned on. It is not clear that the physical situation of the measurement can be
given any sort of propositional form that could resemble an event nor, if it could, whether
it is a type of event to which one could ascribe (or be interested in ascribing) a probability.
Moreover, quantummechanics does not itself provide such a probability ascription: it would
need to give probabilities to propositions of the form ‘measurement M is performed by
experimenter X’, which it does not, and most likely cannot, do. Hence, the conditional-
on-measurement probabilities are better understood as unconditional probabilities.
The question of whether the conditional-on-measurement probability is a genuine con-
ditional probability, is in fact very similar to another debate about probabilities in the
propensity account literature. On the propensity interpretation probabilities measure the
disposition or tendency of a particular experimental set-up to produce a certain frequency
of outcomes in the long run; similarly, pW(ai) in (6.30) can be thought of as the tendency
of the measuring device to produce a frequency of outcome ai equal to the value pW(ai)
when measuring observable A. And the question arises as to whether propensities actually
play the role of conditional or unconditional probabilities.
We will not go into this discussion in any detail6.8 for we here take the view that,
irrespective of the particular interpretation of probability, the distinction between back-
ground conditions and regular events does indicate the distinction between conditional
and unconditional probabilities. Hence, we regard conditional-on-background-conditions
probabilities, such as the conditional-on-measurement probability of definition 6.2, as
unconditional probabilities, and probabilities conditional on events as (genuine) condi-
tional probabilities.
This distinction is particularly relevant for us since the classical theorem 2.1 and its
analogue in quantum probability theory (theorem 4.2), which are precisely supposed to
characterize conditional probability, could otherwise not fulfill their task. Indeed, for the
probability Pp(A|B) to be a (genuine) conditional probability and be defined in terms of
the unconditional probability measure p, it is necessary that the measure p applies to both
A and B. For example, P(1|odd) in the die example is a (genuine) conditional probability
since p assigns both the events ‘1∩ odd’ and ‘odd’ a probability which serves to calculate
P(1|odd). In contrast, in the example of the radioactive particle, p(particle decays ∩
6.8. See, for example, [Easwaran, 2008]’s reconstruction of the debate, [McCurdy, 1996], [Gillies, 2000], and
[Humphreys, 1985].
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particle has the relevant features) is undefined and hence the conditional probability that
the particle decays given it has the relevant features is also undefined. And thus the
probability for a radioactive particle to decay is better conceived of as an unconditional
probability.6.9 Of course, that the particle is of the relevant isotope, or has the relevant
atomic structure, is indeed relevant for the particle to decay, but not in the way in which
a (genuine) conditional probability requires.
Similarly, the conditional-on-measurement probability of definition 6.2 is not a
(genuine) conditional probability. The event ‘measurement M of observable A is per-
formed by experimenter X’ is not relevant to the event ‘measurement result ai’ in the
right way. There is no projector operator which represents it as Pai represents ‘meas-
urement result ai’, and hence the density operator W cannot assign it any probability
similarly to how it assigns it to Pai. Hence their conditional probability is not determ-
ined. And thus, again, the conditional-on-measurement probabilities are better understood
as unconditional probabilities – albeit ones which only apply to measurement results.
To conclude, the conditional-on-measurement probability given by definition 6.2 is
really an unconditional probability which, as such, does not need to be considered as a
possible candidate for a quantum notion of conditional probability.
6.5 Non-Adequacy of the Orthodox Interpretation
We finally turn to evaluate whether the orthodox interpretation, with its reliance on the
Projection Postulate, provides an adequate interpretation of quantum theory. First, as we
saw in section 6.2, the projection postulate is usually justified because it ensures repeatab-
ility of measurement results. That is, it guarantees that when we repeat a measurement,
the result of the second measurement always matches the result of the first. However,
while sufficient to ensure repeatability, the projection postulate is by no means necessary.
Indeed, nothing more than the quantum probability theory and the Schrödinger equation
are required to guarantee the matching.6.10
Consider, similarly to equation (6.5), a measurement interaction described by a unitary
dynamical evolution (in particular, we make no use of the projection postulate), i.e.∑
i
ciαiM0
∑
ciαiMi (6.31)
6.9. Note that Hájek sees this as a failure of the ratio analysis while we see it as indicating that the probability
involved is not really a conditional probability. See footnote B.2 and [Hájek, 2003a].
6.10. [Dickson, 1998], pp.28-29
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And introduce a second apparatus, whose eigenstates are Ni. The second measurement
interaction, again under unitary dynamics, gives∑
i
ciαiM0N0
∑
ciαiMiNi (6.32)
Calculate now the probability of two states of the measuring devices Pj
M and Pi
N , i.e.
pψ(Pj
M ⊗ PiN) =
∣∣∣∣∣
( ∑
i
ci〈αi|〈Mi|〈Ni|
)
Pj
M ⊗ PkN
( ∑
i
ci|αi〉|Mi〉|Ni〉
)∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
=
δjk |cj |2 (6.33)
where δij = 0 if i  j and δij = 1 if i= j. The probability for finding the two measuring
devices in non-matching states given by (6.33) is already zero, with no need to invoke von
Neumann’s or the Lüders projection postulate. Hence, the projection postulate can only
be partly justified by empirical evidence. As Lüders says,
‘The [von Neumann] ansatz – at least so far – is justified only partly
through experiment, but mainly by its compelling simplicity’ ([Lüders, 1951],
p.664)6.11
In addition, the projection postulate faces other difficulties that cast serious doubt
on its adequacy. First, the projection postulate introduces an extra-dynamics for the act
of measurement and thus makes measurement interactions unlike any other interactions.
Indeed, measurement interactions cannot count as regular physical process because the
projection postulate, which gives the evolution of the system upon measurement, cannot
be derived by considering a Schrödinger evolution for the composite system containing the
measuring apparatus – this is what the insolubility proofs of the measurement show.6.12
But what else could measurement interactions be?
Moreover, even if one admits this special status for measurements, the orthodox view
does not say what kinds of interactions qualify as measurements. It introduces the notion
of measurement into the statement of the fundamental physical laws without providing an
explicit definition of measurement nor what is it about measurements that causes such a
collapse. And to make things worse, the solution it gives for the ‘measurement problem’ is a
non-starter as soon as one realizes that the problem is not only restricted to the context of a
measurement but to all macroscopic objects: all sorts of interactions involving macroscopic
systems will evolve by Schrödinger’s law into states that are not eigenstates of ordinary
physical properties. The orthodox interpretation is hence on very bad grounding unless
one thinks of quantum theory instrumentally, that is, as merely providing an algorithm
for generating the statistical predictions of the outcomes of measurements.
6.11. Note that Lüders’ statement equally applies to his own rule for change of state upon measurement.
6.12. [Wigner, 1963], [Fine, 1970], [Shimony, 1974]
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Von Neumann’s and Lüders’ projection postulates are thus, at best, seen as nothing
more than definitions of special classes of measuring instruments (with interactions unlike
any other physical interactions!). And though the majority of the measuring instruments
used in practice do not satisfy either of them, there is no definite example of a phys-
ical quantity not admitting at least one measuring instrument satisfying, even if only
approximately, these postulates.6.13 Following a terminology proposed by Wolfgang Pauli,
the measuring instruments that obey von Neumann’s projection postulate are referred to
as ‘first-kind instruments’. And those that match the stronger postulate of Lüders are often
called ‘ideal and of first kind’.
6.13. [Beltrametti & Cassinelli, 1981], p.79.
104 Orthodox Quantum Theory
Chapter 7
Interpreting Quantum Conditional
Probability II
In Chapter 5 we argued that the Lüders rule does not define the quantum extension of the
notion of conditional probability at a physically meaningful level, and we asked ourselves
what concept it could possibly define. It appears that the previous chapter provides an
answer to this question: when an observable B is measured on a system in state W (with
an ideal first-kind measuring device), followed by a second measurement of an observable
A, the probability PW(ai|bi) = PWbi(ai) =
Tr(PbiWPbiPai)
Tr(PbiW )
given by definition 6.1 seems to
define the probability of measurement outcome ai conditional on measurement outcome bi.
But is this really so? In this chapter we argue against this claim.
We also argue that introducing a diachronic perspective for the conditional-on-meas-
urement-outcome probability interpretation, and thus interpreting PW(ai|bi) as the prob-
ability for finding measurement outcome ai when observable A is measured at time tf,
conditional on a measurement of measurement of observable B with measurement out-
come bi at time ti, provides little help in understanding the probabilities defined by the
Lüders rule as conditional-on-measurement-outcomes probabilities (section 7.3). Moreover,
this discussion sheds further light on why the formal projective notion of conditional
probability cannot, after all, yield an adequate reading, both interpreted synchronically
or diachronically (section 7.4). Hence, we conclude that the probability defined by the
Lüders rule cannot be interpreted as a conditional probability neither for measurement
results, nor at a formal level for projection operators (nor for physical values), both from
a synchronic and a diachronic perspective.
In section 7.5 we use our discussion on the diachronic projective notion of conditional
probability to show explicitly that the only possible reading of the probability defined
by the Lüders rule as a conditional probability is a purely instrumental one. Indeed, this
rule can only define the probability for measurement outcome ai at time t2 immediately
before the measurement of observable A conditional on measurement outcome bi at time
t0 immediately before the measurement of B, namely
PW(ai, t2|bi, t0)= Tr[WPbi(t0)Pai(t2)Pbi(t0)]Tr[WPbi(t0)]
(7.1)
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therefore saying nothing about what happens to the system during the first measurement
nor between both measurements. Thus, it offers a purely instrumental interpretation with
a strong ‘black-box’ character which is unsatisfactory unless one reduces quantum theory
to an algorithm for generating the statistical predictions of the outcomes of measurements.
Indeed, if when one says the probability of a certain measurement outcome ai at time
t2 given a previous measurement at time t0 which has outcome bi is PW(ai, t2|bi, t0) one
only means that if these two measurements are repeated many times, one after the other,
one expects that the fraction of those which give the outcome ai is roughly PW(ai, t2|bi,
t0), then no problems arise. But as soon as one attempts to say anything else, then all the
problems we consider in sections 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, 7.3 and 7.4 appear.
We end the chapter by reconsidering the two-slit experiment in the light of our dis-
cussion (section 7.6) and by evaluating two further arguments, namely those presented
in [Bub, 1979a, 1979b, 2007] and [Fuchs, 2002a, 2002b], for the interpretation of the
probability defined by the Lüders rule as a conditional probability (section 7.7).
7.1 A First Look II
So far we have seen two possible definitions of a quantum notion of conditional probability.
First, in Chapter 5, we argued that the probability defined by the Lüders for projectors P
and Q with respect to the initial probability measure pW , namely
PW(P |Q)= Tr(WQPQ)Tr(QWQ) (7.2)
can be interpreted, albeit under a quite feeble and counterintuitive reading, as the quantum
extension of conditional probability at the formal level of projection operators (definition
5.1). Indeed, since PW(P |Q) is the pro rata increase of the common ‘projector’ QPQ of
P and Q, it is to be understood as the probability of projector P conditional on projector
Q, with respect to the initial probability measure pW .
We also argued in Chapter 5 that this probability cannot be understood as a conditional
probability for the eigenvalues p and q associated with P and Q. For if P and Q are
incompatible, the event ‘p and q’ cannot always be represented in terms of the projection
operators P and Q as P ∧Q; and in the cases in which such a correspondence does exist,
the probability assigned to the event ‘p and q’ does not correspond to the probability
assigned to the common operator of P and Q employed by the Lüders rule, i.e. Q P Q.
PW(P |Q) cannot, therefore, be read as the pro rata increase of the probability of ‘p and q’
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and, hence, cannot be interpreted as a quantum conditional probability from a physically
meaningful perspective.
Second, in chapter 6, we defined the notion of quantum conditional-on-measurement-
outcome probability (definition 6.1). For an ideal first-kind measurement of an observable
B (with possible eigenvalues bi) performed on a system in state W , followed by a meas-
urement of an observable A (with possible eigenvalues ai), the probability of measurement
outcome ai conditional on measurement outcome bi is
PW(ai|bi)=PWbi(ai)=
Tr(PbiWPbiPai)
Tr(PbiW )
(7.3)
Or, for a pure state ψ, Pψ(ai|bi)= pψbi(ai)= |〈αi, ψbi〉|2, with ψbi=
Pbiψ
‖Pbiψ‖
.
The probability given by (7.3) can also be expressed in terms of the values p and q
associated with P and Q. Imagine we perform an ideal first-kind measurement of a certain
observable, where Q belongs to its spectral decomposition, and find measurement outcome
q. We then perform a measurement of a second observable, where P belongs to its spectral
decomposition. According to definition 6.1, the probability to find measurement outcome
p in this second measurement, conditional on having found q in the first one, is
PW(p|q)= pWq(p)=Tr
(
QWQ
Tr(QWQ)
P
)
(7.4)
for a system in state W .
Now, the right hand side of equations (7.2) and (7.4) are formally the same. But in
(7.4) it is interpreted as giving the probability of measurement outcome p conditional on
measurement outcome q, i.e PW(p|q), whereas in (7.2) it is interpreted as the probability
of the projector P conditional on the projector Q, i.e. PW(P |Q) (albeit under a weak
construal of such a notion). We want to evaluate whetherPW(p|q) can really be interpreted
as the probability of measurement outcome p conditional on measurement outcome q, when
P and Q are incompatible. It seems that it cannot, and for reasons that go beyond those we
presented in sections 6.5 when discussing the inadequacy of the orthodox interpretation.
Indeed, under the projective interpretation, the probability PW(P |Q) is read as
the ‘probability’ of the common ‘projector’ Q P Q increased pro rata, i.e. divided by
pW(Q). The state W determines the ‘probability’ of both the common ‘projector’ QPQ
– an operator which only depends on the projectors P and Q – and the probability
of projector Q, and hence determines the probability of P conditional on Q. However,
for the conditional-on-measurement-outcome reading of PW(p|q), there seems to be no
possible notion of commonality between measurement outcomes p and q which would
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underwrite interpreting it as a conditional-on-measurement-outcome probability when P
and Q are incompatible observables. For one cannot seemingly perform simultaneous meas-
urements of incompatible quantities and thus cannot read PW(p|q) as the probability
for finding measurement result p and q, increased pro rata.7.1
The only possible reading of PW(p|q) seems to be that of a transition probability:
changes of state are called transitions, and the probabilities associated with them are
called transition probabilities. In effect, upon finding q as the measurement outcome of the
first measurement, the state of the system changes from W to Wq=
QWQ
Tr(QWQ)
, where the
probability for finding q is given by pW(q)=Tr(WQ). Then, when the system is measured
a second time and measurement result p is found, its state changes again, this time from
state Wq to state Wp, where Wp =
PWqP
Tr(WqP )
if the second measurement is also ideal and
of the first-kind. The probability for finding the outcome p is given by the state Wq as
pWq(p) = Tr(Wq P ) in accordance with (7.4). Thus, PW(p|q) is the probability that the
state of the system changes from Wq to Wp, that is, it is a transition probability.
However, the situation is far more involved that this. First, even if one cannot seemingly
perform simultaneous measurement of incompatible quantities, one can still consider the
probability for finding measurement result p and q at different times, i.e. pW(ptf&qti).
And thus one can try to interpret PW(p|q) as the probability for finding measurement
outcome p at a certain time tf, conditional on having found measurement outcome q at
an earlier time ti, i.e. PW(ptf |qti). This would yield a notion of conditional probability
different both from a synchronic notion of conditional probability PW(pti|qti) – wherein
measurement results p and q are both considered at the same initial time ti – and from a
diachronic notion of conditionalization pW(ptf)=PW(pti|qti) – wherein the probability of
measurement outcome p at time tf is updated by equating it to the synchronic conditional
probability of p given q at time ti. We might call this notion, in general, diachronic
conditional probability; and in our particular case, diachronic conditional-on-measurement-
outcome probability.
And second, while it is true that one cannot measure simultaneously two incompatible
quantities directly , one can measure them simultaneously by means of indirect measure-
ments (when one allows the system of interest to interact with another system on which one
can also perform measurements). Thus, the possibility of a simultaneous measurement of
incompatible quantities cannot be ruled out so lightly and, therefore, PW(p|q) might still
allow a synchronic conditional-on-measurement-outcome interpretation. Let us consider
these different possibilities in detail.
7.1. See for example [Margenau, 1963a, 1963b], [Parker & Margenau, 1968], and [Varadarajan, 1962].
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7.2 Transition Probabilities
7.2.1 Classical Transition Probability
Classical transition probabilities appear in the theory of Markov chains.7.2AMarkov chain,
is a stochastic process with the Markov property , namely that, given the present state,
future states are independent of the past states; in other words, that the description of the
present state fully captures all the information that could influence the future evolution
of the process. Formally, a Markov chain is a sequence of random variables X1,X2, .,Xn
which satisfy the Markov property
P(Xn+1= x|Xn= xn, , X1=x1)=P(Xn+1=x|Xn=xn) (7.5)
At each step the system may change its state from the current state to another state, or
remain in the same state, according to the probability distribution given by (7.5).7.3 The
changes of state are called transitions, and the probabilities associated with the various
state-changes are called transition probabilities.
Now only for reversible Markov chains, which are necessarily stationary, can transition
probabilities be read as conditional probabilities. In effect, time-homogeneous or stationary
Markov chains are processes where, for all n,
P(Xn+1= x|Xn= y)=P(Xn=x|Xn−1= y) (7.6)
So that if X0 has a certain distribution p, then Xn at any subsequent time has the same
distribution. Reversible Markov chains are those in which one can ‘invert’ a transition
probability using Bayes’ rule, i.e.
P(Xn= i|Xn+1= j)= p(Xn= i,Xn+1= j)
p(Xn+1= j)
=
p(Xn+1= j |Xn= i) p(Xn= i)
p(Xn+1= j)
(7.7)
Intuitively, a reversible chain is one in which given a movie of the chain run forward and
the same movie run backward, one cannot tell which is which.
7.2. We give here a very basic exposition of the theory of Markov chains. See [Doob, 1953] for a detailed
exposition.
7.3. Note that chains with a certain ‘memory’ can also be regarded as Markov chains. In effect, for a Markov
chain with memory m, where m is finite, i.e. p(Xn = xn|Xn−1 = xn−1, Xn−2 = xn−2,  , X1 = x1) = p(Xn =
xn|Xn−1 = xn−1, Xn−2= xn−2, , Xn−m= xn−m), it is possible to construct a chain (Yn) from (Xn) which has
the Markov property. Indeed, let Yn = (Xn, Xn−1, ..., Xn−m+1), the ordered m-tuple of X values. Then Yn is a
Markov chain that has the Markov property.
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In general, thus, transitions probabilities do not satisfy equation (7.7). Only for revers-
ible processes does it hold and therefore
p(Xn= i,Xn+1= j)=P(Xn= i|Xn+1= j) p(Xn+1= j)
=P(Xn+1= j |Xn= i) p(Xn= i) (7.8)
That is, both products are equal to the joint probability p(Xn= i, Xn+1= j) and hence
the transition probabilities P(Xn+1= j |Xn= i) and P(Xn= i|Xn+1= j) can also be read
as conditional probabilities, i.e.
P(Xn+1= j |Xn= i)= p(Xn= i,Xn+1= j)
p(Xn= i)
P(Xn= i|Xn+1= j)= p(Xn= i,Xn+1= j)
p(Xn+1= j)
(7.9)
Note, however, that these conditional probabilities, are different both from the synchronic
notion of conditional probability and from the diachronic notion of conditionalization
we saw in chapter 2. Expressing them in terms of our usual notation for conditional
probabilities, with the events indexed in time, namely
P(At2|Bt1)= p(Bt1∩At2)p(Bt1)
P(Bt1|At2)= p(Bt1∩At2)p(At2)
(7.10)
we can clearly see that they are different from a synchronic notion of conditional probability
Pt1(A|B)=P(At1|Bt1)= p(Bt1∩At1)p(Bt1)
(7.11)
wherein events A and B are both considered at the same initial time t1, and from a
diachronic notion of conditionalization
pt2(A)=Pt1(A|B) (7.12)
wherein the probability of A at time t2 is updated by equating it to the synchronic con-
ditional probability of A given B at time t1. Indeed, A and B are considered at different
times in the joint event of A and B in the conditional probabilities (7.10). As we suggested
in the previous section, we can call this new notion of conditional probability, diachronic
conditional probability.
To sum up, in the classical case, if a process is reversible then the equality
P(At2|Bt1) p(Bt1)=P(Bt1|At2) p(At2)= p(Bt1∩At2) (7.13)
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is satisfied for the transition probabilities P(At2|Bt1) andP(Bt1|At1). And hence P(At2|Bt1)
and P(Bt1|At2) can also be interpreted as diachronic conditional probabilities. The reverse
implications also hold. Hence, a process is reversible if and only if equality (7.13) holds;
and the probabilities P(At2|Bt1) , P(Bt1|At2) can be interpreted as (classical) conditional
probabilities if and only if equality (7.13) holds.
7.2.2 Quantum Transition Probability
As we have just seen, ifP(At2|Bt1) p(Bt1)P(Bt1|At2) p(At2), then the classical process that
these probabilities represent is non-reversible and the transition probabilities P(At2|Bt1)
and P(Bt1|At2) cannot be interpreted as conditional probabilities. However, if A and B
are considered at the same time, the ratio definition of synchronic conditional probability
implies that P(A|B) p(B) = P(B |A) p(A) always holds. Hence, the failure of equality
(7.13) only makes sense in the classical case if events A and B occur at different times. In
contrast, in the quantum case, the equality analogue to (7.13) for the probabilities PW(p|q)
and PW(q |p) defined by the Lüders rule, namely
PW(p|q) pW(q)=PW(q |p) pW(p) (7.14)
can fail even if p and q are considered at the same time. Indeed, only if P and Q are
compatible, is (7.14) satisfied. We can easily show that this is the case for our previous
examples involving compatible and incompatible observables.
Example 7.1. Incompatible Observables. In example 6.1 we considered a system in
state ψ=c1β1+c2 β2+c3β3, where |c1|2+ |c2|2+ |c3|2=1, and two incompatible observables
A= a1Pα1+a2Pα2+ a3Pα3 and B= b1(Pβ1+Pβ3)+ b2Pβ2, where α1=
β1+ β2
2
√ ; α2=
β1− β2
2
√ ;
α3 = β3. Initially state ψ assigns probabilities to the various measurements results ai of
observable A
pψ(a1)=
1
2
(|c1|2+ |c2|2); pψ(a2)= 1
2
(|c1|2+ |c2|2); pψ(a3)= |c3|2 (7.15)
And to the various measurements results bi of observable B
pψ(b1)= |c1|2+ |c3|2; pψ(b2)= |c2|2 (7.16)
Let us first calculate Pψ(a1|b1) pψ(b1) and then Pψ(b1|a1) pψ(a1). If we perform an ideal
first-class measurement of observable B and find result b1, the Lüders projection postulate
tells us that the new state just after the measurement of B is
ψb1=
c1
|c1|2+ |c3|2
√ β1+ c1|c1|2+ |c3|2√ β3 (7.17)
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With this new state vector:
pψb1(a1)=Pψ(a1|b1)=
1
2
|c1|2
|c1|2+ |c3|2 (7.18)
and thus
Pψ(a1|b1) pψ(b1)= 12 |c1|
2 (7.19)
Now, if we perform first an ideal first-class measurement of observable A and find result
a1, the Lüders projection postulate tells us that the new state is
ψa1=α1=
β1+ β2
2
√ (7.20)
With this new state vector:7.4
pψa1(b1)=Pψ(b1|a1)=
1
2
(7.21)
and thus
Pψ(b1|a1) pψ(a1)= 14 (|c1|
2+ |c2|2) (7.22)
which is different form the result of (7.19). Hence,
P(b1|a1) p(a1) P(a1|b1) p(b1) (7.23)
Example 7.2. Compatible Observables. In example 6.2 we considered a system in
state ψ= c1 α1+ c2 α2+ c3 α3 and two commuting operators A= a1Pα1+ a2 Pα2 + a3Pα3,
and B = b1 Pα1 + b2(Pα2 + Pα3). Initially state ψ assigns probabilities to the various
measurements results ai of observable A
pψ(ai)= |ci|2 (7.24)
and to the possible measurement results bi of observable B
pψ(b1)= |c1|2; pψ(b2)= |c2|2+ |c3|2 (7.25)
If we perform an ideal first-class measurement of observable B and find result b2, the Lüders
projection postulate tells us that the resultant state after this measurement
ψb2=
c2
|c2|2+ |c3|2
√ α2+ c3|c2|2+ |c3|2√ α3 (7.26)
With this new state vector
pψb2(a2)=Pψ(a2|b2)=
|c2|2
|c2|2+ |c3|2 (7.27)
7.4. 〈ψa1, (Pβ1+Pβ3) ψa1〉= 〈ψa1, Pβ1 ψa1〉= |〈β1, ψa1〉|2= 12
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and thus
Pψ(a2|b2) pψ(b2)= |c2|2 (7.28)
Now, if we perform an ideal first-class measurement of observable A getting result a2, the
Lüders projection postulate tells us that the resultant state after this measurement is
ψa2= α2 (7.29)
With this new state vector
pψa2(b2)=Pψ(b2|a2)= 1 (7.30)
and thus
Pψ(b2|a2) pψ(a2)= |c2|2 (7.31)
Hence,
P(a2|b2) p(b2)=P(b2|a2) p(a2) (7.32)
So what are the interpretive consequences of the failure of equality (7.14) for incompat-
ible observables? Orthodox interpreters claim that the key to understanding this failure
lies in that, analogously to the classical case, the probabilities PW(p|q) for incompatible
observables are not really conditional-on-measurement-outcome probabilities, but rather
transition probabilities for irreversible processes, and hence cannot be given a conditional
interpretation. Indeed, the probability PW(p|q) only makes sense if it is indexed in time
as PW(pt2|qt1) and then it is to be interpreted as a transition probability; that is, as the
probability that a measurement changes the state of the quantum system from state Wq
at time t1 to state Wp at time t2. The underlying reasoning would go something like this.
Given that one cannot perform simultaneous measurements of incompatible observ-
ables, the probability PW(p|q) (for P and Q incompatible) only makes sense if it is indexed
in time. In addition, given that quantum measurements are necessarily disturbing, they
correspond to irreversible processes. Indeed, quantum measurements are invariably pro-
cesses which drastically change the measured system and which introduce an irreducible
disturbance to the quantum system. And thus, transition probabilities for incompatible
observables cannot be understood as classical conditional probabilities. That is why equa-
tion (7.14), appropriately indexed in time, i.e. PW(pt2|qt1) pW(qt1) =PW(qt1|pt2) pW(pt2),
does not hold for incompatible ones. In orthodox quantum mechanics measurements are
thus not ideal processes for merely learning something. Only if the quantities involved are
compatible is quantum measurement like classical measurement.
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The reasoning afforded by the orthodox interpreter for why the probabilities defined
by the Lüders rule for incompatible events are transition probabilities for the irreversible
process of a quantum measurement, and hence cannot be given a classical conditional-on-
measurement-outcome interpretation is, however, flawed. Schematically, it is the following:
Premise 1 : One cannot perform simultaneous measurements of incompatible
observables, and hence the probability PW(p|q) (for P and Q incompat-
ible) only makes sense if it is indexed in time. For P and Q incompatible,
PW(ptf |qti) is thus a transition probability.
Premise 2 : Quantum measurements are necessarily disturbing, and hence
correspond to irreversible processes.
Premise 3 : Transitions probabilities for irreversible processes cannot be
interpreted as conditional probabilities.
——————–——————–——————–——————–——————–
Conclusion: The transition probabilityPW(pt2|qt1) for P and Q incompatible
observables cannot be understood as a classical diachronic conditional-
on-measurement-outcome probability.
The problem with this argument is two-fold. First, premise 1’s claim on the non-simul-
taneous measurability of incompatible observables is incorrect. Indeed, even if one cannot
measure simultaneously two incompatible quantities directly, and, seemingly, cannot inter-
pret PW(p|q) as the pro rata increase of the joint probability of measurement outcome p
and q, one can measure them simultaneously by means of indirect measurements (when
one allows the system of interest to interact with another system on which one can also
perform measurements). And thus it is not correct to hold that PW(p|q) (for P and Q
incompatible) only makes sense if it is indexed in time. In effect, PW(p|q) might still allow
a synchronic conditional-on-measurement-outcome interpretation.
Second, the orthodox interpreter does not present any justification for the assumption
of premise 2, namely that quantum measurements are necessarily disturbing. Moreover,
even if this assumption does hold in practice – there is no argument to the effect that
quantummeasurements are necessarily disturbing as a matter of principle, but it in practice
quantum measurements are disturbing– the conclusion of premise 2 does not follow from
it. For disturbing processes need not always lead to irreversible processes. Hence, one can
still consider the probability for finding measurement result p and q at different times, i.e.
pW(pt2&qt1), and try to interpret PW(pt2|qt1) as the probability for finding measurement
outcome p at time t2 conditional on having found measurement outcome q at an earlier
time t1; that is, as a diachronic-conditional-on-measurement-outcome probability.
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The rationale given by the orthodox interpreter to the effect that the probability
PW(p|q) only makes sense if it is indexed in time as PW(pt2|qt1), and that then it is
to be interpreted as a transition probability, thus, is not correct. Unlike the classical case,
the fact that (7.14) does not hold for P and Q incompatible at the same and at different
times, i.e. PW(p|q) pW(q)PW(q |p) pW(p) andPW(pt2|qt1) pW(qt1)PW(qt1|pt2) pW(pt2),
does not rule out the interpretation of the probability PW(p|q) and P(pt2|qt1) as a syn-
chronic or diachronic conditional-on-measurement-outcome probability.
However, as it turns out, this is not so. But for reasons which are not, contrary to
what the orthodox interpreter holds, related to the (allegedly) disturbing character of
measurements of incompatible quantities. The reasons for why PW(p|q) and P(pt2|qt1)
cannot be so interpreted, i.e. as synchronic or a diachronic conditional-on-measurement-
outcome probabilities for incompatible quantities, lie elsewhere. We tackle this issue in the
next section.
7.3 Conditional-on-Measurement-Outcome Probability
Let us then see why the probability defined by the Lüders projection postulate PW(p|q)
cannot be interpreted as a (synchronic nor diachronic) conditional-on-measurement-out-
come probability. Recall that to motivate this possibility, we appealed to the fact that while
one cannot measure simultaneously two incompatible quantities directly (and thus cannot
interpret PW(p|q) as the pro rata increase of the joint probability of measurement outcome
p and q), one can measure them simultaneously by means of indirect measurements when
one allows the system of interest to interact with another system on which one can also
perform measurements.
Discussions on indirect measurements are intimately tied with discussions on locality,
and these are rather intricate and involved. However, we do not need to go into them.
For, as we already mentioned in the previous section, PW(p|q) cannot be interpreted as
a synchronic nor diachronic conditional-on-measurement-outcome probability for reasons
that have nothing to do with measurements. Hence, we show that the conceptual problems
of quantum mechanics cannot be traced back to the alleged irreducible and uncontrollable
disturbance of the system measured by a measuring instrument.
Let us begin by considering the synchronic case. An interpretation of PW(p|q) as
a synchronic conditional probability for measurement results, simply considers a partic-
ular interpretation of the physical values of the probability PW(p|q) of sections 5.3 and
7.3 Conditional-on-Measurement-Outcome Probability 115
5.4, namely physical values as measurement outcomes. Thus, the same difficulties we
encountered there come into play here.
Indeed, recall that we there argued that, for incompatible quantities P and Q, the
event ‘p and q’ cannot always be represented in terms of the projection operators P and
Q as P ∧ Q, and in the cases in which such a correspondence does exist, the probability
assigned to the event ‘p and q’ does not correspond to the probability assigned to the
common operator of P and Q employed by the projective notion of quantum conditional
probability, i.e. QPQ. Thus, the probability PW(P |Q) defined by the Lüders rule cannot
be understood as the pro rata increase of the probability of ‘p and q’; and hence, it cannot
be interpreted as the probability of value p conditional on value q for P and Q incompatible
quantities.
Let us rehearse this argument again for the spin-1 particle example of section 4.4.1. in
terms of measurement results. The probability
Pψ(sy+1|sx+1)=
〈
Psx+1
ψ
||Psx+1 ψ‖
, Psy+1
Psx+1
ψ
||Psx+1 ψ‖
〉
(7.33)
cannot be interpreted as the probability of measurement outcome sy+1 conditional on
measurement outcome sx+1. Indeed, the event Psx+1 ∧ Psy+1 corresponds to ‘Sx takes the
value +1 and Sy takes the value +1’, with ‘and’ the ordinary logical relation. However,
it is false under all truth assignments Vψ since there is no state ψ which is an eigenstate
of both Psx+1 and Psy+1. Hence the probability of sx+1 conditional on sy+1 should be
zero for all ψ. Which we know is not what the Lüders rule prescribes in (7.33). Hence,
Pψ(sy+1|sx+1) cannot be interpreted as a the probability for measurement outcome sy+1
conditional on measurement outcome sx+1.
The same applies for the probability Pψ(Psy+1|Psx+1 + Psx0), although here it is even
more difficult to interpret it as a conditional-on-measurement-outcome probability. For the
projector Psy+1∧ (Psx+1∨ Psx0) cannot even be interpreted as measurement outcome sy+1
and measurement outcome sx+1 or sx0 as we discussed at length in section 5.4.2.
In addition, notice that nothing in the above argument hinges on time; we could run
this same argument for measurement results p and q considered at different times. Hence,
the probability PW(p|q) defined by the Lüders rule cannot be interpreted either as the
synchronic or the diachronic probability of measurement outcome p conditional on meas-
urement outcome q. Thus, it seems that, after all, we cannot interpret the probabilities
defined by the Lüders rule as conditional-on-measurement-outcome probabilities. Their
only possible interpretation as conditional probabilities appears to be the, weak and coun-
terintuitive, formal notion of conditional-on-quantum-event probability.
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But is the latter interpretation viable after all? In the next section we argue that this
formal notion of synchronic conditional probability is even less plausible than what we
argued in section 5.2.
7.4 Diachronic Projective Conditional Probability
Similarly to the conditional-on-measurement-outcome probabilitiesPW(p|q) andPW(q |p),
the conditional-on-quantum-event probabilities PW(P |Q) and PW(Q|P ) are such that for
P and Q incompatible
PW(P |Q) pW(Q) PW(Q|P ) pW(P ) (7.34)
(recall that PW(P |Q) is formally equivalent to PW(p|q)), where this inequality fails both
for P and Q considered at the same and at different times. i.e.
PW(Pt2|Qt1) pW(Qt1)=PW(Qt1|Pt2) pW(Qt2) (7.35)
In section 5.2 we considered its interpretive consequences for the former case. We argued
that PW(P |Q) and PW(Q|P ) can be understood as extended conditional probabilities –
PW(P |Q) as the pro rata increase of the common ‘projector’ QPQ, and PW(Q|P ) as the
pro rata increase of the common ‘projector’ PQP – even though the notion of commonality
it relies on is somewhat counterintuitive – the common projector for P and Q in PW(P |Q)
is different from that of Q and P in PW(Q|P ) – and weak – the common projector of P
and Q is taken to be QPQ (or PQP ) without any explanation.
However, this notion of commonality would not be so counterintuitive if the events P
and Q were considered at different times. Indeed, the operator Qt1 Pt2 Qt1 would be the
common ‘projector’ of P at time t2 given Q at time t1 as given by PW(Pt2|Qt1), which,
prima facie, need not be equal to Pt2 Qt1 Pt2, i.e. the common ‘projector’ of Q at time t1
given P at time t2 as given by PW(Qt1|Pt2) for the time-reverse process. Indeed, already
in the classical context, there are physical processes which are not reversible in which this
is so. One would then calculate the (diachronic) joint ‘probability’ of Pt2 and Qt1 through
the trace rule, i.e. Tr(WQt1Pt2 Qt1), and thus arrive at a less counterintuitive reading of
PW(P |Q).
Hence, the correct interpretation of PW(P |Q) is not as a synchronic conditional prob-
ability, namely as the probability at time t1 of P conditional on Q, but rather as a
diachronic conditional probability, namely as the probability of projector P at time t2 con-
ditional on projector Q at time t1, i.e. PW(Pt2|Qt1). This notion would be somewhat weak –
it would still need to postulate that precisely Qt1Pt2Qt1 represents the common ‘projector’
of Pt2 given Qt1 – but it would not be as counterintuitive as its synchronic counterpart.
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Moreover, this same result would also hold in the presence of interference terms. Indeed,
consider the particular example of section 4.4.1 of the spin-1 particle for events Q =
Psx+1
+Psx0 and P =Psy+1. The existence of interference terms in Pψ(Psy+1|Psx+1+Psx0)
would raise no additional difficulties: again, under the diachronic perspective, there is no
reason to suppose that the common ‘projector’ of (Psy+1)t2 given (Psx+1+Psx0)t1 should be
the same as that of (Psx+1+Psx0)t1 given (Psy+1)t2. In addition, one would understand the
origin of the interference terms given that each term of the common ‘projector’ gives rise to
a term in the probability defined by the Lüders rule. In effect, the probability Pψ
[
(Psx+1+
Psx0)t1
∣∣∣(Psy+1)t2
]
is the sum of two terms because (Psy+1)t2(Psx+1 + Psx0)t1 (Psy+1)t2 is
composed of only two common ‘projectors’; whereas Pψ
[
(Psy+1)t2
∣∣∣(Psx+1 + Psx0)t1
]
is the
sum of four terms because (Psx+1 + Psx0)t1 (Psy+1)t2(Psx+1 + Psx0)t1 is composed of four
common ‘projectors’.
However, notice that under this diachronic reading of PW(Pt2|Qt1), the projectors P
and Q evolve in time. Is this possible? Thus far, we have been working in the ‘Schrödinger
picture’, according to which states evolve in time (according to the Schrödinger equation)
and any given observable is at all times represented by the same operator. But to interpret
PW(Pt2|Qt1) as a diachronic conditional probability for projectors in L(H), P and Q need
to evolve in time. Thus, can PW(Pt2|Qt1) really be interpreted as a diachronic conditional
probability for projection operators?
Yes, it seems that it can. For there is an equivalent formulation of quantum mechanics,
namely the so-called ‘Heisenberg picture’, which is equivalent to the ‘Schrödinger picture’ –
in the sense that they generate the same probability measures over the values of observables
at all times – but which employs the reverse time evolution dependence. That is, in the
Heisenberg picture, contrary to what happens in the Schrödinger one, states are constant in
time and observables evolve in time. In effect, if At1 represents a given observable at time
t1, then, in the Heisenberg time-picture, At represents the same observable at time t, with
At=Ut−t1
−1 At1Ut−t1 (7.36)
Note that this time evolution is different from that of the quantum states, namely Wt =
Ut−t1 Wt1 Ut−t1
−1 as given by equation (6.1) because of the order in which the unitary
evolution operator Ut−t1 and its inverse appear.
And if one now writes PW(Pt2|Qt1) in the Heisenberg time picture, i.e. PW(Pt2|Qt1)H,
one gets
PW(Pt2|Qt1)H= Tr(WQt1Pt2Qt1 )Tr(Qt1WQt1)
=
Tr(WQt1Ut2−t1
−1 Pt1Ut2−t1Qt1 )
Tr(Qt1WQt1)
(7.37)
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Hence, it seems that PW(Pt2|Qt1)H, as given by (7.37), can actually be read as the prob-
ability of P at time t2 given Q at time t1: it is the pro rata increase of the ‘probability’
of the common ‘projector’ Qt1 (Ut2−t1
−1 Pt1 Ut2−t1)Qt1 . The state of the system W , which
does not evolve in time in the Heisenberg picture, generates both the ‘probability’ of the
common ‘projector’ Qt1Pt2Qt1and the probability of Qt1. Thus, it seems that, after all, we
do have a sound interpretation of the probability defined by the Lüders rule as a conditional
probability for projection operators. We refer to this interpretation as the Heisenberg
diachronic projective notion of conditional probability.
Definition 7.1. Heisenberg Diachronic Projective Quantum Conditional Probab-
ility. The probability given by (the Heisenberg analogue of) the Lüders rule for projectors
Pt2, Qt1∈L(H) in the Heisenberg picture, namely
PW(Pt2|Qt1)H= Tr[W (Qt1Pt2Qt1)]Tr(WQt1)
=
pW
′ (Qt1P t2 Qt1)
pW(Qt1)
(7.38)
is the probability of projector P at time t2 conditional on projector Q at time t1 with respect
to the probability measure pW. The operator Qt1Pt2Qt1 represents the common operator of
projectors Pt2 and Qt1, where the evolution from Pt1 to Pt2 is given by the unitary evolution
operator Ut2−t1 as
Pt2=Ut2−t1
−1 Pt1Ut2−t1 (7.39)
To repeat, even if the Heisenberg diachronic projective notion, similarly to the synchronic
one, is somewhat weak – it gives no understanding of why precisely the operator Qt1Pt2Qt1
represents the common ‘projector’ of Qt2 and Pt1 – it is not counterintuitive – there is
nothing wrong with the fact that the common projector of Pt2 given Qt1 is not equal to that
of Qt1 given Pt2. Moreover, this diachronic projective notion appeals to a time evolution
which is perfectly acceptable from a physical perspective since it is dictated by a unitary
operator (unlike the one which the diachronic conditional-on-measurement-outcome notion
would need to invoke).
In effect, the evolution given by (7.39) is from event P at time t1 to event P at time t2,
i.e. Pt2 =Ut2−t1
−1 Pt1Ut2−t1, and then Pt2 is used to calculate the common projector of Qt1
and Pt2. This evolution is indeed quite different from the evolution dictated by the Lüders
projection postulate from stateW before the first measurement to stateWQ=
QWQ
Tr(WQ)
after
the first measurement. Indeed, while the former can be represented by a unitary evolution
operator, the latter cannot . And thus, while the evolution from W to WQ is generated by
an interaction which is unlike any other physical interaction, the evolution from Pt1 to Pt2
is a perfectly normal time evolution.
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This last remark, however, throws cold water on the Heisenberg diachronic projective
interpretation. It is indeed quite dubious that, simply by a change of time picture, one gets
both the probability for event P after a perfectly normal time evolution process represented
by the unitary evolution operator Ut2−t1, and the probability for measurement result p after
a measurement interaction governed by the projection postulate. Indeed, these two pictures
should be equivalent in the sense that they generate the same probability measures over
the values of observables at all times. Thus, maybe, the change from the Schrödinger to the
Heisenberg picture which led to definition 7.1 is not as innocent as it looks. Indeed, upon a
closer look, it turns out to be incorrect: the probability given by (7.38), i.e. PW(Pt2|Qt1)H=
Tr[W (Qt1Pt2Qt1)]
Tr(WQt1)
, is not equal to the probability given by the Lüders rule, i.e. PW(P |Q)=
Tr(QWQP )
Tr(WQ)
.
To see why our derivation of (7.38) is incorrect, we begin with the (inadequate) inter-
pretation of PW(pt2|qt1) as a diachronic conditional-on-measurement-outcome probability
under the Schrödinger picture. At time t1 an ideal first-kind measurement is performed
on a system in state W , and measurement outcome q is found; thus the system’s state
changes fromW to (Wq)t1=
QWQ
Tr(WQ)
. The system then evolves freely until time t2: (Wq)t2=
Ut2−t1 (Wq)t1Ut2−t1
−1 . Finally, a second measurement is performed on the system, where P
belongs to the spectral decomposition of the observable measured. If it is an ideal first
class measurement, then the state after this measurement is again given by the Lüders
projection postulate as (Wp)t2=
P (Wq)t2P
Tr[(Wq)t2P ]
. This process is, schematically, the following:
W FirstMeasurement  (Wq)t1 =
QWQ
Tr(WQ)

FreeEvolution
 (Wq)t2 =
Ut2−t1 (Wq)t1Ut2−t1
−1

SecondMeasurement
 (Wp)t2=
P (Wq)t2P
Tr[(Wq)t2P ]
(7.40)
Now, if the system’s state does not change in its free evolution between measurements,
as for example in the spin-1 example of section 4.4.1, we have that (Wq)t2 = (Wq)t1. In
this case, the state only changes due to the measurement interaction as described by the
projection postulate. The probability given by the Lüders rule for measurement outcome
p at time t2 is then given by (Wq)t2=(Wq)t1=
QWQ
Tr(WQ)
. Hence,7.5
PW(p, t= t2|q, t= t1)= p(Wq)t2(p)= p(Wq)t1(p)=
Tr[(Wq)t1P ]
Tr[(Wq)t1 Q]
=
Tr(QWQP )
Tr(WQ)
(7.41)
Now write (7.41) in terms of projection operators instead of measurement outcomes, i.e.
PW(P , t= t2|Q, t= t1)= p(WQ)t2(P )= p(WQ)t1(P )=
Tr[(WQ)t1P ]
Tr[(WQ)t1Q]
=
Tr(QWQP )
Tr(WQ)
(7.42)
7.5. Note that probability ‘p’ and measurement outcome ‘p’, appear together in (7.39). Though this is not
particularly appropriate, their difference should be clear by the context in which they appear.
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And then switch to the Heisenberg picture as we did to derive (7.38): first, we said that
PWt2
(P |Q) in the Schrödinger picture, which is equal to PWt1(P |Q), was equivalent to
PW(Pt2|Qt1)H in the Heisenberg picture; second, we developed Pt2 as Ut2−t1−1 Pt1Ut2−t1; and
we, thus, obtained PW(Pt2|Qt1)H =
Tr(WQt1Ut2−t1
−1 Pt1Ut2−t1Qt1 )
Tr(Qt1WQt1)
, and its understanding as
the pro rata increase of the common projector of Q at time t1 and P at time t2 (under an
ordinary dynamical evolution of projector Pt).
However, this derivation is flawed. For even though PWt2(P |Q) is equal to PWt1(P |Q)
in the Schrödinger time picture – given that the system’s state does not change between
t1and t2 – neither of them is equivalent to PW(Pt2|Qt1)H in the Heisenberg picture. Indeed,
in the Heisenberg equivalent of the SchrödingerPWt2(P |Q), the projector P does not evolve
freely from Pt1 to Pt2=Ut2−t1
−1 Pt1Ut2−t1. For, just as the system’s state does not change in
between measurements, there is no free evolution of projector P between t1 and t2. And
hence, PW(Pt2|Qt1)H given by (7.38) in the Heisenberg time picture does not describe the
same process as PWt2(P |Q) in the Schrödinger time picture.
If the Schrödinger and Heisenberg pictures are to be equivalent – in the sense that they
generate the same probability measures over the values of observables at all times – then
Qt1 must be Qt1 =
QWQ
Tr(WQ)
. And hence, the probability defined by the Lüders rule in the
Heisenberg picture should be
PW(Pt2|Qt1)H☼=Tr
(
QWQ
Tr(WQ)
P
)
(7.43)
where the sun symbol ☼ emphasizes that PW(Pt2|Qt1)H☼ is different from the previous
one, i.e. PW(Pt2|Qt1)H, and is the correct one. Thus, the relevant time evolution for
PW(Pt2|Qt1)H☼ is that of Qt from Q to Qt1= QWQTr(WQ) , so that
PW(Pt2|Qt1)H☼=Tr(Qt1Pt2)=Tr
(
QWQ
Tr(WQ)
P
)
=
pW
′ (QPQ)
pW(Q)
(7.44)
We refer to this interpretation as the Heisenberg☼ diachronic projective notion of quantum
conditional probability.
Definition 7.2. Heisenberg☼ Diachronic Projective Quantum Conditional Prob-
ability. The probability given by (the Heisenberg☼ analogue of) the Lüders rule for
projectors Pt2, Qt1∈L(H) in the Heisenberg picture, namely
PW(Pt2|Qt1)H☼=Tr(Qt1Pt2)= pW
′ (QPQ)
pW(Q)
(7.45)
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is the probability of projector P at time t2 conditional on projector Q at time t1 with respect
to the probability measure pW, where the evolution from Q to Qt1 is given by the Heisenberg
analogue of the Lüders projection postulate as
Qt1=
QWQ
Tr(WQ)
(7.46)
The probabilities defined by the Heisenberg☼ notion, in contrast to those defined by the
Heisenberg one, do agree with the probabilities defined by the Lüders rule. Thus, the
Heisenberg☼ projective diachronic reading of (7.45), even if rather weak – it gives no
understanding of why precisely the operator Q PQ represents the common ‘projector’ of
Qt1 and Pt2 – does seem to provide a correct non-counterintuitive understanding of why
the probability defined by the Lüders rule should be read as a diachronic conditional
probability for quantum projectors.
However, a more careful analysis shows that again this is not so; that, in fact, the
Heisenberg☼ notion faces serious and, as we now argue, unsurmountable difficulties. Indeed,
first, it is clear that it relies on a physically unacceptable time evolution, for the evolution
it invokes is not a unitary one from event P at time t1 to event P at time t2. Rather, to
calculate PW(Pt2|Qt1)H☼, one needs to consider the time evolution from Q to Qt1= QWQTr(WQ)
as if the observable to whose spectral decomposition Q belongs to, say B =
∑
i
qi Qi,
were subject to a measurement and the measurement interaction were governed by the
Heisenberg analogue of the Lüders projection postulate. Indeed, one needs to consider the
following time evolution
W , Q, P
FirstMeasurementB=
∑
i
qiQi
 W , Qt1=
QWQ
Tr(WQ)
, P (7.47)
The relevant change for PW(Pt2|Qt1)H☼ is that of Qt when the first ‘measurement’ is
performed, i.e. from Q to Qt1. Indeed, in the Schrödinger picture – see diagram (7.40) –
it is the evolution from W to (Wq)t2 which is relevant to calculate PW(p|q), and not that
from (Wq)t2 to (Wp)t2, as would need to be if the relevant time evolution for PW(Pt2|Qt1)H☼
were Pt2=Ut2−t1
−1 Pt1Ut2−t1.
Now the fact that the evolution from Q to Qt1=
QWQ
Tr(WQ)
is given by an extra-dynamics
which cannot be derived from a unitary-type dynamics may not be particularly trouble-
some, since the projective notion can, at most, only work at a mathematical level for
projection operators. So what sense would it make to consider non-measurement unitary-
type interactions as physically acceptable and measurement non-unitary-type interactions
as unacceptable? Moreover, even if this is so, a problem does arise as to when and why one
should consider unitary and non-unitary time-evolutions. Indeed, to make these choices
and to justify them (and thus retrieve the correct probabilistic predictions), one needs to
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supplement the Heisenberg☼ diachronic projective reading with too many physical intu-
itions, i.e. ‘imagine’ process (7.47) as taking place, which are, moreover, not even adequate
in the case of the evolution from Q to Qt1=
QWQ
Tr(WQ)
due to all the problems related to the
quantum notion of measurement (section 6.5). The resulting notion thus presents, at best,
a strange mixture of mathematical and physical components.
However, regardless of whether or not the preceding arguments provide grounds to
fully dismiss this second Heisenberg diachronic projective reading (definition 7.2), it turns
out that this notion is, after all, not even correct. Indeed, the problem is that for the
general case in which the projection operator Q also ‘evolves freely’ after the first ‘meas-
urement’, i.e. it ‘evolves’ from Qt1 =
QWQ
Tr(WQ)
(just after the first ‘measurement’) to Qt2 =
Ut2−t1
−1 Qt1Ut2−t1 (just before the second ‘measurement’), the probabilities provided by the
Heisenberg☼ picture do not agree with the probabilities defined by the Lüders rule in the
Schrödinger picture. And the latter are the correct empirical probabilities.
Let us see this in detail. When considering the probability of projector P at time t2
given projector Q at time t1 in the Heisenberg☼ picture, one has to imagine a time evolution
process similar to that given in (7.40), namely
[W, Qt0, Pt0]
8
Measurement
′Bt0

[
W , Qt1 =
Qt0WQt0
Tr(WQt0)
,
Pt0
]

Free
8
Evolution
′
of Qt
 [W , Qt2 =Ut2−t1
−1 Qt1Ut2−t1, Pt0]
Measurement
8 ′At0

[
W , Qt2, Pt2=
Pt0WPt0
Tr(WPt0)
]
(7.48)
After the first ‘measurement’ Qt changes from Qt0 to Qt1=
Qt0WQt0
Tr(WQt0)
. If no further evolution
of Qt occurs, then the probability of P at time t2 is given by definition 7.2 as
PW(Pt2|Qt1)H☼=Tr
(
Qt0WQt0
Tr(WQt0)
Pt0
)
=Tr(Qt1Pt0) (7.49)
(Note that (7.49) employs both projection operators Pt and Qt before the second ‘meas-
urement’ is performed, i.e. Pt1 = Pt0 and Qt1 =
Qt0WQt0
Tr(WQt0)
.) But if the operator Qt does
evolve freely from the first to the second ‘measurement’, namely from Qt1 to Qt2 =
Ut2−t1
−1 Qt1 Ut2−t1, then to calculate the probability of P at time t2 in the Heisenberg☼
picture one now needs to consider this freely evolved projection operator. Analogously
to (7.49), this probability would be given by
PW(Pt2|Qt1)H☼=Tr(Qt2Pt0)=Tr
(
Ut2−t1
−1 Qt0WQt0
Tr(WQt0)
Ut2−t1Pt0
)
(7.50)
And the problem is that the probability given by (7.50) does not agree with the probability
given by the Lüders rule in the Schrödinger picture.
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Indeed, consider again the process given by (7.40), namely
Wt0 
FirstMeasurement
 (Wq)t1 =
QW t0 Q
Tr(W t0Q)

FreeEvolution
 (Wq)t2 =
Ut2−t1 (Wq)t1Ut2−t1
−1

SecondMeasurement
 (Wp)t2=
P (Wq)t2P
Tr[(Wq)t2P ]
(7.51)
where measurements are now really existing processes. Consider the probabilities defined
by the Lüders rule for measurement outcomes p and q when, as described by (7.51), the
system’s state does change in its free evolution between the two measurements, i.e. (Wq)t2=
Ut2−t1 (Wq)t1Ut2−t1
−1 (rather than the case we considered before with (Wq)t2=(Wq)t1). The
probability for measurement outcome p at time t2 is then given by the standard trace rule
by using the state of the system at time t2, i.e. (Wq)t2=Ut2−t1
QWt0Q
Tr(W t0Q)
Ut2−t1
−1 :
PWt0
(p, t2|q, t1)= p(Wq)t2(p)=Tr[(Wq)t2P ] =Tr
(
Ut2−t1
QWt0Q
Tr(Wt0Q)
Ut2−t1
−1 P
)
(7.52)
Written in terms of projection operators P and Q, instead of measurement outcomes p
and q, we get
PWt0
(P , t2|Q, t1)=P(WQ)t2(P )=Tr
(
Ut2−t1
QWt0 Q
Tr(Wt0Q)
Ut2−t1
−1 P
)
(7.53)
Now compare this probability with the (supposedly) same probability calculated in the
Heisenberg picture as given by (7.50), namely
PW(Pt2|Qt1)H☼=Tr
(
Ut2−t1
−1 Qt0WQt0
Tr(WQt0)
Ut2−t1Pt0
)
(7.54)
One can see that PW(Pt2|Qt1)H☼ given by (7.54) does not agree with the empirically
adequate PW(P , t = t2|Q, t = t1) given by (7.53), where the difference lies in the order
in which the unitary evolution operators appear.7.6 Hence, the Heisenberg☼ projective
reading of the probability defined by the Lüders rule as a diachronic conditional probability
(definition 7.2) is not correct.
The Heisenberg projective reading (definition 7.1) is also incorrect when Qt evolves
freely between both measurements (in addition to, as we showed before, when Qt does not
evolve). Indeed, in this picture, the probability of projector Pt2 given projector Qt1 is given
by
PW(Pt2|Qt1)H= Tr[W (Qt2Pt2Qt2)]Tr(WQt1)
=
pW
′ (Qt2P t2 Qt2)
pW(Qt1)
(7.55)
with Qt2 = Ut2−t1
−1 Qt1 Ut2−t1 = Ut2−t1
−1 Qt0WQt0
Tr(WQt0)
Ut2−t1 and Pt2 = Pt0. And (7.55) is also
different from (7.53).7.7
7.6. This order cannot be altered by invoking the invariance property of the trace under cyclic permutations.
Also note that that Pt0 in the Heisenberg picture is just P in the Schrödinger picture, i.e. [Pt0]H=[P ]S, and similarly,
[Qt0]H=[Q]S and [W ]H= [Wt0]S.
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We thus seem to have arrived at the end of our story. For we have considered all
the seemingly possible ways of giving an understanding of the probability defined by the
Lüders rule as a conditional probability. In sections 5.3 and 5.4 we showed why it cannot
be understood as a synchronic conditional probability for physical values. In section 7.3 we
showed why it cannot be understood as a synchronic nor diachronic conditional probability
for measurement results, (nor as a diachronic conditional probability for physical values).
And in this section we have shown why it cannot either be understood as a diachronic
conditional probability for projection operators.
Furthermore, acknowledging the inadequacy of the diachronic projective notion,
weakens even more the synchronic projective notion of conditional probability we discussed
in section 5.2. Indeed, it shows that, what seems to be a possible intuitive explanation
of the fact that the common projector of P and Q for PW(P |Q) is different than that
for PW(Q|P ), namely that the projectors are to be considered at different times, is not
satisfactory. Hence, even if one cannot fully dismiss the synchronic projective reading
of the probabilities defined by the Lüders rule, one can safely conclude that it is unlikely
that it can provide an adequate understanding of a quantum notion of conditional prob-
ability. Indeed, it gives no understanding of why the operator Q P Q represents the
common ‘projector’ of Q and P ; it relies on a counterintuitive notion of commonality
since the common projector of P given Q is not equal to that of Q given P ; and a pos-
sible way, if not the only, of making sense of this counterintuitive property is inadequate.
To conclude, we have seen nothing so far which justifies the understanding of the prob-
ability defined by the Lüders rule as a conditional probability, but quite, on the contrary,
have given many arguments against this understanding at different levels. Indeed, it cannot
be interpreted as a conditional probability for physical values, nor for measurement results,
nor at a formal level for projection operators, both from a synchronic and a diachronic
perspective. Even if the probabilities defined by the Lüders rule are the only probabilities
which are co-extensive with conditional probabilities for compatible events, we have no
reason to assimilate them to conditional ones for incompatible events and many reasons
against this assimilation.
Contrary to the standard view, the probability defined by the Lüders rule does not
acquire a precise meaning, in the sense of synchronic or diachronic conditional probability,
when quantum mechanics is interpreted as a generalized probability space or as probability
space for measurement results. Nothing comparable to the classical way of generating the
conditional probability measure works in the Hilbert space when incompatible events are
involved.
7.7. This is explicitly shown in the next section.
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7.5 So Why Is It Seemingly a Conditional Probability?
However, there remains a tension. For in spite of the validity of the rather intricate and long
argument developed in this dissertation (against the conditional reading of the probability
defined by the Lüders rule), the Lüders rule still defines a probability which is, in some
sense, a conditional probability. Indeed, look again at the examples of section 4.4. For
example, in the double slit experiment it does yield the probability that the electron hits
the detecting screen given that either one or both slits are open. So isn’t this enough to
regard the probabilities it defines as conditional probabilities? How do we reconcile this
intuition with our arguments? Incredibly enough, seeing explicitly why the Heisenberg
probability PW(Pt2|Qt1)H given by (7.55) does not agree with the empirically adequate
(Schrödinger) probability defined by the Lüders rule, i.e. PWt0(P , t2|Q, t1), will allow us
to resolve this tension.
Take the (Schrödinger) probability PWt0(P ,t2|Q,t1) defined by the Lüders rule as given
by (7.53). Using first the invariance of the trace rule,7.8 then switching to the Heisenberg
picture,7.9 and finally rearranging this expression taking into account that Pt0=Pt1,7.10 we
get [
PWt0
(P , t2|Q, t1)
]
S
=
[
pW
′ (Qt0Pt2Qt0)
pW(Qt0)
]
H
(7.56)
where we emphasize by an under-script the time picture used in each expression. And hence
we can clearly see that the probability defined by the Lüders rule
[
PWt0
(P , t2|Q, t1)
]
S
is
not equal to either the (alleged) Heisenberg H projective reading of it (definition 7.1) given
by (7.55), i.e.
PW(Pt2|Qt1)H= pW
′ (Qt1P t2Qt1)
pW(Qt1)
(7.57)
nor to the (alleged) Heisenberg H☼ projective reading of it given by (7.54), i.e.
PW(Pt2|Qt1)H☼=
Tr(Qt0WQt0 Ut2−t1Pt1Ut2−t1
−1 )
Tr(WQt0)

[
pW
′ (Qt0Pt2 Qt0)
pW(Qt0)
]
H
(7.58)
(because, given the order in which the evolution operators appear, one cannot equate
Ut2−t1Pt1Ut2−t1
−1 with Pt2, and hence write PW(Pt2|Qt1)H☼ as
[
pW
′ (Qt0Pt2Qt0)/pW(Qt0)
]
H
).
Thus, as we concluded in the last section, the probability defined by the Lüders rule cannot
be interpreted as the probability of projector P at time t2 given projector Q at time t1.
7.8. PWt0(P , t2|Q, t1)=Tr
(
Ut2−t1
QWt0Q
Tr(Wt0Q)
Ut2−t1
−1
P
)
=
Tr(QWt0QUt2−t1
−1
P Ut2−t1)
Tr(Wt0Q)
.
7.9.
[
Tr(QWt0QUt2−t1
−1 P Ut2−t1)
Tr(Wt0Q)
]
S
=
[
Tr(Qt0WQt0Ut2−t1
−1 Pt0Ut2−t1)
Tr(WQt0)
]
H
.
7.10.
[
Tr(Qt0WQt0Ut2−t1
−1 Pt0Ut2−t1)
Tr(WQt0)
]
H
=
[
Tr(Qt0WQt0Ut2−t1
−1 Pt1Ut2−t1)
Tr(WQt0)
]
H
=
[
Tr(Qt0WQt0Pt2)
Tr(WQt0)
]
H
=[
pW
′ (Qt0Pt2Qt0)
pW(Qt0)
]
H
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However, simply by reading (7.56), it appears that we can now finally say how it can
be interpreted. Indeed, the probability defined by the Lüders is simply the probability of
projector P at time t2 – immediately before the second measurement – given projector Q
at time t0 – immediately before the first measurement. The problem with the Heisenberg H
and H☼ readings of the probability defined by the Lüders rule is that they invoke incorrect
Heisenberg time pictures. Indeed, guided by the attempt to interpret this probability as
the probability of projector Q after the first measurement, i.e. event Qt1, given projector
P after the second measurement, i.e. Pt2, we have derived incorrect Heisenberg expressions
of it.
The probability defined by the Lüders rule is defined for projection operator Qt0 imme-
diately prior to the first measurement, and not for Qt1 immediately posterior to the first
measurement. That is, projector Qt needs to be considered immediately before the first
measurement rather than immediately after it. (Note that, since the actual result of the
second measurement plays no role in PWt0(P , t2|Q, t1) – just as the actual result of a
measurement plays no role in the ‘unconditional’ probability given by the trace rule pW(P )
– we have not needed to introduce a further time t3 to distinguish between Pt2 immediately
before the second measurement and Pt2 immediately after the second measurement). We
refer to this (almost last!) interpretation of the probabilities defined by the Lüders rule as
Heisenberg diachronic(t0−t2) projective notion of conditional probability.
Definition 7.3. Heisenberg Diachronic(t0−t2) Projective Quantum Conditional
Probability The probability given by the Lüders rule for projectors Pt, Qt ∈ L(H) in the
Heisenberg picture, namely
PW(Pt2|Qt0)= Tr(Qt0WQt0Pt2)Tr(Qt0W )
=
pW
′ (Qt0Pt2Qt0)
pW(Qt0)
(7.59)
is the probability of projector Pt at time t2 – immediately before the second measurement of
the observable to whose spectral decomposition Pt belongs to – conditional on projector Qt
at time t0 – immediately before the first measurement of the observable to whose spectral
decomposition Qt belongs to – with respect to the probability measure pW.
The operator Qt0 Pt2 Qt0 represents the common operator of projectors Pt2 and Qt0,
where, given that Pt0=Pt1, the evolution from Pt0 to Pt2 is given by the unitary evolution
operator Ut2−t1 as
Pt2=Ut2−t1
−1 Pt0 Ut2−t1 (7.60)
Note that, since [Qt0]H=[Q]S and [Pt0]H=[P ]S, (7.59) simply reduces the usual expression
of the probability defined by the Lüders rule, i.e. PW(P |Q)= Tr(QWQP )Tr(QW ) .
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It is not strange that, after all, the Heisenberg picture does provide the appropriate
interpretation of the probability defined by the Lüders rule. Indeed, the notion of condi-
tional probability is that of the probability of an event conditional on another event, and
given that quantum events are represented by projection operators and that these need to
be considered at different times, one needs to resort to the time picture in which the time
evolution is carried by the projection operators, namely the Heisenberg picture.
Note that we have arrived at this conclusion after a long argument. Indeed, to derive
expression (7.59) we have been guided by our discussion in section 5.2 and in this chapter,
which has first, made us search for a common quantum event of P and Q given by QPQ
and second, consider these projection operators at different times (and hence in the Heisen-
berg picture).7.11 But expression (7.59) is very easy to derive from the probability defined
by the Lüders rule in the Schrödinger picture. Indeed, it takes, at most, two lines of trivial
calculations (see footnotes 7.8-7.10). However, as we have seen, adequately interpreting
such an expression and seeing why each attempted reading goes wrong has not been as
trivial.
However, the Heisenberg diachronict0−t2 reading is again not wholly satisfactory. First,
it relies on a strange mixture of physical and mathematical notions. For it is defined for
projection operators, and hence gives an interpretation of a mathematical notion, while it
invokes time and physical and measurement processes, and hence, gives a physical inter-
pretation of such a notion. Indeed, both time t0 and t2 are defined as immediately prior to
both the first and the second measurement, respectively, and the time evolution process
of Pt, namely Pt0=Pt1 and Pt2=Ut2−t1
−1 Pt0 Ut2−t1, needs to be considered. Second, it still
provides no explanation of why Qt0Pt2 Qt0 represents the common quantum event of Qt0
and Pt2 in PW(Pt2|Qt0).
Finally, and most importantly, the Heisenberg diachronict0−t2 projective reading,
however weak and unsatisfactory, is physically adequate only in so far as it can underwrite
a quantum notion of conditional probability in terms of physically relevant values. That
is, a reading of PW(Pt2|Qt0) as the probability for value p at time t2 conditional on value
q at t0 associated with projection operators Pt2 and Qt0, respectively, where p and q can
both be interpreted as physical values or, in particular, as measurement results. Given that
PW(Pt2|Qt0), as defined by definition 7.3, makes explicit use of measurements, we focus on
the latter interpretation of p and q. We refer to this interpretation as the diachronic(t2−t0)
conditional-on-measurement-outcome reading of the probability defined by the Lüders rule.
7.11. Note that this has led us to, contrary to what we intended, define a Heisenberg notion which is not even
calculated through the standard trace rule. Indeed, definition 7.2 reads PW(Pt2|Qt1)H☼ = Tr(Qt1 Pt2), something
which should have warned us against the adequacy of such a reading before developing the general expression of
PW (Pt2|Qt1)H☼ when Qt evolves freely between measurements.
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Definition 7.4. Diachronic(t2−t0) Conditional-on-Measurement-Outcome
Quantum Probability. When an ideal first-kind measurement of a certain observable
(where Q belongs to its spectral decomposition), is performed at time t1 on a system in
state W, followed by a second measurement of an observable (where P belongs to its spec-
tral decomposition) at time t2, the probability given by the Lüders rule for measurement
outcome qt0 at time t0 – immediately before the first measurement – associated to pro-
jector Qt0 ∈ L(H) – and measurement outcome pt2 at time t2 – immediately before the
second measurement – associated to projector Pt2∈L(H), namely
PW(pt2|qt0)= Tr(WQt0Pt2Qt0)Tr(WQt0)
(7.61)
is the probability of measurement outcome pt2 conditional on measurement outcome qt0.
The evolution from Pt0 to Pt2 is given by the unitary evolution operator Ut2−t1 as
Pt2=Ut2−t1
−1 Pt0 Ut2−t1 (7.62)
Note that this is so because Pt0=Pt1.
So can the probability given by (7.61) be interpreted as the probability for measure-
ment outcome p at time t2, immediately prior to the second measurement, conditional on
measurement outcome q at time t0, immediately prior to the first measurement?
There are several problems with this interpretation. First, neither qt0 nor pt2 are really
measurement outcomes, for they are both considered prior to the actual performance of
both measurements. One could try to solve this by thinking of them as potential meas-
urement outcomes rather than actual measurement outcomes. Moreover, this potential
interpretation would allow one to escape the difficulty in the cases in which the occurrence
of the event Qt0 is not drawn back to the occurrence of the single events (Qi)t0 that compose
it. Indeed, consider the Stern-Gerlach or the double slit experiments we presented in
sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2. There, we have Qt0=(Psx+1)t0+(Psx0)t0 and Qt0=(PA)t0+(PB)t0,
respectively, where no actual measurement result can be ascribed to them since no actual
measurement of (Psx+1)t0 or (Psx0)t0, and of (PA)t0 or (PB)t0, is performed at time t0. But
since qt0 is interpreted as a potential measurement outcome, one does not need to consider
actually performed measurements; qt0 can potentially be either (q1)t0or (q2)t0, without this
implying that either of them has to be actual.
But regardless of whether this potential versus actual talk is acceptable, the notion
of conditional probability afforded by the diachronic(t2−t0) conditional-on-measurement-
outcome reading is utterly unsatisfactory. Indeed, it says nothing about what happens
to the system in the first measurement since the notion strictly applies to q at time t0
immediately before the first measurement. This is the way in which this reading of the
7.5 So Why Is It Seemingly a Conditional Probability? 129
probability defined by the Lüders rule avoids introducing an extra-dynamics for the act of
measurement.
The diachronict2−t0 conditional-on-measurement-outcome notion thus offers a purely
instrumental interpretation with a strong ‘black-box’ character which is unsatisfactory
unless one thinks of quantum theory as merely providing an algorithm for generating the
statistical predictions of the outcomes of measurements. Moreover, even if one admits that
this is in fact so, there is no determinate criteria as to what kinds of interactions qualify
as measurements.
To conclude, if when one says the probability of a certain measurement outcome p given
a previous measurement which has potential outcome q is P, one only means that if these
two measurement are repeated many times one expects that the fraction of those which
give the outcome p is roughly P, then no problems arise. But as soon as one attempts to
say anything else, then all the problems we saw in sections 5.3, 5.4 and 7.3 appear.
7.6 Revisiting The Two-Slit Experiment
Let us revisit the two-slit experiment in the light of all our discussion. We begin by
describing it from the perspective of an orthodox interpreter. A particle first leaves the
source in a state described by ψ. The two-slit screen S1 then performs a position meas-
urement of the particle in its plane: it localizes the particle to a certain range of values of
the position observable Y1, namely A when only slit A is open, B when only slit B is open,
and A∪B when both slits are open. Immediately after this measurement the state of the
particle is given by the Lüders projection postulate. When only slit A is open, the new state
is the normalized projection of the initial state ψ onto the subspace which is the range of
the projector PA belonging to the spectral decomposition of position observable Y1. That is,
ψA=
PAψ
‖PAψ‖ (7.63)
Similarly, when only slit B is open, the new state of the system immediately after the
electron has passed through slit B is
ψB=
PBψ
‖PBψ‖ (7.64)
And when both slits are open, the new state is the normalized projection of the initial state
ψ onto the subspace which is the range of the projector PA+PB. Indeed, given A∩B=∅,
PA and PB are orthogonal and hence PA∪B=PA∨PB=PA+PB. And, therefore, the state
of the particle immediately after the measurement of the double-slit screen is
ψAB=CAψA+CBψB (7.65)
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where CA =
‖PAψ‖
‖(PA+PB) ψ‖ , CB =
‖PBψ‖
‖(PA+PB) ψ‖ . If we set pψ(PA) = pψ(PB), i.e. ‖PA ψ‖
2 =
‖PBψ‖2, corresponding to the most simple experimental arrangement, then CA=CB= 1
2
√
and thus
ψAB=
ψA+ ψB
2
√ (7.66)
The particle then evolves freely between the double slit screen S1 and the detecting screen
S2. Letting t=0 be the instant at which the particle reaches S1, t= τ the instant at which
it reaches S2, and Uτ the free evolution operator in L(H) between the two slits, the particle
reaches the detecting screen in state ψA
′ =UτψA when only slit A is open, ψB′ =UτψB when
only slit B is open, and ψAB
′ = Uτ ψAB when both slits are open. Finally, upon reaching
the latter is localized in the set R in S2’s plane.
As we saw in section 4.4.2, using the time evolution of the states ψ ′ = Uτ ψ one can
calculate the probability that the particle is measured at R on the detecting screen. This
probability is given by the trace rule using the time evolution of the collapsed state as
given by the Lüders projection postulate. When only slit A is open, this probability is thus
given by
Pψ(R, t= τ |A, t=0)= pψ
A
′ (R)= 〈ψA′ , PRψA′ 〉 (7.67)
Similarly, when only slit B is open, the probability that the particle is measured at R on
the detecting screen at t= τ is
Pψ(R, t= τ |B, t=0)= pψ
B
′ (R)= 〈ψB′ , PRψB′ 〉 (7.68)
And when both slits are open, the probability that the particle is measured at R on the
detecting screen at t= τ is
Pψ(R, t= τ |A∪B, t=0)= pψ
AB
′ (R)=
〈
ψAB
′ , PRψ ′AB
〉
(7.69)
The probability to arrive at R when the two slits are open (7.69) , is not, as in the classical
case, the weighted sum of the probabilities when each slit is open (7.67)-(7.68). Rather we
have the characteristic quantum interference terms. That is,
Pψ(R, τ |A∪B, 0)= 1
2
Pψ(R, τ |A, 0)+ 1
2
Pψ(R, τ |PB , 0)+ I (7.70)
with
I =
1
2
〈ψA′ , PRψB′ 〉+ 12 〈ψB
′ , PRψA′ 〉 (7.71)
We now verify that in these three experiments the corresponding equalities given by
P(At2|Bt1) p(Bt1)=P(Bt1|At2) p(At2) fail, that is,
Pψ(R, τ |A, 0) pψ(A, 0) Pψ(A, 0|R, τ) pψ(R, τ) (7.72)
Pψ(R, τ |B, 0) pψ(B, 0) Pψ(P , 0|R, τ) pψ(R, τ ) (7.73)
Pψ(R, τ |A∪B, 0) pψ(A∪B, 0) Pψ(A∪B, 0|R, τ ) pψ(R, τ) (7.74)
7.6 Revisiting The Two-Slit Experiment 131
Consider first the experiment in which only slit is A open. The left-hand side of inequality
(7.72), i.e.7.12
Pψ(R, τ |A, 0) pψ(A, 0)= 〈ψ,Uτ−1PRUτPAψ〉 (7.75)
and the right-hand side, i.e.7.13
Pψ(A, 0|R, τ) pψ(R, τ )= 1‖PRψ‖2 〈ψ,UτPRUτ
−1PAψ〉 〈ψ,Uτ−1 PRUτψ〉 (7.76)
are, in general, not equal. Second, similarly to the previous case, when only slit B is open
we can verify inequality (7.73). Finally, consider the case in which both slits A and B
are open. We show this for the case in which ‖PA ψ‖2 = ‖PB ψ‖2. The left-hand side of
inequality (7.74), i.e.7.14
Pψ(R, τ |A∪B, 0) pψ(A∪B, 0)= 1
2
〈ψ, Uτ−1PRUτPAψ〉+ 12 〈ψ, Uτ
−1PRUτPBψ〉+ 1
2
〈ψ,
PAUτ
−1PRUτPBψ〉+ 1
2
〈ψ,PBUτ−1PRUτPAψ〉 (7.77)
and the right-hand side, i.e.7.15
Pψ(A ∪ B, 0|R, τ ) pψ(R, τ ) = 1‖PRψ‖2
[
〈PR ψ, Uτ−1 PA Uτ PR ψ〉 + 〈PR ψ,
Uτ
−1PBUτPR ψ〉
]
〈ψ,Uτ−1 PRUτψ〉 (7.78)
are not equal to each other, even in the case in which the interference term, i.e.
I =
1
2
〈ψA′ , PRψB′ 〉+ 12 〈ψB
′ , PRψA′ 〉 (7.79)
vanishes.
In addition, note that the interference term I is equal to zero only if τ is zero, and
hence there is a non-zero distance between the two screens. Indeed, for τ =0, we have that
ψA
′ = ψA and ψB′ = ψB, and thus
I =
1
2
〈ψA , PRψB〉+ 1
2
〈ψB , PRψA〉 (7.80)
7.12. Pψ(PR, τ |PA, 0) pψ(PA, 0) = 〈Uτ PAψ‖PAψ‖ , PR Uτ
PAψ
‖PAψ‖〉 〈ψ, PA ψ〉 = 〈Uτ PA ψ, PR Uτ PA ψ〉 = 〈ψ,
PAUτ
−1
PRUτPAψ〉= 〈ψ, Uτ−1PRUτPAψ〉.
7.13. Pψ(PA,0|PR, τ) pψ(PR, τ )= 〈Uτ PRψ‖PRψ‖ ,PAUτ
PRψ
‖PRψ‖〉 〈Uτψ,PRUτψ〉=
1
‖PRψ‖2 〈UτPRψ,PAUτPRψ〉 〈ψ,
Uτ
−1 PR Uτ ψ〉 = 1‖PRψ‖2 〈ψ, PR Uτ
−1
PA Uτ PR ψ〉 〈ψ, Uτ−1 PR Uτ ψ〉 = 1‖PRψ‖2 〈ψ, Uτ PR Uτ
−1
PA ψ〉 〈ψ,
Uτ
−1 PRUτψ〉.
7.14. Pψ(PR, τ |PA∪B, 0) pψ(PA∪B, 0) = 12
[‖PA ψ‖2 + ‖PB ψ‖2 ][ 1‖PAψ‖2 〈ψ, Uτ−1 PR Uτ PA ψ〉+ 1‖PBψ‖2 〈ψ,
Uτ
−1
PR Uτ PB ψ〉 + 1‖PAψ‖
1
‖PBψ‖ 〈ψ, PA Uτ
−1
PR Uτ PB ψ〉 + 1‖PAψ‖
1
‖PBψ‖ 〈ψ, PB Uτ
−1
PR Uτ PA ψ〉
]
. If
‖PAψ‖2= ‖PBψ‖2, then we get (7.77).
7.15. Pψ(PA+ PB, 0|PR, τ) =Tr
([
Uτ
PRPψPR)
Tr(PψPR)
Uτ
−1] (PA+ PB))= Tr[PRPψPR Uτ−1 (PA+PB)Uτ]Tr(PψPR) . Using that
PR Pψ PR= PPRψ, it is equal to
Tr(PPRψ Uτ
−1 (PA+PB)Uτ)
‖PRψ‖2 , which, in turn, is equal to
〈PRψ,Uτ−1 (PA+PB)UτPR ψ〉
‖PRψ‖2 =
1
‖PRψ‖2
[
〈PRψ, Uτ−1PAUτPR ψ〉+ 〈PRψ,Uτ−1PBUτPR ψ〉
]
, we get (7.78).
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But since
〈ψA , PRψB〉= 1‖PAψ‖ ‖PBψ‖ 〈ψ,PAPRPBψB〉=0 (7.81)
(given that PA commutes with PR – because Y1 and Y2 are compatible observables – and
that PA and PB are orthogonal), and similarly for 〈ψB , PR ψA〉, the interference term I
vanishes. In contrast, I is different from zero if τ  0. Indeed, for τ  0 both terms in (7.79)
are different from zero. Consider the first one, i.e.
〈ψA′ , PRψB′ 〉= 1‖PAψ‖ ‖PBψ‖ 〈ψ, PAUτ
−1PRUτPBψB〉 (7.82)
Given PA does not commute with PR
′ = Uτ
−1 PR Uτ (since the evolution ψA → ψA′ and
ψB→ ψB′ will be generated by a Hamiltonian involving the momentum operator which is
incompatible with the position observables Y1 and Y2), we have that PA Uτ
−1 PR Uτ PB 
Uτ
−1PRUτPAPB. And hence (7.82), and therefore I, are non-zero.
This last analysis makes clear the role played by (i) the initial quantum state, namely
a superposition of states ψA and ψB, and (ii) the non-zero distance between the slit screen
and the detecting screen, i.e. a non-zero time evolution between the two screens, for the
presence of interference terms. Indeed, because of the former, inequality (7.74) – when both
slits are open – holds even more strongly than (7.72) and (7.73). Indeed, the superposition
ψAB =
ψA+ ψB
2
√ after the measurement of the double-slit is crucial to get the interference
terms in (7.79). And because of the the non-zero distance between the slit screen and the
detecting screen, the position observables Y1 and Y2 are incompatible – unlike Sx and Sy in
the S-G example which are always incompatible, Y1 and Y2 are only incompatible if they
are considered at different times.
Let us now look at the interpretation of the probabilities defined by the Lüders rule for
the three experiments and show why they cannot be interpreted as diachronic conditional-
on-measurement-outcome probabilities. That is, why they do not allow a non-instrumental
conditional-on-measurement-outcome interpretation. Recall that in section 7.3. we con-
sidered this interpretation for the probabilities defined by the Lüders rule in general and
dismissed it as not applicable. We now develop these arguments for the present case.
First, the probability defined by the Lüders rule with only one slit open, e.g. Pψ(R,τ |A,
0), cannot be understood as the pro-rata increase of the probability of measurement result
A at time t= 0 and measurement result R at time t= τ , and hence as a conditional-on-
measurement-outcome probability. For even though the event ‘measurement result A0 and
measurement result Rτ ’ is represented by (PA)0∧ (PR)τ , where ‘∧ ’ can be interpreted as
the ordinary ‘and’, the pro rata increase of the probability assigned to this event does not
coincide with the value assigned to Pψ(R, τ |A, 0)= 〈UτψA , PRUτψA〉 by the Lüders rule.
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By an analogue reasoning, one concludes that Pψ(R, τ |B, 0) cannot be interpreted as the
pro-rata increase of the probability of measurement result B at time t=0 and measurement
result R at time t= τ , and hence as a conditional-on-measurement-outcome probability.
Second, it is even more difficult to understand the probability defined by the Lüders
rule for the case in which both slits open, i.e. Pψ(R, τ |A ∪ B, 0) =
〈
ψAB
′ , PR ψ ′AB
〉
, as
a conditional-on-measurement-outcome probability. For now (PA ∨ PB)0 ∧ (PR)τ cannot
even be interpreted as measurement result A or measurement result B at time t = 0,
and measurement result R at time t = τ . Indeed, recall our discussion in section 5.4.2.
In addition, the probability assigned to (PA ∨ PB)0 ∧ (PR)τ does not coincide with that
assigned to the common event (PA+PB)0 (PR)τ (PA+PB)0 employed by the Lüders rule.
To conclude, the probabilities Pψ(R, τ |A, 0), Pψ(R, τ |B, 0) and Pψ(R, τ |A ∪ B, 0)
defined by the Lüders rule for the three situations considered in the double slit experiment
cannot be interpreted as conditional-on-measurement-outcome probabilities. Contrary to
the standard view, they cannot be interpreted as
‘the probability that the [particle] will arrive at a certain region in the
detecting screen [R], conditional on localization to a certain range of values
of Y1, (A, B, or A∪B)’ on the double-slit screen. ([Bub, 1977], p.387)
As a final remark, note that the orthodox interpreter would try to resist our conclusion.
Take the experiment in which both slits are open. The orthodox interpreter would say
that the measurement performed by the double slit need not be interpreted in terms
of the measurement when only A is open and the measurement when only B is open.
That is, she would hold that the fact that (PR)τ ∧ (PA ∨ PB)0 cannot be interpreted as
measurement result R and measurement result A or B is irrelevant. For the measurement
performed by the double slit screen when both slits are open does not measure which slit
the particle actually goes through. Thus, according to her, one should not say anything
about measurements which have not been performed. Moreover, she would continue, if
one were to perform a which-slit experiment, then one could talk about the results of
both measurements. But since, in this case, no experimental interference terms would be
obtained, this would pose no further problem.
Now even if one accepts this reasoning, the orthodox interpreter would still have to
explain why the probability given by the pro rata increase of (PR)τ ∧ (PA∨PB)0 – where
now PA∨PB would simply be interpreted as a measurement result localizing the particle
to the range of values A∪B – does not coincide with the probability Pψ(PR, t= τ |PA∪B ,
t = 0). And thus, the orthodox interpreter cannot provide an answer to the interpretive
difficulties by not speaking about results of measurement which have not been performed.
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7.7 Two further arguments
One finds in the literature two further arguments for the claim that the probabilities
defined by the Lüders rule should be interpreted as conditional probabilities. First, [Bub,
1979a, 1979b, 2007] presents an argument based on a formal analogy between the classical
rule of conditionalization and the Lüders rule for this interpretation. He also claims that,
given this interpretation, one can show that the difference between classical and quantum
conditionalization cannot be regarded as grounds for interpreting the quantum-mechanical
conditionalization rule as reflecting the irreducible and uncontrollable disturbance of the
system measured by a measuring instrument. Rather, for him,
‘the peculiar features of the quantum-mechanical conditionalization rule
relative to the classical rule reflect solely the non-Boolean character of the
possibility structures of quantum-mechanical systems.’ ([Bub, 1979b] p.90)
And second, [Fuchs, 2002a, 2002b] presents an argument which goes beyond inter-
preting the Lüders rule as a conditionalization rule; he argues that, in contrast to the
classical picture in which gathering new information simply refines the agent’s old degrees
of belief through conditionalization,
‘quantum measurement is [...] a refinement and a readjustment of one’s
initial state of belief’ ([Fuchs, 2002a], p.34; emphasis added).
Let us, and with this finish this chapter, consider these arguments in detail.
7.7.1 Bub’s Analogy Argument
Bub considers a countable classical probability space 〈S, F(S), p〉, where he denotes by
x1, x2,  . the elementary events, associated with the characteristic functions χ1, χ2,  .
He denotes by a, b,  . other non-elementary events. He then gives the following formal
expression of a classical conditional probability assignment.7.16 For any probability measure
p defined by an assignment of probabilities pi to the elementary events xi, it is possible
to introduce a density operator ρ=
∑
i
piχi (where
∑
i
pi=1, pi> 0, for all i) in terms of
which the probability of an event a can be represented as
pρ(a)=
∑
j
(
∑
i
piχi(xj))χa(xj)=
∑
j
ρ(xj)χa(xj) (7.83)
7.16. The notation and numbering of equations are adapted to maintain uniformity.
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(7.83) can also be simply expressed as pρ(a)=
∑
ρχa, where the summation sign without
an index is understood as summing over all the atomic events. In terms of this density
operator ρ, the conditional probability of an event a, given an event b, can be expressed as
Ppρ(a|b)=
∑
j
ρ(xj)χb(xj)χa(xj)∑
j
ρ(xj)χb(xj)
=
∑
ρχbχa∑
ρχb
(7.84)
He then considers the transition from the probability measure given by p to the probability
measure given by Ppρ, and writes it in terms of the corresponding density operators. That
is, he considers the transition from ρ to ρb=
ρχb∑
ρχb
or, equivalently in the symmetrized form,
ρ→ ρb= χb ρ χb∑
ρ χb
(7.85)
so that Ppρ(a|b)=
∑
ρbχa.
Bub then notes the formal similarity between equation (7.85) and the change of state
described by the Lüders rule and claims:
‘Now, equation (7.85) is just the classical analogue of the Von Neumann-
Lüders projection postulate in quantum mechanics! [...] After a measure-
ment of an observable B with outcome b [associated with the eigenvalue
corresponding to the projector Pb], the conditional probability of an event a,
relative to an initial probability assignment given by W , is:
PW(a|b)=Tr(WbPa) (7.86)
where,
Wb=
PbWPb
Tr(PbWPb)
(7.87)
That is, since the projection operators Pb are the non commutative analogues
of the characteristic functions χb, the transition W → Wb in (7.87), which
is the quantum projection postulate, is just the Bayesian rule (7.85) for
updating a probability distribution on new information.’ ([Bub, 2007], pp.
245-246, notation adapted)
Bub thus takes the formal analogy between (7.85) and (7.87) to show that the projec-
tion postulate describes the conditionalization of the statistics of a quantum system.
In addition, he uses this same conclusion to argue that the difference between clas-
sical and quantum conditionalization cannot be regarded as grounds for interpreting the
quantum-mechanical conditionalization rule as reflecting the irreducible and uncontrollable
disturbance of the system measured by a measuring instrument. For him, this difference
only reflects the non-Boolean character of the ‘possibility structures’ of quantum mechan-
ical systems. He gives the following argument.
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In the classical case, the rule (7.85) ρ→ ρb= χb ρχb∑ ρχb represents conditionalization with
respect to the event b, in the sense that ρb preserves all initial ‘statistical information’
specified by χb concerning the system, consistent with the event b. That is, the transition
ρ→ ρb preserves the relative probabilities of events a such that a⊆ b. In contrast, the rule
ρ→ ρb′ = χb∑ χb (7.88)
represents conditionalization with respect to the event b and randomization of the initial
probability measure corresponding to ρ on the subset b, so that the initial ‘information’
specified by ρ or pρ concerning the relative probabilities of the events a⊆ b is eliminated.
That is, the initial measure is not merely renormalized to include the new information (that
the value is b), but replaced by a uniform measure over the set b, so that the information
contained in the initial measure concerning the relative probabilities of properties repres-
ented by subsets a in b is lost.
Now in quantum theory, the transition W → Wb dictated by the Lüders rule also
preserves the relative probabilities of events Pa6Pb, and hence, in his view, Wb retains all
initial statistical information specified byW concerning the system consistent with b. Thus,
it should be regarded as describing the conditionalization of the statistics of a quantum
system. In contrast, the Von Neumann rule
W→Wb′= PbTr(WPb) (7.89)
is the analogue of the classical rule (7.85) representing a conditionalization and randomiz-
ation of the initial measure within the subsets b.
Thus, Bub argues, that whereas the change of state prescribed by von Neumann’s pro-
jection postulate W→Wb′ is conditionalization and randomization of the initial measure,
the transition prescribed by the Lüders rule W → Wb is only conditionalization on the
non-Boolean possibility structure. And hence, that the difference between classical condi-
tionalization and quantum conditionalization, as given by the Lüders rule, should not be
regarded as grounds for interpreting the quantum-mechanical conditionalization rule as
reflecting the irreducible and uncontrollable disturbance of the system measured by any
measuring instrument. In his own words,
‘On the usual interpretation, the projection postulate is a rule repres-
enting the effect of the necessarily finite and uncontrollable disturbance of a
system involved in any quantum mechanical measurement process. My point
is that the projection postulate in its corrected Lüders version is properly
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understood asmere conditionalization on a non-Boolean possibility structure,
since it is the analogue of mere conditionalization on new information in the
Boolean case. The effect of a measurement disturbance involved in obtaining
this information would be represented as an additional change in the stat-
istical operator, over and above the change defined by the Lüders rule. Such
a measurement disturbance may be more or less violent. The von Neumann
rule corresponds to the most violent disturbance possible, in which all initial
information concerning the system is lost, and only information represented
by the measurement result is retained.’ ([Bub, 1977], p.389)
7.7.2 Fuchs’ Two Process Interpretation
In the classical case, updating through Bayesian conditionalization can be seen as just
involving a refinement of the agent’s degrees of beliefs. This interpretation is grounded on
the fact that the degree of belief in A, q(A), can be expressed as a linear sum of the various
conditional degrees of belief q(A|Bi), weighted by the degree of belief in each possible Bi,
i.e. q(A)=
∑
i
q(A|Bi) q(Bi). When the agent learns that Bi is the case, she transforms her
initial or prior degree of belief q(A) to generate a final or posterior degree of belief qBi(A),
by conditioning on Bi, that is, qBi(A)= q(A|Bi). As Fuchs somewhat mysteriously puts it,
‘It is not as if the new state [qBi(A)] is incommensurable with the old
[q(A)]. It was always there; it was just initially averaged in with various other
potential beliefs.’ ([Fuchs, 2002a], p.30)
However the situation is more complex in the quantum case. When the agent learns that
bi is the case, the density operator generating the agent’s old degrees of belief W cannot
be expressed as a linear sum of the various Wbi’s due to the non-commutativity structure
of the quantum events. And hence, Fuchs argues, the change of state given by the Lüders
rule from W to Wbi=
PbiWPbi
Tr(PbiWPbi)
does not lend itself to be interpreted as a refinement of
the agent’s degrees of belief. Instead he claims that one can achieve a proper interpretation
by considering not only a refinement but also a ‘readjustment’.
Fuchs bases his interpretation on the possibility of formally breaking up the quantum
transition from W to Wbi into two distinct processes, which are subsequently understood
(respectively) as refinement and readjustment of an agent’s degrees of belief:7.17
1. ‘Process 1’: W→ W˜bi, where W =
∑
i
W˜bi q(Pbi) and W˜bi=
1
Tr(WPbi)
W 1/2PbiW
1/2.
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2. ‘Process 2’: W˜bi→Wbi, where Wbi=
PbiWPbi
Tr(PbiWPbi)
.
Given that W˜bi andWbi have the same eigenvalues and thatW can be expressed as a linear
sum of the various W˜bi with weights q(Pbi), Fuchs interprets the first process as
‘an observer refining his initial state of belief and simply plucking out a
term corresponding to the “data” collected.’ ([Fuchs, 2002a], p.34)
To make fully explicit the comparison between the classical and the quantum case we
rewrite the classical expression
q(A)=
∑
i
q(A|Bi) q(Bi) (7.90)
in terms of density operators as ρ=
∑
i
ρBi q(Bi), where q(A)=
∑
ρχA and
q(A|Bi)=
∑
ρBiχA,with ρBi=
χBi ρ χBi∑
ρχBi
(7.91)
Thus the refinement form q(A) to q(A|Bi) is formally equivalent to the change from ρ to
ρBi, which is what Fuchs compares to the change from W to W˜bi.
Fuchs then sees the second process as
‘a further “mental readjustment” of the observer’s beliefs, which takes
into account details both of the measurement interaction and the observers
initial quantum state.’ ([Fuchs, 2002a], p.34)
Hence, he concludes that
‘one can think of quantum collapse as a non commutative variant of
Bayes’ rule.’([Fuchs, 2002a], p.35) where ‘[t]aking into account the idea
that quantum measurements are ‘invasive’ or ‘disturbing’ alters the classical
Bayesian picture only in introducing a further outcome-dependent readjust-
ment.’ ([Fuchs, 2002a], p.38)
7.7.3 Evaluation
We now argue that both Bub’s analogy argument for the claim that the Lüders rule is the
appropriate conditionalization rule in quantum mechanics and Fuchs’ interpretation that
quantum measurement is a refinement and a readjustment of one’s initial state of belief
are incorrect.
7.17. Note that [Palge and Konrad, 2008] argue that the expression for the unitary re-adjustment operator in
[Fuchs, 2002a] is not correct.
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Bub shows nicely that for a countable space we can rewrite the classical Bayes’ rule
as a state transition that mimics the transition achieved by applying the Lüders rule.
The relevant equations can be manipulated to display the same form. But in addition to
a formal analogy, what one would require is an interpretive analogy. As we have already
emphasized, even if formal features are a good guide when extending established concepts
to new contexts, formal features alone can never justify that the formally extended concept
is also a conceptual extension of the relevant notion to the new domain. Thus our main
reservation with his argument is that, by failing to distinguish formal and interpretive
aspects, he draws an unwarranted interpretive conclusion. Bub owes us an argument for
why his formal analogy about change of state would sanction the conclusion that the
meaning of this change in the quantum case is analogous to that of the classical case.
Moreover, given our discussion in Chapters 5 and 7, Bub’s argument is not merely incon-
clusive but incorrect: the Lüders rule cannot be interpreted as quantum conditionalization.
And, therefore, his (incorrect) conclusion can provide no grounds for his further claim that
the Lüders projection postulate, which describes the change of state of a quantum system
upon measurement, does not reflect the irreducible and uncontrollable disturbance of the
system measured by a measuring instrument. This claim may turn out to be true, but
Bub’s argument cannot support it.
Fuchs’ proposal also turns out to be inadequate. At first glance Fuchs’ suggestion for the
interpretation of ‘process 1’ seems to be reasonable. After all, the change from W to W˜Bi
looks equivalent to the classical conditionalization change from ρ to ρBi. So why should it
not be interpreted in the same fashion? However, as we have already emphasized, formal
similarity is not enough. We would like an argument for why ‘plucking out’ Tr(W˜Bi PA)
bears the same interpretation as q(A|Bi), which Fuchs says ‘was always there’. It is hard
to see in what sense what corresponds to a term in an operator equation would be ‘there’
at all, and especially if one is building a subjective view.
Fuchs’ treatment of ‘process 2’ fares worse. Here too Fuchs provides no rationale for the
interpretation he gives to the process; namely as a change of state arising from the disturb-
ance character of quantum measurements. Moreover, this reading of the state transition
cannot be correct in general; that is, the change cannot be understood as due to an ordinary
physical interaction between the measurement apparatus and the quantum system. This
is clearly seen in his own example of a probability function given by a pure state ψ. The
corresponding density operator W = |ψ〉〈ψ | can already be expressed as a linear sum of
the different WBi’s and hence he maintains that the only change that can come about is a
transition of the readjustment type (‘process 2’) according to the operator Ui= |i〉〈ψ |. In
Fuchs’ words,
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‘we learn nothing new; we just change what we can predict as a con-
sequence of our experimental intervention. [...] there is a sense in which the
measurement is solely disturbance’ ([Fuchs, 2002a], p.34).
However the transition from W = W˜Bi to WBi is just the usual transition given by
Lüders’ rule, which in this case is simply the old projection postulate.7.18 We know that it
cannot be derived from the Schrödinger equation and thus it cannot be interpreted as the
effect of an ordinary physical interaction.
Perhaps a more sophisticated treatment of Process 2 using decoherence might help
Fuchs here. But one needs to be careful because the state transitions used to demonstrate
decoherence effects already make use of the projection (or the Lüders) rule in tracing over
the environment-system to get the reduced state.7.19 In any case, the interpretive moves
that Fuchs does make with respect to the two processes seem unsupported by his formal
analysis. Finally nothing in Fuchs’ treatment hinges on taking a subjective view, either of
probability or the quantum state. Indeed the language Fuchs uses (beliefs tracking ‘data’,
and ‘invasive’ disturbances) readily lends itself to a realist view.
To sum up, both Bub and Fuchs’ arguments are not valid because, while their conclusion
is supposed to work at an interpretive level, their arguments are merely formal.
7.18. It is a transition from ψ to i enacted via the operator Ui= |i〉〈ψ |: Ui|ψ〉= |i〉〈ψ |ψ〉= |i〉. U simply acts
as a projection operator on ψ.
7.19. [Schlosshauer, 2007], section 8.1, especially p.333.
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Chapter 8
Implications for the Interpretations of
Quantum Probability
In this chapter we consider the interpretation of the unconditional quantum probabilities
defined by the trace rule. We show that, similarly to the conditional probabilities defined by
the Lüders rule, these can only be interpreted as probabilities under a purely instrumental
view of quantum mechanics. Indeed, if when one says the probability of a certain outcome
of an experiment is p, one only means that if the experiment is repeated many times
one expects that the fraction of those which give the outcome in question is roughly p,
then no problems arise. But as soon as one tries to give a more satisfactory interpret-
ation, then problems start cropping up. The difficulties in giving a (non-instrumental)
interpretation of quantum unconditional probability, we show, are ultimately the same as
those we encountered in giving a (non-instrumental) interpretation of quantum conditional
probability.
We show this by focusing on two interpretations of probability, namely quantum
Bayesianism and Frequentism. In sections 8.1.1 and 8.1.2 we consider, respectively, whether
a subjective or an objective Bayesian interpretation of the quantum probabilities is pos-
sible. We argue that neither of them can provide an adequate interpretation. In section 8.2,
we turn to the frequency interpretation of probability and consider whether the empirically
found quantum frequencies can be thought of, as in the classical frequency interpret-
ation, as arising from an ensemble of similarly prepared systems. We argue that this
is not so and that the quantum probabilities cannot be thus thought of as revealing an
underlying distribution of properties of quantum objects.
8.1 Quantum Bayesianism
Bayesianism interprets the concept of probability as ‘a measure of a state of knowledge’,
where the ‘state of knowledge’ concept is, broadly speaking, interpreted in two different
ways. For the subjectivist school, the state of knowledge corresponds to a ‘personal belief’,
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and is in that respect subjective. In particular, the claim is that the choice of the prior
probability is necessarily subjective. We considered this interpretation in Chapter 2. In
contrast, other Bayesians state that such subjectivity can be avoided, and claim that the
prior state of knowledge uniquely defines a prior probability distribution for well posed
problems. For the objectivist school, the rules of Bayesian statistics can be justified by
desiderata of rationality and consistency.
We now show that the quantum probabilities do not allow either a subjective or an
objective Bayesian interpretation.
8.1.1 Subjective Quantum Bayesianism: a Quantum Dutch Book
The quantum (subjective) Bayesian interpretation maintains that probabilities in quantum
mechanics are subjective, across the board .8.1As Timpson writes in ‘Quantum Bayesianism:
a Study’,
‘Considered as an interpretation of quantummechanics, the characteristic
feature of quantum [subjective] Bayesianism is [...] its non-realist view of the
quantum state. This takes a distinctive form: the quantum state ascribed to
an individual system is understood to represent a compact summary of an
agent’s degrees of belief about what the results of measurement interventions
on a system will be, and nothing more.’ ([Timpson, 2008], p.583)
That is, on this view, quantum states are a matter of what degrees of belief one has
about what the outcomes of measurement will be. The probability ascriptions arising from
a particular state assignment are understood in a purely subjective, Bayesian manner, in
the mold of de Finetti, and are assigned to individual systems.
In Quantum Chance and Non-Locality (pp.10-14), Michael Dickson considers whether
the quantum probabilities can be interpreted in such subjective manner by considering
whether a Dutch Book can be made against an agent whose degrees of belief are dictated
by the quantum probabilities. He first argues that it can be made, but then, casting doubt
on the adequacy of the assumptions on which the Dutch Book relies, does not reach a
definite conclusion. We first present his Dutch Book argument and his reservations about
it, and then argue why a Dutch Book can in fact be made against an agent who sets his
degrees of belief to the quantum probabilities.
8.1. This particular form of quantum Bayesianism can be found in the writings of Caves, Fuchs and Schack,
especially in [Fuchs, 2002a, 2002b]; [Caves, Fuchs, & Schack, 2002, 2007].
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Consider a quantum system in a pure state ψ and two quantum events, namely Pχ,
where χ= c1ψ+ c2ϕ, |c1|> |c2|, and ϕ is perpendicular to ψ, and Pξ, where ξ=d1ψ+d2ϕ
and |d1|> |d2|. Also, c1 and d1 are such that c1 d1. Note first, that Pχ and Pξ are non-
orthogonal, i.e. 〈χ|ξ〉 = c1 d1 + c2 d2  0, and hence incompatible; and second, that the
intersection of their ranges is zero, i.e. Pχ∧Pξ= ∅. The probabilities of these two events
are given, according to the trace rule (3.6), by
pψ(Pχ)=Tr(WψPχ)= |〈ψ, χ〉|2= |c1|2 (8.1)
pψ(Pξ)=Tr(WψPξ)= |〈ψ, ξ〉|2= |d1|2 (8.2)
We now show that if one sets one’s degrees of belief on events Pχ and Pξ to the quantum
probabilities (8.1) and (8.2), that is, if one accepts to pay |c1|2 for a wager that pays 1
if Pχ is occurrent and, similarly, one accepts to pay |d1|2 for a wager that pays 1 if Pξ is
occurrent, then one is subject to a Dutch Book.
The situation is the following. There are three possible cases. First, if Pχ occurs and
Pξ does not occur, i.e. the event Pχ ∧ ¬Pξ occurs, then one wins |c2|2 from the first
bet,8.2 and loses |d1|2 from the second one. So that the net gain if event Pχ∧¬Pξ occurs
is |c2|2− |d1|2< 0. Second, if Pχ does not occur and Pξ does occur, i.e. the event ¬Pχ∧Pξ
occurs, then one wins |d2|2 from the second bet and looses |c1|2 from the first one, so that
the net gain is |d2|2− |c1|2< 0. Finally, if neither of them occur, i.e. the event ¬Pχ∧¬Pξ
occurs, then one looses |c1|2 from the first bet and |d1|2 from the second one, and the net
gain is − |c1|2− |d1|2< 0. Given that these three net gains are negative, one is guaranteed
to lose no matter what happens. And hence, a Dutch Book can be made against an agent
whose degrees of belief are dictated by the quantum probabilities. Thus, if one sets one’s
degrees of belief on quantum events to the quantum probabilities, then these degrees cannot
be given a subjective interpretation.
Let us evaluate this argument. To begin with, note that it rests on the following
assumptions. First, that one’s degrees of belief on Pχ and Pξ individually should be set to
the probabilities dictated by quantum mechanics. Second, that if one’s degrees of belief on
Pχ and Pξ individually are |c1|2 and |d1|2 respectively, then these degrees of belief also hold
for Pχ and Pξ at the same time. That is, if one is committed individually to the fairness
of both bets, then one is committed to both bets taken together. And third, that Pχ and
Pξ cannot co-occur, i.e. the event Pχ∧Pξ cannot occur.
The first assumption seems justified for, in both cases, the degrees of belief are coherent.
In effect, one’s degrees of belief on the two mutually exclusive outcomes Pχ and ¬Pχ should
be coherent, i.e. p(Pχ)+ p(¬Pχ)= 1, which is satisfied if p(Pχ)= |c1|2 and p(¬Pχ)= |c2|2.
8.2. Given one’s degree of belief in Pχ is |c1|2, if Pχ occurs then one wins 1− |c1|2= |c2|2
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Precisely what quantum theory dictates.8.3 And similarly for p(Pξ) and p(¬Pξ). It is not
clear, however, whether the second and the third assumptions are justified.
Consider first the third one. If one denies that Pχ ∧ Pξ cannot occur, that is, if one
holds that Pχ ∧ Pξ can occur, then the alleged Dutch Book is ruined. For then a fourth
case is possible, namely Pχ∧Pξ, and in this case the bettor wins – he wins |c2|2 from the
first bet and |d2|2 from the second one, so that the net gain is |c2|2+ |d2|2>0. Hence, no
sure loss is guaranteed and no Dutch Book can be made against the bettor.
Now the fact that Pχ and Pξ can co-occur seems justified by appealing to the non-exist-
ence of joint distributions for incompatible events. Indeed, given that the joint distribution
of Pχ and Pξ is not zero (because it is undefined), there is no reason to deny the occurrence
of Pχ and Pξ. On the other hand, precisely because their joint probability is undefined, a
story about how exactly it is possible for them to co-occur seems to be wanting. Moreover,
there seem to be other reasons for denying the occurrence of Pχ∧Pξ. Indeed, it may not
be possible for Pχ and Pξ to co-occur because Pχ and Pξ have nothing in common, given
that the intersection of their ranges is zero, i.e Pχ∧Pξ= ∅. Thus, Dickson writes:
‘Any proponent of the epistemic interpretation who wishes to avoid the
Dutch Book by allowing that Pχ and Pξ can co-occur must have a story to
tell about how they can co-occur given that (1) their lattice-theoretic meet
is the zero subspace (i.e. they are distinct simple events), and (2) their joint
probability is undefined. ([Dickson, 1998] p.12)
The appeal to the fact that the joint distribution of Pχ and Pξ is not defined, can also be
seen as providing grounds for denying the second assumption, thus again ruining the Dutch
Book argument and allowing the subjective interpretation of the quantum probabilities.
In effect, given that the joint distribution of Pχ and Pξ is not defined, it seems plausible
to agree to each of the bets individually, while refusing to agree to both of them together.
In addition, one could argue that, because one cannot (seemingly) verify the occurrence or
non-occurrence of each of a pair of incompatible events, propositions involving incompatible
events are not well-defined. And thus that to agree to both of them together is to take a
stand on the joint occurrence or non-occurrence of each of a pair of non-orthogonal events.
Something, which one might reasonably not want to do. In Dickson’s words,
‘To agree to both bets together is to take a stand on a statement about
non-orthogonal events. Therefore, agreeing to both bets together amounts
to betting on the truth or falsity of a statement whose meaning is undefined,
and to refuse such a bet seems completely reasonable.’ ([Dickson, 1998], p.13)
8.3. Or as Dickson puts it, this bet is fair for its expected value, i.e. p(Pχ) (amountwon)+ p(¬Pχ) (amountlost),
is zero, i.e. |c1|2 |c2|2− |c2|2 |c1|2=0.
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The difficulty, hence, seems to be the following. The third assumption of the Dutch
Book argument, namely that Pχ and Pξ cannot co-occur, seems to be justified because the
joint probability of Pχ and Pξ is undefined and because the intersection of their ranges is
zero. But does not seem justified because the joint distribution of Pχ and Pξ is not zero.
And the second assumption, namely that if one agrees to each of the bets individually, then
one must also agree to both of them together, seems to not be justified because first, the
joint distribution of Pχ and Pξ is not defined; and second, because given that one cannot
(seemingly) verify the occurrence or non-occurrence of each of a pair of incompatible
events, propositions involving them are not well-defined and thus should not be assigned a
probability. And the problem is that if either of these assumptions are not in place, then one
cannot make a Dutch Book against an agent who sets his degrees of belief to the quantum
probabilities, and hence the quantum probabilities would still allow a subjective Bayesian
interpretation. Maybe it would, in the end, turn out that they cannot be so interpreted,
but a new argument would need to be provided.
Ultimately, the crucial question is whether one can, and if so, what it means to have
a degree of belief in the joint outcome of two incompatible quantum events. Indeed, one
can hold a perfectly adequate degree of belief in a certain event Pξ, and another perfectly
adequate degree of belief in Pχ. But if these two events are incompatible, then it is not clear
if one should assign a degree of belief to the joint occurrence of both events, i.e. to the event
Pχ ∧ Pξ; and if one can assign a value to Pχ ∧ Pξ, what the appropriate value is. Again,
the fact that the structure of quantum events is non-Boolean gives rise to this situation.
For if one is concerned only with the results of a single observable (or with a compatible
set of them), then no problems arise: the quantum probabilities would simply agree with
the classical probabilities, and would thus allow a subjective Bayesian interpretation. The
interpretive difficulties precisely appear when one considers two or more incompatible
quantum events.
Let us reconsider the third assumption, i.e. that Pχ∧Pξ cannot occur, but now bringing
in what we learned form the previous chapters. First, the fact that the intersection of the
ranges of Pχ and Pξ is zero, does not seem to justify it. For it rests on the unjustified
assumption that if the intersection of the ranges of two events is zero, then they have
nothing in common, and thus cannot co-occur. Indeed, as we discussed in section 5.2, this
only holds for orthogonal events. For non-orthogonal events, we suggested that there is,
albeit under a somewhat lax reading, a measure of commonality between any two projectors
P and Q given by the ‘probability’ of their common ‘event’, namely Tr(WQPQ). (Recall
that this function is not normalized, but is non-negative and additive.) Hence, even if
Pχ∧Pξ=∅, Pχ and Pξ can be seen as having something in common which, in general, will
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not be assigned a zero ‘probability’.
However, the denial that Pχ and Pξ cannot co-occur, i.e. the claim that Pχ and Pξ can
co-occur, on the grounds that their ‘joint probability’ is defined by Tr(W Pχ Pξ Pχ) and
is generally non-zero, needs to be appropriately qualified. First, this ‘joint probability’
Tr(W Pχ Pξ Pχ) we have resorted to can only be so interpreted at a mathematical level
for projection operators; that is, it cannot be interpreted as the ‘joint probability’ for the
physical values nor for the measurement outcomes associated to Pχ and Pξ. And second, it
is not uniquely specified – for it can be either given by Tr(WPχPξPχ) or Tr(WPξPχPξ)
8.4 – and it is quite weak – for it postulates that these traces give the ‘joint probability’ of
Pχ and Pξ without giving any explanation of why this is so.
Moreover, the (seemingly) only possible way of uniquely specifying the ‘joint prob-
ability’ (and thus have a more adequate notion of joint probability distribution at the
mathematical level for projection operators), namely by interpreting it as a diachronic
probability – Tr[W (Pχ)t1 (Pξ)t2 (Pχ)t1] would then represent the probability of Pχ at time
t1 and Pξ at time t2, i.e. (Pχ)t1 ∧ (Pξ)t2, and Tr[W (Pξ)t1 (Pχ)t2 (Pξ)t1] would represent
the probability of Pξ at time t1 and Pχ at time t2, i.e. (Pξ)t1∧ (Pχ)t2 – does not yield an
adequate notion of joint probability.
Indeed, similarly to what we argued in section 7.4, the Heisenberg diachronic pro-
jective notion of joint probability of Pχ at time t1 and Pξ at time t2 as given by
Tr[W (Pχ)t1 (Pξ)t2 (Pχ)t1], does not coincide with the empirical ‘probability’ of Pχ at
time t1 and Pξ at time t2 as given by Tr
(
Ut2−t1 Pχ Wt0 Pχ Ut2−t1
−1 Pξ
)
.8.5 The only
adequate interpretation of the latter expression is as the probability for measurement
outcome pχ at time t0 – immediately before the first measurement of a certain observ-
able where Pχ belongs to its spectral decomposition – and measurement outcome pξ at
time t2 – immediately before the second measurement of an observable where Pξ belongs
to its spectral decomposition. And, as we argued in section 7.5, this reading yields a notion
of joint probability only under a purely instrumental interpretation of quantum mechanics.
But then the claim that the event Pχ∧Pξ cannot occur, i.e. the second assumption of
the Dutch Book argument, is fully justified whether it is interpreted at a formal level for
projection operators Pχ and Pξ, or in terms of the physical values or measurement results
associated to these, both from a synchronic and a diachronic perspective. And, therefore,
a Dutch Book can indeed be made against an agent who sets his/hers degrees of belief to
the quantum probabilities.
8.4. Note how the counterintuitive feature of the (synchronic) projective notion of conditional probability
translates into the non-uniqueness of the (synchronic) projective notion of joint probability.
8.5. See expression (7.53).
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Consider now the second assumption of the Dutch Book argument, namely that if one
agrees to each of the bets individually, then one must also agree to both of them together.
Recall that it was seemingly not justified because the joint distribution of Pχ and Pξ is
not defined. However, this does not seem correct. For one can take the joint distribution
of Pχ and Pξ to be defined for all incompatible events as Tr(WPξPχPξ).
To sum up, given that both the second and third assumptions are justified, a Dutch
Book can be made against an agent who sets his/hers degrees of belief to the quantum
probabilities. Indeed, given that the net gains are negative in the only three possible cases,
one is guaranteed to loose no matter what happens. And, therefore, if ones degrees of belief
on quantum events are dictated by the quantum probabilities, then they are not coherent
and, hence, cannot be given a (non-instrumental) subjective interpretation.
Note that this argument does not need to invoke the supposed impossibility of the
joint measurement of two incompatible quantities. In particular, one does not need to
evaluate whether the fact that one can (seemingly) not verify the occurrence or non-
occurrence of each of a pair of incompatible events justifies regarding propositions involving
incompatible events as not well-defined, and thus not worthy of assigning a degree of belief.
(So that one can agree to each of the bets individually, without also agree to both of them
together). As in section 7.3, we have shown that the Bohr-Heisenberg doctrine according
to which puzzling features of quantum mechanics can be traced back to an inevitable
and uncontrollable physical disturbance brought about by the act of measurement is not
correct.
To conclude, the quantum probabilities dictated by Gleason’s theorem cannot be inter-
preted as subjective probabilities, for physical values, nor for measurement results, nor at a
formal level for projection operators; both from a synchronic and a diachronic perspective.
Hence, subjective quantum Bayesianism is not a viable interpretation of quantum mech-
anics.
8.1.2 Objective Quantum Bayesianism
Up till now we have been focusing on the subjectivist view of credences, in which prob-
ability is interpreted as the degree of belief (or strength of belief) an individual has in
the truth of a proposition. However, as we already noted, there are two different views
within the Bayesian approach to probability. For the subjectivist school, the state of
knowledge corresponds to a ‘personal belief’, and is in that respect subjective. In contrast,
for the objectivist school, the rules of Bayesian statistics can be justified by desiderata of
rationality and consistency. This was actually the position taken in by the first followers
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of the Bayesian view, beginning with Laplace. In the Bayesian revival in the 20th century,
the chief proponents of this objectivist school were E. T. Jaynes and Harold Jeffreys.
Objective Bayesians resort to several principles for the objective construction of the
prior distribution as, for example, the maximum entropy principle, transformation group
analysis and reference analysis. Objective Bayesianism, as developed by [Jaynes, 1957,
1983] and [Williamson, 2004, 2009] focuses on the maximum entropy principle. Briefly,
as defined by Shannon’s Information Theory, entropy is a function of a probability distri-
bution which measures the amount of uncertainty that a certain probability distribution
represents. Hence, on this view, it is a measure of the lack of knowledge. According to
objective Bayesianism, an agent’s prior probability distribution should be given by the
one which maximizes entropy because it is the only possible unbiased assignment; that is,
according to this interpretation, to use any other probability distribution would amount
to an arbitrary assumption on information that we do not have. In Jaynes’ words,
‘The distribution that maximizes H [the entropy] subject to constraints
which represent whatever information we have, provides the most honest
description of what we know.’ ([Jaynes, 1983], p.109).
Our prior distribution should thus be the one which, while satisfying the constraints
imposed by our knowledge, is otherwise as non-committed as possible with regard to
missing information.
Now, an analogue objective Bayesian interpretation of the quantum probabilities can
be found in the recent literature. For example, Bub argues that
‘a quantum theory is best understood as a theory about the possibilities
and impossibilities of information transfer, as opposed to a theory about the
mechanics of non classical waves or particles’ ([Bub, 2004] p.241)
And one can find similar ideas in the writings of Chris Fuchs. For example, he claims
‘I myself see no alternative but to contemplate deep and hard the tasks,
the techniques, and the implications of quantum information theory. The
reason is simple, and I think inescapable. Quantum mechanics has always
been about information. It is just that the physics community has somehow
forgotten this.’ ([Fuchs, 2002a] p.4)
‘[T]he quantum state is solely an expression of subjective information –
the information one has about a quantum system. It has no objective reality
in and of itself.’ ([Fuchs, 2002a] p.7)
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In addition, [Fuchs, 2002a] gives an expression for a quantum entropy which also, upon
maximization, yields the quantum probabilities.
We do not give a detailed presentation of either of these approaches and simply con-
sider the general idea behind an objective Bayesian view of quantum mechanics.8.6 For an
evaluation of whether ‘objective quantum Bayesianism’ can provide an adequate interpret-
ation of the quantum probabilities seems to be possible without considering each different
approach in depth.
Indeed, prima facie, it seems unlikely that objective quantum Bayesianism is cap-
able of presenting a viable interpretation of the quantum probabilities for it faces the
same challenge as subjective Bayesianism, namely, that there is no (satisfactory, i.e. non-
instrumental) notion of the joint distribution of incompatible events, or, equivalently, no
notion of quantum conditional probability. And this precludes the interpretation of the
quantum probabilities as degrees of belief, regardless of whether or not the prior probab-
ility is determined by appealing to principles for the objective construction of the prior
distribution. Hence, while at a formal level the analogies between classical and quantum
information theory might be fruitful and interesting to study, they do not seem capable of
providing any new conceptual or interpretive insight.
8.2 Quantum Frequentism
Let us now turn to the frequency interpretation of probability. As we pointed out in
the introduction, the quantum probabilities allow a frequency interpretation under an
instrumental perspective. Indeed, if when one says the probability of a certain outcome
of an experiment is p, one only means that if the experiment is repeated many times
one expects that the fraction of those which give the outcome in question is roughly p,
then no problems arise. However, if one wants to interpret these frequencies as revealing
an underlying distribution of properties of quantum objects, as in the classical ensemble
interpretation, then problems arise.
The discussion in this section draws heavily on Pitowsky’s work ‘Quantum Probability.
Quantum Logic’ and various works of Arthur Fine (an integrative summary of them is
provided in [Fine, 1986]). We thus provide a detailed exposition of their results in Appendix
D and present here only a brief overview of them.
8.6. See [Timpson, 2007] for a detailed analysis.
8.2 Quantum Frequentism 151
8.2.1 Classical Correlation Experiments
As we have seen, the differences between classical and quantum probabilities stem from the
fact that in quantum mechanics observables are generally represented by non-commutative
operators. Thus a good place to study the peculiarities of quantum mechanics is by looking
at scenarios which involve probabilities for more than a single observable. The experiments
considered in section 4.4 provided one such scenario. Correlation experiments provide
another such scenario, and a more appropriate one to consider unconditional probabilities.
In correlation experiments one performs simultaneous measurements of pairs of dif-
ferent physical quantities on a system and studies the relations that hold between the
various single and joint probabilities. In the most simple case, one performs simultaneous
measurements of two physical quantities, call them 1 and 2, and one finds that the relation
p1+ p2− p126 1 always holds between the various single and joint probabilities, i.e. p1, p2,
and p12, for classical systems. This is well understood by thinking of these probabilities
as having their source in an ensemble of systems with well-defined properties; that is, as
reflecting the distributions of properties of the systems.
To give an example, consider randomly selecting atoms of a gas and simultaneously
measuring their velocity and position. The number of atoms which either have a certain
velocity – property 1 – or a certain position – property 2 – or both, is simply the number
of atoms with property 1, plus those with property 2, minus the number with property 1
and 2 (in order to not count the atoms with properties 1 and 2 twice). In symbols, N1 or2=
N1+N2−N1&2. And given that the number of atoms which have either property 1 or 2 is
at most equal to the total number of atoms in the gas, the inequality N1+N2−N1&26N
must hold. Now if probabilities reflect the distributions of the atom’s properties, then they
will be simply given by proportions; that is, the probability for selecting an atom with
property 1 is given by the proportion of atoms with property 1, i.e. p1=
N1
N
; and similarly
p2=
N2
N
and p1&2=
N1&2
N
. And hence the previous inequality translates into an inequality
for probabilities, namely p1+ p2− p126 1.
In addition to this objective reading which regards probabilities as reflecting the fre-
quency distributions of the properties of the various systems in the ensemble, one can
also provide a subjective one and hence view the probabilities as reflecting degrees of
belief of a rational agent. Both interpretations turn out to be formally equivalent. The
objective view leads to constraints on the probabilities in terms of linear inequalities,
e.g. p1 + p2 − p12 6 1, while the subjective view leads to constraints as convex sums of
certain vectors (see section D.1.1), and both constraints can be shown to be mathematically
equivalent. These constraints are, in turn, equivalent to requiring that the various single
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and joint probabilities allow an ensemble representation (see theorem D.1). These results
can be generalized for the single and joint probabilities in a general correlation experiment
(section D.1.2).
Two particularly relevant cases are the so-called Bell-Wigner and Clauser-Horne cor-
relation experiments (sections D.1.3 and D.1.4, respectively). In the former, the single and
joint probabilities p1, p2, p3, p12, p13, p23 admit an ensemble representation if and only if
they satisfy the ‘Bell inequalities’, namely
p1+ p2+ p3− p12− p13− p236 1
p1− p12− p13+ p23> 0
p2− p12− p23+ p13> 0
p3− p13− p23+ p12> 0 (8.3)
And in the latter, p1, p2, p3, p4, p13, p14, p23, p24 admit an ensemble representation if and
only if they satisfy the ‘Clauser-Horne inequalities’.
− 16 p13+ p14+ p24− p23− p1− p46 0
− 16 p23+ p24+ p14− p13− p2− p46 0
− 16 p14+ p13+ p23− p24− p1− p36 0
− 16 p24+ p23+ p13− p14− p2− p36 0 (8.4)
8.2.2 Quantum Correlation Experiments
It turns out that in quantum correlation experiments the empirically found (and theor-
etically predicted) single and joint frequencies (probabilities) do not generally satisfy the
above relations. (In sections D.2.1 and D.2.2 we give particular examples.) The quantum
probabilities do not, therefore, generally admit an ensemble representation, and thus their
understanding as revealing an underlying distribution of properties of quantum objects
or as subjective degrees of belief is precluded. That is, they cannot in general be given
an objective reading in terms of frequencies revealing proportions of properties nor a sub-
jective reading in terms of degrees of belief. (Note that the events can here be interpreted
as physical values or as measurement results.)
One can, however, try to modify the classical construal of an ensemble interpretation
so as to make it a viable interpretation for the quantum probabilities. In section D.3 we
consider this possibility in detail in the case of a Clauser-Horne experiment and show
that the problem in giving an ensemble representation appears when we consider a unique
probability function defined over an ensemble of systems in which all four observables
together, call them AA′BB ′, take determinate pre-measurement values. For it is then that
we cannot ignore the incompatibility between the values given for the BB ′ correlations
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by the ABB ′ distribution and those given by the A′BB ′ distribution (see theorem D.2).
Hence, if one could somehow get rid of this incompatibility, the quantum statistics might
be understood as having their source in an ensemble of similarly prepared systems with
well-defined properties.
One way of avoiding this incompatibility is by employing Fine’s ‘Prism Models’ [Fine,
1986]. The main idea is that measurement results are not restricted to the two possible
eigenvalues corresponding to the measured observable, but can also yield no result at all
(so for example, if we measure A, the measurement result need not be a1 or a2, but also
no value at all). If one allows this possibility then not all measurements give determinate
values for the four observables, and the incompatible probabilistic predictions for the
incompatible observables disappear. In this way one can build statistical models that
reproduce the quantum statistics successfully.
The probabilities that arise from these statistical models are by construction compatible
with an ensemble representation. They can thus be seen as having their source in an
ensemble of similarly prepared systems taking values for the different observables but
without the requirement that every system has a definite value for all four observables:
some types of particles would have determinate values for AA′B (a1a1′ b1 or a1a1′ b2 or any
of the remaining six combinations) but would be ‘B ′-defective’, i.e. yielding no value upon
a B ′ measurement, others would have determinate values for A′BB ′ but would be A-
defective, and so on. The various single and joint probabilities arise by averaging over the
appropriate non-defective results. The probabilities could then be understood as reflecting
the properties of these ‘some times for some observables’-defective systems and could thus
be given this modified frequency reading.
What about a subjective interpretation? Our agent would assign degrees of belief to
these different possibilities but would in some way have to take into consideration the
possibility of defective systems. This would result in some modification of the coherence
condition imposed on her degrees of belief. Indeed, it is the requirement of coherence that
lies at the heart of the Ramsey-de Finetti theorem ensuring that degrees of belief satisfy the
classical axioms of probability. Hence if one is to give a consistent subjective interpretation
of the quantum probabilities it is this requirement that needs, in some way, to be modified.
How exactly the coherence assumption is to be changed would need to be developed.
We will not attempt here to give an evaluation of this particular proposal – Fine himself
wonders whether
‘it really contributes to our understanding of nature to suppose that
quantum systems have built-in properties that predetermine their suitability
for measurements’ ([Fine, 1986], p.56).
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The point we want to make is that it is possible to relax some of the conditions on the
statistical models of the quantum probabilities and explore how these modifications open
up new possibilities for understanding the quantum probabilities. Of course, ultimately
one needs to provide some rationale backing these modifications. But both an elaboration
of these changes and their detailed discussion lie outside the scope of the present essay.
8.3 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have considered the impossibility of providing an interpretation of the
quantum probabilities in terms of a frequency and a Bayesian interpretation. Ultimately,
the reason for the failure of these interpretations lies in the difficulty to define a quantum
notion of joint probability, or equivalently, a quantum notion of conditional probability,
which can be interpreted both at a mathematical level for projection operators and at a
physical level for the physical values associated with these projectors from a non-instru-
mental perspective.
For the notion of conditional probability, on the one hand, if one takes the joint prob-
ability of projectors P and Q (or physical values p and q) to be defined by p(P ∧Q), then
the ensuing conditional probability is inconsistent with the probability defined by the
Lüders rule. Moreover if either P or Q is the sum of two or more orthogonal events, say
Q=Q1+Q2, then P ∧ (Q1+Q2)=(P ∧Q1)∨ (P ∧Q2) cannot be generally interpreted as
the value ‘p and q1 or q2’. And, on the other hand, if one takes the joint ‘probability’ of
P and Q to be defined by the probability of their ‘common projector’, i.e. Tr(WQPQ),
then the ensuing conditional probability only works at a mathematical level for projection
operators in a weak and counterintuitive way from a synchronic perspective. When arguing
in section 8.1. that a Dutch Book can be made against an agent whose degrees of belief
are dictated by the quantum probabilities we relied on both these reasonings.
For the quantum correlations experiments this difficulty appears in a different way.
Take the Clauser-Horne case. There we calculated the joint probabilities by employing
equation (D.15), namely pij = Tr[WS (Pi ∧ Pj)]. These probabilities are well-defined
for, even though they involve incompatible quantities for a single electron, they apply
here to different electrons.8.7 Now choosing the Pi and Pj’s in an appropriate way, these
probabilities fail to comply with the Clauser-Horne inequalities and can thus not be seen
as arising from an ensemble of similarly prepared systems with well-defined properties.
Which, in turn, precludes the Bayesian and the frequency interpretations.
8.7. For example, in example of section D.2.1, the projector P1∧P3=P+x⊗P+z corresponds to the left electron
having spin up in the x direction and the right electron to have spin up in the z direction.
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Putting it somewhat differently, the difficulty is that the axioms of classical probability
are not compatible with the quantum probabilities. The axioms of non-negativity and
normalization do not pose any problems, and the axiom of additivity is respected for
the quantum probabilities since it is defined for orthogonal (i.e. compatible) projection
operators. But the fourth axiom of classical probability, which takes conditional probability
to be defined as a joint probability increased pro rata, simply does not work for the
quantum probabilities (if by joint occurrence we try to take the direct quantum analogue
of the classical joint distribution, i.e. p(P ∧Q)). In this way, we can now understand why
we chose to use Accardi’s quote at the beginning of this dissertation. For
‘all the paradoxes of quantum theory arise from the implicit or explicit
application of Bayes’ axiom (or of the theorem of composite probabilities,
which is an equivalent form of it [...]) to the statistical data of quantum
theory. This application being unjustified both physically and mathematic-
ally.’ ([Accardi, 1984a], pp.298 - 299).
Thus, it seems that the quantum probabilities cannot be interpreted as measuring our
degrees of belief on the quantum events as the Bayesian interpretation holds, nor as fre-
quencies revealing an objective distribution of the properties of quantum systems. Maybe
they need to be understood as part of the physical ‘furniture’ of the world described by
quantum theory, and, in particular, as dispositions that get manifested upon measurement.
Indeed, many different ways of fleshing out dispositional notions from a propensity inter-
pretation perspective have been used in the attempt to solve the quantum paradoxes.8.8
However, an evaluation of these proposals and their adequacy goes beyond the scope of
this dissertation.
8.8. Some of the best known are Heisenberg’s potentialities, Margenau’s latencies, and Maxwell’s propensitons.
See [Suárez, 2007] for a review and references therein. More recently, Mauricio Suárez [Suárez, 2004a, 2004b, 2007]
has developed the selective propensities interpretation of quantum mechanics.
156 Implications for the Interpretations of Quantum Probability
Chapter 9
Concept Extension
In Chapter 4, we showed that the probabilities defined by the Lüders rule, while not
additive with respect to ‘conditioning’ events, are characterized by an analogue existence
and uniqueness theorem (theorem 4.2) to the classical one (theorem 2.1), which states that
the Lüders rule gives the only probability measure that, for events P 6 Q in L(H), just
involves a renormalization of the initial probability function pW . Combining this result with
the fact that, if P and Q are compatible, the probabilities defined by the Lüders rule reduce
to classical conditional probabilities, we arrive at the result that the Lüders rule gives the
only probability measure on the quantum event space L(H) which reduces to classical
conditional probability in their shared domain of application, i.e. compatible events. In
Chapter 4 we explained why this result is standardly taken as justifying the interpretation
of the Lüders rule as defining the quantum extension of conditional probability in quantum
probability theory.
However, as we have argued in detail in Chapters 5 and 7, this is not so. Even if the
probabilities defined by the Lüders rule are the only probabilities which are co-extensive
with conditional probabilities for compatible events, we have no reason to assimilate them
to conditional ones for incompatible events, neither for physical values, nor at a formal
level for projection operators, both from a synchronic and a diachronic perspective (except
under a purely instrumental perspective). Rather, we have given many reasons against this
assimilation.
In this chapter we claim that this result holds in general. Indeed, in sections 9.1 and
9.2, we argue that the fact that a concept appearing in a certain theoretical context is co-
extensive with another concept of a different theoretical context in their shared domain
of application, does not guarantee that the former will be the conceptual extension of the
latter.9.1 Thus the standard philosophical view that concept extension can be characterized
by co-extension of two concepts in their shared domain of application – as for example,
that presented by the logical positivists, by Imre Lakatos or by Albert Einstein – is shown
to be inadequate.
9.1. Notice the different senses in which the word ‘extension’ is being used, namely as an enlargement in scope
– concept extension – and as the total range over which something extends – co-extension of two concepts in the
shared domain.
157
We then argue that concepts present an ‘open texture’ that does not allow for a set
of jointly necessary and sufficient conditions to characterize an extended concept (section
9.3), and develop a scheme and methodology – the ‘Cluster of Markers’ account – for the
problem of tracing conceptual lineages so as to judge when one concept truly extends
another (section 9.4).9.2 This new account, we argue, can capture the complexity involved
in actual cases of conceptual change in science and can account for the fact that there are
concepts which, even if co-extensive in their shared domain of application, do not share
enough meaning so as to justify regarding them as defining one and the same concept.
9.1 Concept ‘Refinement’
Physicists and mathematicians have tended to focus on limits as the appropriate criterion
to characterize concept extension: a concept in a new context is taken to be an extension
of an old one if it reduces to it when taking the appropriate limit. For example, so-
called ‘relativistic mass’ mγ=m/ 1− v2
c2
√
is standardly seen as the extension of classical
mass because it reduces to it in the Newtonian limit, namely for speeds small compared
to the speed of light.
Similarly, philosophers and philosophically minded physicists have focused on co-exten-
sion in the shared domain of application as the adequate requirement for conceptual exten-
sion. Most extremely, the logical positivist tradition (e.g. philosophers such as Carnap,
Reichenbach and Hempel), tried to characterize extended concepts as logical extensions
of previous ones. But co-extension has also been defended as the appropriate require-
ment for conceptual extension under less stringent accounts. Albert Einstein, for example,
explicitly defended this view in his ‘method of conceptual refinement’.9.3; [Lakatos, 1976]
developed a somewhat similar account which he termed ‘conceptual stretching’; and [Fine,
1978, 1986], building on Einstein and criticizing Lakatos’ account, further spelled out
the method of conceptual refinement.9.4
9.2. Credit for the cluster of markers account should be jointly given to Arthur Fine and Isabel Guerra. It was
born from our going back and forth with each other over this problem.
9.3. We follow Fine’s interpretation of Einstein’s thought as presented in ‘The Shaky Game. Einstein, Realism
and the Quantum Theory’ [Fine, 1986]. The reader should, therefore, look for reference to Einstein’s own works in
Fine’s book. Regarding the method of conceptual refinement, Fine writes:
‘I try to tease out of Einstein’s scientific papers a general method of his, the method of conceptual
refinement, that actually requires significant conceptual change as the vehicle for scientific develop-
ment.’ ([Fine, 1986] pp. 3-4)
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In Lakatos’ view, science grows by making adjustments in the concepts employed in a
certain scientific argument so as to accommodate counterexamples or empirical anomalies;
and these adjustments result in the ‘stretching’ of concepts.9.5 In more detail, the concept
to be stretched figures centrally in a scientific argument (a law, a hypothesis or a theorem),
whose conclusion, as well as some stage of the argument itself, is challenged by a counter-
example. In order for progress to be made, what happens is that the argument is essentially
preserved by altering the concept so as to accommodate the counterexample. That is, the
concept is molded or stretched so as to avoid the counterexample and preserve the validity
of the argument. [Fine, 1978] argues that the program to construe conceptual change as
concept stretching is idle for it is seriously confused about the role of argument (both in
empirical sciences and mathematics). The method of conceptual refinement suggests why
this is so. So let us first look at this method.
In Einstein and Fine’s view, new concepts arise as a refinement of old ones: they
agree with the old ones in their shared range of application, but have a broader range
of application which enables a new and ‘deeper’ way of understanding and organizing
experience. Conceptual refinement can be seen as a process occurring in two-stages. The
first stage consists in a mapping of the boundary of a concept. One examines the limits of
the concept-to-be-changed so as to find out its range of application, i.e. where the concept
clearly applies, where it does not clearly apply and any possible middle grounds (which
will mostly cover unclear or indeterminate applications).
The second stage consists in the extension of the concept to its indeterminate or unclear
range of application. A new theory is in charge of determining how the refinement of the
concepts exactly takes place. It will employ the refined concepts satisfying the following
two constraints:
i. the refined concepts are co-extensional with the unrefined ones, at least approx-
imately, in the central region where the unrefined concepts clearly apply. This is
supposed to ensure that the refined concepts generalize or extend the originals.
ii. the refined concepts apply in a determinate way beyond this central region. This
constraint represents the progress of science: the new theory employing the refined
concept
9.4. We present here a rather simplified account of Einstein and Fine’s method of conceptual refinement. These
authors do not defend explicitly that co-extension in the shared domain of application is a necessary and sufficient
condition for conceptual extension. However, co-extension seems to be implicitly assumed to be the only condition
in their account since no other is considered.
9.5. Lakatos focused mainly on the development of mathematical science but took much of his conclusion to
also apply to empirical science.
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‘will penetrate into nature more deeply than its predecessors; it
should advance our understanding by allowing us to put to nature
certain questions which were not clearly expressible on the basis of the
old concepts and it should lead us to expect that some such questions
have determinate answers.’ ([Fine, 1978], p.331)
Thus, the first stage prepares the way for the second one:
‘In the first stage we show that there is room for conceptual innovation,
and in the second stage we do it.’ ([Fine, 1978], p.332).
Lakatos’ concept stretching account can, from this perspective, be seen as follows.
First, the role of counterexamples is to mark out the limits of where the concept of interest
applies, and second, the ‘good’ argument around which our concept is stretched functions
like the new theory. Indeed, the good argument forces our stretched concept to apply to
the clear cases, for otherwise it would not be a good argument at all; and it extends the
application of our concept by making the concept fit the more general constraints of the
proof. But, as Fine argues,
‘We are not playing “save the proof” (by stretching the concept), the
way the medievals played “save the phenomena” (by stretching the hypo-
thesis). We are playing the game of advancing our science, by developing
new theories. If it happens, as in mathematics especially it sometimes does,
that to develop the theory involves focusing on an especially interesting line
of argument, then conceptual refinement may come dressed as conceptual
stretching.
She wears those clothes well. And because Imre had an excellent eye
for finery, he may have mistaken the persona for the person. Had he got to
know her more intimately, I think it unlikely that he would have continued
his misapprehension.’ ([Fine, 1978] pp.339-340)
9.1.1 An Example: Cardinality
The extension of the notion of ‘the number of elements of a set’ from the finite to the
infinite provides an example of conceptual extension.9.6 For a finite set this notion applies
straightforwardly: we simply count the number of elements of the set. But what about for
9.6. [Fine, 1978] pp.335-338 and [Buzaglo, 2002], pp.42-44.
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an infinite set? Talk of the number of elements is not clear; indeed, one could plausibly
argue that counting only makes sense for a finite collection of objects. Does the set of, say,
the real numbers have the same number of elements as that of the natural numbers given
that they both have infinite elements? Or rather are there more real numbers than natural
numbers? Or to take another example, does the set of even numbers have fewer elements
than the set of the natural numbers, given that the former is a proper subset of the latter?
Or, on the contrary, do they have the same number of elements?
The notion of ‘the number of elements of a set’ of the finite domain does not afford
a clear answer to these questions involving infinite sets. Georg Cantor, in the late 19th
century proposed one. He argued that the concept ‘number of elements of a set’ is rooted
in the process of counting and that this is what allows defining its coherent extension in the
infinite domain. Indeed, establishing one-to-one correspondences is what we do when we
count the number of elements in the case of finite sets: we establish or follow an ordering
of its elements that maps isomorphically to an initial segment of the positive integers; then
the number of elements of a set is just the positive integer that corresponds to the last
element counted.
Therefore, Cantor proposed that two infinite sets have the same number of elements if
they can be put into a one-to-one correspondence with each other. The extended notion is
known as the cardinality of a set. The cardinality of set A is, thus, equal to the cardinality
of B just in case there is a one-to-one correspondence between A and B. Hence, the set
of natural numbers and the set of even numbers have the same number of elements or
cardinality given that there is a one-to-one correspondence between their elements – simply
associate 1 in N to 2 in E, 2 in N to 4 in E, 3 in N to 6 in E, etc. And this regardless of
the fact that the even numbers are a proper subset of the natural numbers. In contrast, the
set of natural numbers and the set of the real numbers do not have the same cardinality
since there is no way of establishing a one-to-one correspondence between them. In effect,
there are ‘many more’ real numbers than natural numbers even if both have an infinite
number of elements.
Two final remarks. First, notice that these counterintuitive properties of the extended
concept result from the very project of conceptual extension. Indeed, if the extended
concept is to adequately apply in a new domain, which the old concept was unable to
capture, then it cannot retain all the features of the concept it extends. Rather, it will retain
the essential features of the old concept, and let go of those which would not enable it to
capture the phenomena of the new domain. Second, notice that the concept of cardinality
reduces to the number of elements in the case of finite sets, in satisfaction of the conceptual
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refinement analysis’ first constraint, but takes over for infinite sets, according to the second
constraint. Here it enables one to raise questions which will now have determinate answers.
9.1.2 Necessity of Classical Concepts: the Bohr-Einstein Debate
Both Einstein and Bohr shared the view that, in constructing new theories, it is necessary
to seek for the precise limits of application of a concept. However they disagreed on
how exactly this information should be used; that is, they did not agree on the second
stage of the conceptual refinement method. In particular, they held opposite views on the
implications of the limits of application of the classical concepts. While Einstein thought
that in general the construction of a good theory calls for a refinement of the old concepts
– one looks to a series of revisions of the classical concepts by first seeking the limits of
their application in the experimental situations and then by building a theory to refine
them – Bohr thought that there could be no concepts which would extend the range of
application of the classical ones in a uniform way.9.7
In more detail, Bohr claimed that one must view the world through the old classical
concepts; that is, that we have only the classical concepts with which to organize exper-
ience for only these seem to be linked with the human capacity for conceptualization.
New contexts, though presenting new phenomena, may not be novel at a conceptual level
because new concepts are, as a matter of principle, ruled out.9.8 Thus, when looking into
the quantum domain one must first select a particular set of classical concepts to employ;
and what one then sees, once this choice is made, will depend on the chosen set of concepts,
i.e. on our view point, in such a way that different perspectives cannot be pieced together
in one unitary picture of the quantum world. This view became known as Bohr’s doctrine
of complementarity (recall section 6.6).
The most distinctive feature of the Bohr’s Copenhagen interpretation (compared to
the orthodox interpretation) is that, in addition to the projection postulate, it postulates
of the necessity for classical concepts to describe quantum phenomena. Instead of deriving
classicality from the quantum world, e.g., by considering the macroscopic limit, the require-
ment for a classical description of the ‘phenomena’, which comprise the whole experimental
arrangement, is taken to be a fundamental and irreducible element of a complete quantum
theory.9.9
9.7. This section follows [Fine, 1986] chapter 2. See the latter for further detail.
9.8. Bohr is usually seen as taking the lead from Immanuel Kant, who is in turn frequently interpreted as a
defender of this view.
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Einstein strongly disagreed with this view. In a letter to Schrödinger – who had also
expressed the view that, given the limitation on the applicability of the concepts of position
and momentum embodied in the Heisenberg indeterminacy relations, these concepts would
eventually be replaced by new ones that apply not approximately but exactly – he writes:
‘Your claim that the concepts p, q [momentum, position] will have to be
given up, if they can only claim such ‘shaky’ meaning, seems to me to be
fully justified. The Heisenberg-Bohr tranquilizing philosophy – or religion? –
is so delicately contrived that, for the time being, it provides a gentle pillow
for the true believer from which he cannot very easily be aroused’ (cited in
[Fine, 1986], p.18)
Thus, whereas Bohr thought that the concepts of classical physics should be segregated
in the manner of his complementarity doctrine, Einstein defended the project of seeking
new concepts that would replace the classical ones in the quantum context. He thought
that holding classical concepts as necessary significantly obstructs any kind of scientific
progress. In his own words,
‘... concepts which have proved useful for ordering things easily assume so
great an authority over us, that we forget their terrestrial origin and accept
them as unalterable facts. They then become labeled as ‘conceptual neces-
sities’, ‘a priori situations’, etc. The road of scientific progress is frequently
blocked for long periods by such errors. It is therefore not just an idle game
to exercise our ability to analyze familiar concepts, and to demonstrate the
conditions on which their justification and usefulness depend, and the way
in which these developed, little by little from the data of experience. In this
way they are deprived from their excessive authority.’ (cited in [Fine, 1986],
p.15-16)
Thus Einstein did not conceal the difficulty in the interpretation of quantum theory
by appealing to the complementarity doctrine and continued searching for some concepts
that would yield an appropriate understanding of the quantum realm.
9.9. This introduces a quantum-classical dualism into the description of nature and requires the assumption of
an essentially non-movable boundary (the famous ‘Heisenberg cut’) between the ‘microworld’, containing the objects
that are to be treated as quantum systems, and the ‘macroworld’ that has to be described by classical physics.
However, the studies of decoherence phenomena demonstrate that quasiclassical properties, across a broad range
from microscopic to macroscopic sizes, can emerge directly from the quantum substrate through environmental
interactions. This makes the postulate of an a priori existence of classicality seem unnecessary, if not mistaken, and
it renders unjustifiable the placement of a fixed boundary to separate the quantum from the classical realm on a
fundamental level. See [Schlosshauer, 2004, 2007] and [Schlosshauer & Fine, 2008].
9.1 Concept ‘Refinement’ 163
Fine describes the debate between Bohr and Einstein over the conceptualization of
quantum theory with a beautiful analogy:
‘According to Bohr the system of classical concepts splits into mutually
exclusive packages if one attempts to use this system outside the region of
macroscopic physics, the region where all the concepts of the system have a
determinate, simultaneous application. To get beyond this central core one
must select which package of concepts to use. Different selections will enable
one to get beyond the core in different ways. But the results of these different
explorations do not combine into some unified picture of a region beyond the
core.
Bohr thus views the product of conceptual refinement as a wheel-like
structure: a central hub from which there extends a number of disjoint
spokes. Different explorers can move out separately along different spokes
but, according to Bohr, the reports they send back will not enable one to
piece together an account of some region between the spokes of a rim that
connects them. Thus the new conceptual structure for Bohr looks like the
steering wheel of an old-fashioned ship. The beauty of this steering mech-
anism and the aspect that Einstein saw as a ‘gentle pillow’ is that it enables
one to navigate into the quantum domain using only a classical chart in
any given direction.
Einstein’s dispute with Bohr (and others) is a dispute over this wheel-
like structure. Einstein asks whether the spokes must really be disconnected,
could there not at least be a rim? This is the question as to whether the
quantum theory allows a realist interpretation, a picture of the world as a
single entity with a rich set of simultaneously determinate properties that are
observer-independent. And Einstein asks whether the spoke must be made of
the same material as the hub. Must we, that is, stick with just the classical
concepts?’ ([Fine, 1986], p.21)
Two final remarks. First, note that the ‘Heisenberg-Bohr tranquilizing philosophy’
cannot provide an adequate recourse for the difficulties in the interpretation of probability
defined by the Lüders rule. For, from this perspective, one would need to argue that
this probability only makes sense for compatible events, and only then as conditional
probabilities. But then, what are we to do in all the other cases in which it applies de facto
to pairs of incompatible events and gives the correct probabilistic predictions? A Bohrian
would need to claim that in all these cases, which are precisely the ones in which the
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quantum predictions differ from the classical ones, the probability defined by the Lüders
rule makes no sense. But this claim is indeed quite difficult to defend in any satisfactory
way.
Second, note that Einstein did not believe that the new concepts would come from
quantum theory. Indeed, already in 1936 he describes quantum theory as
‘an incomplete representation of real things, although it is the only one
which can be built out of the fundamentals concepts of force and material
points.’ (quoted in [Fine, 1986], p.24)
He saw quantum theory as essentially statistical, unable to predict the simplest
phenomena unless one understood the theory as only treating statistical aggregates of
individual systems, and not the individual systems themselves. He thus felt that it could
not be fundamental in the sense of providing a framework for all physics. Rather, he
hoped that the framework of general relativity would provide the new fundamental con-
cepts and the theoretical basis from which the quantum theory would emerge as a statistical
approximation. He devoted his last years to exploring the possibility for thus finding
an account that would penetrate the quantum domain more deeply than does the present
theory. Unfortunately, he did not succeed.
9.2 Inadequacy of the Concept Refinement Account
The refinement account thus characterizes conceptual extension by means of its first
requirement, namely that of co-extension of the refined concept with the unrefined one
in the shared domain. This is taken to ensure that the refined concepts generalize or
extend the original ones. However, we have seen that in the case of the probabilities
defined by the Lüders rule, co-extension in the shared domain is not sufficient to charac-
terize conceptual extension: they reduce to classical conditional probabilities for compatible
events and yet cannot be understood in terms of conditionality for incompatible events.
In this section, we argue that this failure is not an isolated instance due to the partic-
ularly difficult task of interpreting the quantum formalism. That, in fact, co-extension in
the shared domain of application does not in general guarantee that the concept of the new
domain is an extension of the concept it is co-extensive with. In effect, co-extension of two
notions in a certain domain by no means guarantees that outside the shared domain the
new notion will have the same (core) meaning. And hence, it is not a sufficient condition
for a conceptual extension. The conceptual refinement account is, thus, shown to not be
an adequate account of conceptual extension.
9.2 Inadequacy of the Concept Refinement Account 165
We argue for this claim by considering a particularly interesting example of a concept
which, while satisfying the co-extension requirement, cannot be seen as a proper extension
of the concept it formally reduces to, namely, the notion of ‘relativistic mass’.9.10 Indeed,
there are two possible formal functions in relativistic physics which are co-extensive with
classical mass for speeds small compared to the speed of light, i.e. in the shared domain
of classical and relativistic physics. However, only one of them can in fact be interpreted
as an extension of classical mass, something which, given both satisfy the co-extension
requirement, the method of conceptual refinement cannot account for. Let us see this in
some detail.
The Newtonian equations of motion are empirically correct only if the speed of the
object under description is considerably smaller than the speed of light. Otherwise they
are replaced by the equations of relativistic physics which involve mass in a new way. We
will focus on the fundamental equations of special relativity, which, for a free body, are
E2− p2c2=m2c4 (9.1)
p=v
E
c2
(9.2)
where E is the energy, p the momentum and v the velocity of the particle, and c is the
speed of light.
What is the proper interpretation of the symbol m that appears in (9.1)? Is it just our
ordinary classical notion of mass? Or is it an extension of that concept to the relativistic
domain? Or, rather, is it a new concept altogether? Prima facie, m seems to define the
relativistic extension of the classical notion of mass. For the relativistic equations (9.1)
and (9.2) reduce to the classical expressions for momentum and energy involving classical
mass when the speed of the body is small relative to the speed of light. In effect, equation
(9.1) can be rewritten as E
mc2
= 1+
p2
m2 c2
√
which in the Newtonian limit reduces to:9.11
E=mc2+
p2
2m
(9.3)
Here we can identify p
2
2m
as the classical kinetic energy of a particle. Similarly, writing
equation (8.2) as p
m
= v 1+
p2
m2 c2
√
,9.12 we obtain the classical expression for momentum:
p=m v (9.4)
9.10. This discussion mainly follows [Lange, 2002], pp.224-240. See also [Adler, 1987], [Earman & Fine, 1977],
[Field, 1973], [Okun, 1989], [Okun, 2001], [Okun, 2002] and [Sandin, 1991].
9.11. Considering the case in which v≪ c so that x= p2
m2c2
is very small, one can use the expansion 1+ x
√
=
1+
1
2
x+ o(x2) for small x’s.
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The problem is that the quantity symbolized by m is not standardly taken to define
relativistic mass. Rather many standard textbooks on relativity take the quantity mγ to
be the appropriate notion of mass in relativity. Indeed, equations (9.1) and (9.2) can be
rewritten as:9.13
p=mγ v (9.5)
E=mγc2 (9.6)
where γ=1/ 1− v2
c2
√
, and then it is mγ, rather than m alone, that seems to be the proper
extension of mass in relativity theory. For mγ reduces directly to the Newtonian notion
of mass when the speed of the particle is small compared to the speed of light. In effect,
when v≪c, γ reduces to one,9.14 andmγ directly reduces to classical mass. Moreover, the
relativistic equation (9.5) is analogous to the Newtonian expression of momentum p=mv.
Hence, mγ is generally taken to be the proper relativistic extension of mass and, as such,
is usually referred to as ‘relativistic mass’.
But is this really so? Is mγ, rather than m, the appropriate extension of classical mass
in relativity? No, it turns out, that the function m, and not mγ, is the proper extension
of the notion of mass in special relativity because it is the one which is Lorentz invariant.
Indeed, the quantity m is Lorentz invariant, that is, it does not depend or change upon
the transition from one inertial reference frame to another. To see this, one need only
substitute the Lorentz transformations for E and p, namely
E→ (E ′+v p′) γ (9.7)
px→ (px′ + vE
′
c2
) γ
py→ py′
pz→ pz′ (9.8)
where v is the velocity of one reference frame relative to another and v= |v | (we assume
that vector v is directed along the x axis), into equation (9.1). After some straightforward
calculation, one obtains the same equation for the transformed quantitiesE ′ and p′, namely
E ′2− p′2c2=m2c4, where mass m appears unchanged.
9.12. Using the same expansion as before, only the first term survives for the second one is already of second
order.
9.13. Substituting in (9.2) the expression of energy from (8.1) we get p2=
v2
c2
(m2 c4+ p2c2). And rearranging
this expression, p=
m
1− v2
c2
√ v , which taking γ = 1− v2
c2
√
, is normally expressed as p=m γ v . Substituting this
expression into (9.3) we get E=mγc2.
9.14. Indeed, only the first term survives: 1− v2
c2
√
=1− 1
2
v2
c2
+ =1+ o(
v2
c2
)
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Lorentz invariant quantities are taken to be the physically relevant quantities because,
given that they do not depend on the reference frame respect to which they are described,
they seem to capture what is objective. Given that a body’s mass m is independent of its
speed and of any change of reference frame, it is thus the appropriate extension of mass in
relativity theory. In contrast, a body’s so-called ‘relativistic mass’ mγ can change simply
due to a change of the reference frame in respect to which it is described, and depending
on the reference frame, its variation will be different;9.15 this ‘change’ does not represent
an objective physical process. As Marc Lange observes:
‘Because ‘relativistic mass’ [mγ] is not an invariant quantity, the best thing
to do in order to avoid confusing frame-dependent quantities with invariant
ones is just avoid using the term ‘relativistic mass’ [...] We should just use
the term ‘mass’, applying to the invariant quantity symbolized m’ ([Lange,
2002], pp.224-225)
Or in Einstein’s words,
‘I find it not very good to say that the mass of a body in movement is
increased by the speed. It is better to use the word mass exclusively for
[Lorentz-invariant] rest mass.9.16 This rest mass, f.i. for a molecule of copper,
always the same, independent from the speed of the molecule.’
‘It is not good to introduce the concept of a mass which depends from
its velocity for this is not a clear concept.’
‘One should always introduce as ‘mass’ m a quantity independent of
motion.’ (quoted in [Earman & Fine, 1977], p.538)
In addition, relativistic massm is, as classical mass, a conserved quantity. Indeed, given
that E and p are conserved and together determinem by equation (9.1), mass conservation
holds in relativity theory.
To sum up, the notion of ‘relativistic mass’ m γ is not appropriate and is, at best,
highly misleading: the proper extension of the concept of mass to relativity is the Lorentz
invariant property symbolized by m in equation (9.1). Thus, we see that, in this case,
co-extension in the shared domain of application is again not sufficient to characterize
conceptual extension: it cannot determine which, if either, of the two purported notions of
relativistic mass appropriately extends the notion of classical mass. Given this example of
9.15. See [Lange, 2002] ,pp. 236-238 for several examples.
9.16. See the next section on why Einstein, inappropriately, or so we argue, terms Lorentz-invariant mass m
as ‘rest mass’.
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relativistic physics and the case of conditional probability in quantum physics, we contend
that in general co-extension is not sufficient to characterize conceptual extension.
As a final remark, notice that the function m γ allows the relativistic equation (9.5)
p=mγ v to take the classical form ‘momentum=mass× velocity’. However, this formal
analogy does not guarantee the interpretation of ‘m γ’ as a relativistic extension of the
classical notion of mass since, as we have seen, m γ is not Lorentz invariant. Indeed,
this formal analogy constitutes only a mnemonic device that leads to much conceptual
confusion. Hence, similarly to the case of the probabilities defined by the Lüders rule, we see
the need to disengage formal and interpretive features when evaluating whether a concept
is a genuine extension of the concept it is co-extensive with. Any satisfactory theory of
conceptual extension should be able to account for this feature.
9.3 No Fast-Holding Conditions for Concept Extension
Co-extension in the shared domain hence cannot adequately characterize conceptual exten-
sion. What seems to really matter for a notion to be the conceptual extension of another is
that there is some ‘core’ meaning which both concepts share that carries over the boundary
between the old and the new context.9.17 When this happens co-extension will (usually) be
satisfied, but not (necessarily) vice versa. However, evaluating whether there is in fact some
shared core meaning is not a simple matter. In general, the concept of the new theory will
have some features in common with the old concept and some completely new features but
there does not seem to be a clear cut criteria to determine when the overlapping features
justify calling the concept an extension and when they will not. To take a provocative
example, think of the enormous controversy on whether or not the concept of ‘abortion’ is
an extension of the concept of ‘murder’.
Or think again about mass in relativistic physics. The Lorentz-invariant quantity sym-
bolized by m cannot, as in classical physics, be interpreted as the amount matter of which
a body is made of. This is because mass m is not additive in relativity theory: the total
matter of a whole system is not the sum of the matter of the system’s parts (where those
parts are non-overlapping and together include the entire system.) Take for example the
mass of a system composed of two subsystems. Given that energy and momentum are
additive we have that E=E1+E2 and p= p1+ p2. But substituting this into expression
9.17. Meaning is here, and throughout the text, to be understood intuitively as the concept or sense marked
out by a word and not in a technical philosophical sense.
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(9.1) we get that m2= (E1+E2)
2
c4
− (p1+ p2)2
c2
, which is not equal to the sum of the individual
masses (m1+m2)2. Only at v1= v2=0 does the second term vanish and is mass additive.
Nor is mass m a measure of inertia. That is, we cannot think of it as the property a
body possesses that determines its resistance to a force in the vein of ‘the more massive
the body, the more force is required to give it a certain acceleration’. Indeed, in the special
relativity framework the formula dp
dt
=F is valid and substituting in it equation (9.1) we get
a=
(F −F β)β
mγ
, where β= v
c
. The acceleration is not parallel to the force as in the Newtonian
situation and hence we cannot cling onto the Newtonian relation of proportionality between
a and F . The Newtonian equation ‘F =m a’ cannot be used in the relativistic context,
and hence m cannot be interpreted as a measure of inertia.
Nevertheless, there seems to be a surrogate quantity which both classical and Lorentz-
invariant relativistic mass m are measures of. For even though energy is not generally a
Lorentz invariant quantity, in the special case of a body at rest, it is invariant given that
it is proportional to relativistic mass m – for p=0 equation (9.1) yields m=E0/c2 . And
it is the rest energy E0, ‘dormant’ in massive bodies, which Lorentz-invariant mass m,
along with classical mass, measures. Rest energy thus seems to be the core feature of the
notion of mass which is present both in the classical and relativistic domains, allowing us
to appropriately think of massm in relativity as an extension of the classical notion of mass.
Prima facie, one could argue that this is not really so; that is, that rest energy is really
not the core feature of the notion of mass, present both in the classical and relativistic
domains, which allows us to appropriately think of mass m in relativity as an extension of
the classical notion of mass. For when p=0, Lorentz-invariant massm= E
2
c4
− p2
c2
√
reduces
to so-called rest mass m0 = E0/c2, and can be interpreted, analogously to Newtonian
mass, as the ‘dormant’ energy in massive bodies. But what does Lorentz-invariant mass
m=
E2
c4
− p2
c2
√
measure when p 0? So far, we have only said negative things, namely that
it is not a measure of the amount of matter nor of inertia. What is it then a measure of?
This reasoning is, however, misguided for it is confused about the role that p=0 plays
in interpreting mass in relativistic physics, or, put somewhat differently, it is mistaken
in calling m = E0/c2 rest mass m0. Indeed, p = 0 is not a physically relevant condition
because momentum is not a physical property in relativity – in contrast to mass, neither
energy nor momentum are Lorentz-invariant and, therefore, are not objective properties of
the system. Thus, the condition p= 0 simply selects a particular frame of reference, one
which allows understanding mass as the rest energy E0, ‘dormant’ in massive bodies. It is
the only frame in which the combination of energy and momentum only reflects the body’s
mass; in general, a body’s combination of energy and momentum in a given frame reflects
both its mass and that frame.
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It is thus correct to consider rest energy as the core feature of the notion of mass; it
is this ‘dormant’ energy in bodies which allows us to appropriately think of mass m in
relativity as an extension of the classical notion of mass. (Note, that calling E0 rest energy
is, in contrast to calling m0 rest mass, fully justified.) The Lorentz-invariant mass m is
generally referred to as ‘proper mass’. Hence, the notion of proper mass in relativity theory
has some features in common with classical mass – both measure the rest energy in bodies
– and some completely new features – it is not a measure of the amount of matter nor of
inertia.
To determine which, if any, of the overlapping features are the critical features of the
notion of mass, we have needed to engage in a detailed study of the particular science
involved. This brings out the highly topic specificity in the evaluation of concept extension,
and the ensuing difficulty in giving a general account of it. The evaluation of concept
extension needs to be applied alongside with all the scientific knowledge of particular cases.
As Buzaglo points out in ‘The Logic of Concept Expansion’,
‘Modern logic, founded by Frege, gives us no tools for understanding
concept development, for it forces us to claim of the developed concept that
either it is identical to the old one or it is completely different from it. When
we get to philosophy, we feel that this sharp division is insufficient to get
to the bottom of the problem. [...] I suggest we should escape the narrow
dichotomy of the new concepts being identical or totally different from the
old. [...]
I propose to take examples of expansions from mathematics and science,
preferably as simple as possible, and to analyze them. Thus [...] we can see
what is happening in a clearer way.’ ([Buzaglo, 2002], p.169-170)
However, the project of giving an account of concept extension is not as hopeless as
it looks. Indeed, even if concepts have an ‘open texture’ that does not allow for a set of
jointly necessary and sufficient conditions to characterize an extended concept, one can try
to formulate a ‘cluster of markers’ which are expected to hold for the extended concept. If
too many of these markers fail then one would hesitate to regard the concept of the new
theory as an extension of an old one rather than a new concept altogether. And though
this account would be far from giving fast-holding conditions for concept extension, this
need not be considered as a vice but, rather, as a virtue. Indeed, we think that it can more
appropriately capture the complexity of the cases of conceptual change in actual scientific
practice.
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9.4 Cluster of Markers Account
So let us try to formulate this ‘cluster of markers’ which would characterize – in the loose
sense explained above – concept extension. First, we have seen that the requirement of co-
extension in the shared domain of two concepts is not sufficient to characterize conceptual
extension. For example, the probabilities defined by the Lüders rule are co-extensive with
conditional probabilities for compatible events, but this does not ensure that they can be
interpreted as conditional probabilities for general quantum events. Similarly, ‘relativistic
mass’ m γ reduces to classical mass in the Newtonian limit, yet it does not define an
acceptable notion of mass in the relativistic domain. Nevertheless, co-extension of two
concepts in their shared domain does seem to be a necessary feature of concept extension;
at least approximate co-extension is. Hence, we propose to take co-extension of the concepts
of the new and old theory in their shared domain of application as the first marker in our
cluster-of-markers account of concept extension.
Second, we have also emphasized that what seems to really matter for a notion to
be the conceptual extension of another is that there is some ‘core’ meaning which both
concepts share which thus carries over the boundary between the old and the new context.
The requirement of ‘teachability’ is, we think, a particularly useful way of capturing this
core meaning. Indeed, for a concept to extend an old one into a new context, it seems
crucial that teaching standard applications of the concept in the the old context allows its
application in the new one. This is so because it affords a way of focusing on the role that
inferences and explanations play in determining the meaning of a concept.9.18 Teachability
is, therefore, the second marker in our cluster-of-markers account of concept extension.
Consider, for example, the notion of cardinality. Cantor’s idea is that the extension
of the concept of ‘the number of elements of a set’ to encompass infinite numbers lies in
extending the idea of an ordering, like that associated with counting, to infinite sets. The
notion ‘number of’ is bound up with the process of counting both in the finite and infinite
domains thus making cardinality a genuine extension of the notion ‘number of’. Indeed, two
sets have the same number of elements just in case there is a one-to-one correspondence
between them both in the finite and infinite domain. This constitutes the central feature of
9.18. This is similar to the conceptual role semantics (CRS) approach. The basic idea of CRS (also called
functional role semantics) is that the content of syntactic entities and mental representations is at least partially
constituted by the cognitive or inferential role they have for a thinker or community. Concepts have a specific
role in thought, perception, decision making, and action. As CRS focuses on how content figures in reasoning and
rational behavior, it conforms to the idea that the crucial purpose of the ascription of concepts and thought content
is to explain behavior, including verbal behavior. The study of conceptual change is thus about the change of the
inferences and explanations supported by concepts, focusing on something that matters for scientific change and
progress. See [Brigandt, 2004] and references therein (especially footnote 4).
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the notion and as such, if taught in standard applications of the finite domain, will allow
its application in the infinite domain.
Similarly, if one teaches the concept of mass in classical mechanics as the measure
of ‘dormant’ energy in massive bodies, one can readily think of proper mass m in relativity
as an extension of the classical notion of mass. In contrast, even if one learns the notion
of conditional probability for compatible quantum events, one is left clueless as to how to
apply it for incompatible ones. The difficulty lies in that the notion of conditionality – in
contrast to the notion of the ‘number of elements of’ or the notion of mass which extend
smoothly from finite to infinite cases and from low velocities to high velocities, respectively
– does not extend smoothly from compatible cases in which the notion clearly applies to
incompatible ones.
Indeed, the quantum analogue of the classical rationale for obtaining conditional prob-
abilities is simply not available. And thus there seems to be no feature of conditionality
which, if taught for compatible events, will allow one to make an assignment of conditional
probabilities for incompatible events. To assign a number to two incompatible events one
has to introduce a special rule; one such rule is the Lüders rule. One might then call this
an ‘extension’ of conditional probability, but it is really a different concept that bears no
resemblance with conditionality.
This is certainly so if quantum events are interpreted as physical values or as meas-
urements results (both synchronically and diachronically). And if quantum events are
interpreted as projection operators, then, as we have seen, the same conclusion holds for
the diachronic notion and can be arguably shown to hold for the synchronic one. Indeed,
it is difficult to see why one would assign the probability of projector P conditional on
projector Q the pro-rata increase of the probability of the operator QPQ.
Third, an extended concept usually deepens or adds more resolution to an old concept.
This generally enhances our understanding both of the original and the new context.
Indeed, the extended concept helps us distinguish between critical and context-dependent
features of a concept; and it helps us acquire familiarity and understanding of the new
context by allowing us to think of the new area as if it were the old one. Buzaglo describes
it nicely
the extended concept usually leads to making distinctions ‘as if it had
taken an unpainted surface and painted it with a variety of colors, giving us
a way of demonstrating the differences between objects in the newly painted
area.’ ([Buzaglo, 2002], p.66)
Or, as Fine puts it,
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the extended concept ‘penetrate[s] into nature more deeply than its pre-
decessors; it [advances] our understanding by allowing us to put to nature
certain questions which were not clearly expressible on the basis of the old
concepts and it should lead us to expect that some such questions have
determinate answers.’ ([Fine, 1986], p.20).
We refer to this feature of concept extension as ‘conceptual fruitfulness’, a fruitfulness
which works both from the old to the new context and vice versa, and take it as the third
marker in our cluster-of-markers account of concept extension.
To illustrate it, take first the notion of cardinality. Learning this notion enhances
our understanding of the finite domain by showing that what is crucial about the notion
of ‘number of elements’ is the process of counting. Other features present in the finite
domain but not in the infinite one, as say, having fewer number of elements if a set is a
proper subset of another set, are now seen as accessory to the notion of ‘number of’, only
applying in the finite domain. In addition, the notion of cardinality enables to answer
questions pertaining to the infinite domain that did not have determinate answers in the
finite one, as say, the number of elements in the even set is the same as that of the set of
natural numbers.
Similarly, the relativistic notion of proper mass m deepens or adds more resolution
to the classical one. It leads to making further distinctions as, for example requiring to
decouple mass from matter or showing how mass is an objective property, in the sense
of being Lorentz invariant, whereas energy is not. Thus, it helps us distinguish between
critical and context-dependent features of the notion of mass – ‘dormant’ energy in massive
bodies versus a measure of the amount of matter or inertia – and it helps us acquire
familiarity and understanding of the relativistic domain.
Finally, a number of important results that are formulated in terms of the old concept
usually carry over to the extended domain. ‘Conservativeness’ from the old to the new
context will thus be the fourth and final marker in our cluster-of-markers account of concept
extension. For example, the extended concept of cardinality is extremely fruitful at a formal
level. Indeed, an important class of results as, for example, the results of finite arithmetic,
carry over from the finite to the infinite. This allows us to navigate the infinite domain
with an ease otherwise difficult to acquire.
However, special care must be taken with this marker. For formal fruitfulness is not
always a reliable indicator of concept extension: while formal features are a useful guide
for conceptual extension, these can easily lead one astray when drawing their interpretive
conclusions. For example, we have seen that the fact that m γ allows p =m γ v to take
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the classical form ‘momentum=mass× velocity’ gives no additional grounds to regard it
as the appropriate extension. Even if regarding m γ as the relativistic extension of mass
is formally fruitful, this formal analogy constitutes only a mnemonic device that leads to
much conceptual confusion. Thus, one has to make a detailed evaluation of each particular
case. As we already emphasized, the evaluation of conceptual extension needs to be applied
alongside with all the scientific knowledge of particular cases.
Consider also the case of conditional probability. As we have seen, there are two ways
of formally characterizing conditional probability in a classical probability space, namely
by its additivity property (theorem 2.4) and by the existence and uniqueness theorem
(theorem 2.1). Now the probabilities defined by the Lüders rule, while also being charac-
terized by an analogue existence and uniqueness theorem (theorem 4.2), do not retain the
additivity property. And we have argued that, even if the formal characterization of exist-
ence and uniqueness holds both for classical conditional probabilities and the probabilities
defined by the Lüders rule, it does not provide enough interpretive content for the latter
to be read as a conditional probability.
In analogue fashion, the notion of the ‘number of elements’ has two defining features in
the finite domain, namely two sets have the same number of elements if one can establish
a one-to-one correspondence between its elements, and one set has fewer elements than
another if it is a proper subset of it; and only the former property is retained in the infinite
domain. However, whereas in the case of the probabilities defined by the Lüders rule the
extended feature does not yield a genuine extension of conditional probability, in the
number case the extended feature does yield a genuine extension of the notion ‘number of’.
One could also wonder what would happen if the additivity-with-respect-to-con-
ditioning-events characterization of conditional probability were to be retained in the
quantum case. Maybe, one could hope, the now additive probabilities defined by the
(somehow modified) Lüders rule, would genuinely extend the notion of conditional prob-
ability to the quantum context. However, these hopes would be unfounded. For one encoun-
ters difficulties in interpreting the probabilities defined by the Lüders rule as conditional
probabilities even in the absence of interference terms. Indeed, for our spin 1 particle,
both Pψ(Py+1|Px+1) – or Pψ(sy+1|sx+1) – and Pψ(Psy+1|Psx+1 + Psx0) – or Pψ(sy+1|sx+1
or sx0) – cannot be interpreted as conditional probabilities. Hence, once more, we see
the intricate interplay between formal and interpretive features.
To sum up, the general markers we propose to characterize an extended concept are
the following:
1. Co-extension of the concepts of the new and old theory in their shared domain of
application.
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2. Teachability: teaching standard applications of the concept in the the old context
allow its application in the new context.
3. Conceptual fruitfulness: the extended concept enhances our understanding of both
the original and the new context.
4. Conservativeness : a number of important formal results that are formulated in
terms of the old concept carry over to the extended domain.
This cluster of markers is expected to hold if the concept of the new theory is to be regarded
as an extension of a concept of the old domain. However, they do not constitute a set of
jointly necessary conditions for conceptual extension. Indeed, the notion of proper mass
in relativity m, unlike m γ, fails to satisfy the conservativeness requirement and yet it is
a genuine extension of mass. And they are not individually sufficient either: for example,
‘relativistic mass’ mγ satisfies conservativeness and co-extension and yet does not define
a proper concept of mass. Nevertheless, taken all together they do seem to provide an
appropriate rationale for concept extension.
To finish, note that this account is yet to be further developed and would greatly benefit
from a detailed study of more particular mathematical and physical concepts. As Buzaglo
suggests, we should engage in a more promising case-by-case investigation so that ‘we can
see what is happening in a clearer way.’ ([Buzaglo, 2002], p.169) Moreover, this study
need not restrict itself to physical and mathematical concepts. For example, [Fine, 1978]
studies in some detail how the concept of sexuality underwent a significant expansion in
psychoanalytic theory.
9.5 Implications for Conceptual Change in Science
When new scientific theories are developed the concepts of the new theories may or may
not extend those of the older theories in a uniform way. Our attempt in this chapter has
been to provide a rationale to evaluate when conceptual change can be viewed as concept
extension. However, this perspective stands in contrast with much of the literature on
conceptual change in science, in which the emphasis has been more on the discontinuous
character of conceptual change. Indeed, the ‘radical’ historicist philosophers – such as
Norman R. Hanson, Paul Feyerabend and Thomas S. Kuhn – saw scientific change as
abrupt and discontinuous, and thus sought to characterize conceptual change in terms of
new conceptual structures as completely replacing the previous ones with inconsistent or,
more radically, with incommensurable ones.9.19
9.19. For the classical theses of incommensurability see [Kuhn, 1962], [Feyerabend, 1965, 1975].
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Under this view, the concepts employed in one theory are seen as radically different
and not comparable or translatable to those used in the other theory: it is as if different
observers of the same world see it from radically different and not comparable points of
view. For example, for Kuhn, theoretical changes are scientific revolutions, where
‘Scientific revolutions are here taken to be those non-cumulative develop-
mental episodes in which an older paradigm is replaced in whole or in part
by an incompatible new one’ ([Kuhn, 1962], p.92).
Kuhn does not simply define scientific revolutions as non-cumulative; rather, scientific
revolutions must be non-cumulative because of certain presumed truths about the nature
of paradigms, observation, and meaning. And when during these periods one scientific
theory is replaced by another, there are changes in the standards of governing permissible
problems, concepts, and explanations.
We do not wish to enter here the enormous literature surrounding the issue incommen-
surability and meaning change within theoretical change. What we want to do is emphasize
that claims of incompatibility and incommensurability between concepts of different sci-
entific theories should be handled with great care. Indeed, as we have already stressed,
evaluating whether there is in fact some shared core meaning between two concepts which
carries over the boundary between the old and the new context is not a simple matter.
There are no clear cut criteria to determine when the overlapping features justify calling
the concept an extension and when they will not, and much less to determine when the
new concept is (supposedly) not even comparable with the old one. The evaluation of
conceptual change is a very subtle and intricate issue that needs to be applied alongside
with all the scientific knowledge of particular cases.
Take again the notion of mass in the classical and relativistic contexts. While we have
argued that in relativistic physics the notion defined by Lorentz-invariant proper mass m
is an extension of the classical notion of mass, Kuhn claims that it is not . In his view, or
better in Field’s reconstruction of his view [Field, 1973], there are three different notions
of mass, namely Newtonian mass, proper mass m, and ‘relativistic mass’ mγ. Newtonian
mass is neither proper mass m nor ‘relativistic mass’ mγ. Indeed, like ‘relativistic mass’
mγ but unlike proper massm, Newtonian mass is equal to momentum divided by velocity.
Like proper mass m but unlike ‘relativistic mass’ mγ, Newtonian mass has the same value
in all reference frames and is conserved in all interactions. And, unlike both proper mass m
and ‘relativistic mass’ mγ, Newtonian mass is a measure of the amount of matter and of
inertia. Under this perspective, Newtonian mass does not, thus, denote the same physical
quantity that either proper mass m or ‘relativistic mass’ mγ denote.
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That is, Kuhn argued that Newtonian mechanics cannot even be seen as a limiting
case, even, of special relativity: although one can derive laws that look like the Newtonian
ones from the laws of special relativity under appropriate assumptions, namely low speeds,
the significance of these laws is vastly different in the two theories given that the concepts
marked by the terms shared by the two theories, i.e. mass, space, time, will have changed
radically in the move from one theory to another. In Kuhn’s words,
‘Though theNi’s [i.e. the equations derived from the set of statements E1,
E2,..., En, which together embody the laws of relativity theory, in the special
case of (v
c
)2≪1)] are a special case of the laws of relativistic mechanics, they
are not Newton’s Laws. [...] The variables and parameters that in Einstein’s
Ei’s represented spatial position, time, mass, etc., still occur in the Ni’s; and
they there still represent Einsteinian space, time and mass. But the physical
referents of these Einsteinian concepts are by no means identical with those
of the Newtonian concepts that bear the same name. (Newtonian mass is
conserved; Einsteinian is convertible with energy. [...]) Unless we change the
definitions of the variables in theNi’s, the statements we have derived are not
Newtonian. If we do change them, we cannot say to have properly derived
Newton’s Laws [...].
[T]he transition from Newtonian to Einsteinian mechanics illustrates with
particular clarity the scientific revolution as a displacement of the conceptual
network through which scientists view the world.’
([Kuhn, 1962], pp. 100-101).9.20
The problem is that this view relies heavily on the assumption that the concepts marked
by the terms shared by the two theories, e.g. mass, space, time, have changed radically in
the move from one theory to another. But, as we have argued, this need not be the case.
Indeed, first, m γ should be dismissed as defining a valid concept of mass in relativistic
physics because it is not Lorentz-invariant, and thus not an objective property. And second,
the concepts marked by Newtonian and proper mass m have not radically changed as
Kuhn claims: they have a common feature which both share, namely they both measure
the ‘dormant’ energy in massive bodies. Indeed, it is not by coincidence that the symbol
m appearing in the relativistic equations (9.1) has been termed ‘proper mass’. As John
Earman remarks,
‘ ‘Proper mass’ is not a misnomer!’ ([Earman & Fine, 1977], p.537)
9.20. See Appendix E for some clarifications on the (supposed) mass-energy equivalence.
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Regarding proper mass m as an extension of classical mass in relativity theory allows
one to capture an evolution of the concept of mass which is closer to actual scientific
practice. Indeed, as we acquire more empirical data, and accordingly modify our scientific
theories, the concepts employed in them suffer changes. But these changes do not neces-
sarily give rise to completely unrelated, inconsistent or incommensurable concepts; rather
the concepts of the different theories have retained some relation, and this relation can
be stable enough to allow understanding the concept of the new theory as an extension of
that of the old theory. In the case of mass, the concept of proper mass m in relativity can
indeed be seen as an extension of the classical concept of mass.
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Chapter 10
Conclusion
Describing the conceptual changes from the classical to the relativistic notion of mass as
conceptual extension, one can account for the fact that the transition from classical to
relativistic physics is in fact marked by very significant conceptual innovation and change,
without making the process of scientific development degenerate into a series of irrational
choices, as the historicist philosophers view on radical conceptual change entails. But
what about in quantum theory? Have the concepts of quantum mechanics retained a
stable enough relation with respect to the concepts of classical mechanics to allow their
understanding as extensions of the classical ones?
We have argued that in the case of the probability defined by the Lüders rule, the
only possible candidate for a definition of a quantum notion of conditional probability,
this is not the case. That is, we have argued that the change of meaning from conditional
probability to the probability defined by the Lüders rule is so substantial that, even if these
probabilities are co-extensive in their shared domain of application, namely compatible
events, we cannot talk anymore about the same concept. We have shown this claim holds
for physical values, for measurement results, and at a formal level for projection operators,
both from a synchronic and a diachronic perspective.
In addition, in Chapter 8, we have argued that neither quantum Bayesianism nor
quantum Frequentism can provide an adequate interpretation of the quantum uncondi-
tional probabilities. We have concluded that, ultimately, the reason for the failure of these
interpretations is equivalent to the failure of interpreting the probability defined by the
Lüders rule as a conditional probability. Indeed, we have argued that there is no quantum
notion of joint probability, or equivalently, no quantum notion of conditional probability,
which can be interpreted at any level which is not thoroughly instrumental. We have
brought into this evaluation a very detailed analysis of (what now seems as) the relevant
scientific knowledge. Quantum mechanics remains conceptually as puzzling as ever.
Now the problem is that the quantum probabilities defined by the trace rule – both
using a general density operator W or the density operator given by the Lüders rule –
coincide, and to an incredible degree of accuracy, with the empirically found frequencies.
181
Moreover, these frequencies provide the sole connection between quantum mechanics and
the empirical world. Does this then imply, as is widely held, that the classical and quantum
concepts are incommensurable? That the quantum world represents a radical conceptual
break with the classical one?
Maybe yes. And again maybe not. A conclusive answer does not seem to be yet forth-
coming. Perhaps, as Einstein hoped, there are new fundamental concepts and a new
theoretical basis from which the quantum theory will emerge as a statistical approxim-
ation. Or perhaps one of the (many) interpretations of quantum mechanics will turn out
to present a particularly appropriate reading of the quantum formalism. Who knows?
In this sense, we think that it would be interesting to apply our analysis of ‘conditional’
and ‘unconditional’ quantum probability within each particular interpretation of quantum
mechanics and that, hopefully, this will provide a fruitful guide for future research.
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Appendix A
Subjective Bayesian Interpretation of
Probability
Bayesianism takes probability to be a measure of ignorance, reflecting our state of know-
ledge about the world. In this approach, what constitutes a possible event is dictated
by Nature, i.e. is an objective fact of reality, but the probability assigned to that event
is not determined by objective features of the world; rather this probability represents
our uncertainty about facts. In particular, for the subjective Bayesian interpretation the
probability of an event is nothing more than a rational (later to be defined) agent’s degree of
belief on its occurrence.A.1 Further, it does not assume that rationality leads to consensus:
different individuals, although all perfectly reasonable and having the same evidence, may
have different degrees of belief in an event. Probability is thus defined as the degree of
belief of a particular individual, that is, as a subjective degree of belief.
A.1 Betting Quotients and Ramsey-de Finetti Theorem
Probabilities are numbers in the interval [0,1] which satisfy a certain mathematical defini-
tion (definition 2.3). Hence, if the subjective theory is to provide an adequate interpretation
of the mathematical calculus, one must first find a way of measuring the degrees of belief
of an individual so that these are assigned numerical values, and then show that these
degrees of belief satisfy the standard axioms of probability. Betting behavior provides an
answer to the first task and the Ramsey-de Finetti theorem fulfills the second requirement.
We will proceed to present both in turn.A.2
A.1. We here develop the account of subjective Bayesianism associated to [de Finetti, 1937], wherein credences
are regarded as capturing all information about the bets that you are prepared to enter into. Other accounts of
credences are the following. According to [van Fraassen, 1991], credences encapsulate all information about the
judgments that one makes. [Ramsey, 1926], [Savage, 1954] and [Jeffrey, 1983] derive both probabilities and utilities
(desirabilities) from rational preferences. And, in a similar spirit, [Lewis, 1986] analyzes credences as the probability
function belonging to the utility/probability function pair that best rationalizes ones behavioral dispositions.
A.2. This presentation of the subjective Bayesian interpretation follows [Gillies, 2000a], Chapter 4.
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Suppose that Ms A wants to measure the degree of belief of Mr B in some event E.
One way she can do this is by getting Mr B to agree on a bet on it under the following
conditions. Mr B has to choose a number q (called his betting quotient on E) and then
Ms A chooses the stake S. Mr B will pay Ms A q S in exchange for S if E occurs. Thus
his total gain will be S − q S if E occurs but he will loose q S if E does not occur. S can
be positive or negative but Mr B does not know this when choosing q for this guarantees
that he will adjust q to his actual belief.A.3 Under this betting set-up, q is taken to be a
measure of Mr B’s degree of belief in E.
Now it does not yet follow that these betting quotients are a probability measure.
Indeed it seems easy to imagine an individual whose degrees of belief are quite arbitrary and
do not satisfy the standard axioms of probability. The subjectivists solve this problem and
derive the axioms of probability by making the assumption of coherence. The coherence
assumption says that an agent will not accept terms for bets he wants to win that will
make him certain to loose whatever happens. More precisely,
Definition A.1. Coherence. If a bettor (Mr B) has to bet on a number of events E1, ,
En, his betting quotients are said to be coherent if and only if the stake-maker (Ms A)
cannot choose stakes S1, , Sn such that she wins whatever happens.
If Ms A can choose stakes so that she wins whatever happens, she is said to have made
a Dutch Book against Mr B. Mr B will obviously want his bets to be coherent to avoid
the possibility of losing whatever happens. An agent that holds coherent degrees of belief
is said to be rational.
It is a remarkable fact that the coherence condition is both necessary and sufficient for
betting quotients to satisfy the axioms of probability. This is the content of the so-called
Ramsey-de Finetti theorem:
Theorem A.1. Ramsey-de Finetti Theorem. A set of betting quotients is coherent if
and only if they satisfy the axioms of probability.
If your degrees of belief violate the probability axioms, then there exists a Dutch Book
against you, and if your degrees of belief do not violate the probability axioms, then there
does not exist a Dutch Book against you. Thus in the subjective theory the axioms of
A.3. If Mr B knew that the stake is positive then he would set q as low as possible so as to get more money if
E occurs (remember he gains S (1− q) if E occurs) and loose less money if E does not occur (remember he looses
q S if E does not occur). Whereas if Mr B knows that the stake is negative then it will be in his interest to set q
as high as possible.
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probability can be proved rigorously from the very plausible condition of coherence. We
will not provide a full proof of this result but we will consider parts of it and indicate the
reference to the missing ones.
Let us begin by showing how coherence implies 06 p(A)6 1 for any event A ∈ F(S)
and p(B)= 1 in case of the certain event B. Imagine Mr B were to set his degree of belief
in an arbitrary event A to q(A)> 1. He would have a Dutch Book made against him for
Ms A would win whatever happens by choosing S > 0: if A occurs then Mr B’s total gain
S (1− q) would be negative, which simply means that he looses S (1− q); and if A does not
occur then Mr B would also loose, since qS is positive. And similarly if he set q(A)<0 for
now Ms A would win no matter what happens by choosing S<0. Hence to be coherent, Mr
B must choose 06 q(A)6 1. One can prove that q(B)= 1 in an analogue way: if q(B)> 1
Ms A can win by choosing S > 0 and if q(B)< 1 Ms A can win by choosing S < 0. Hence
to be coherent, Mr B must choose q(B) = 1. The reverse implications also hold, that is
if 06 p(A)6 1 for any event A ∈F(S) and p(B) = 1 in case of the certain event B, then
coherence holds.A.4
Let us now show that coherence ensures that (finite) additivity holds, namely that
for events A and B mutually exclusive p(A ∪ B) = p(A) + p(B).A.5 Assume that Mr B
assigns a degree of belief q(A) to the occurrence of event A, q(B) to the occurrence of
event B and q(C) to the occurrence of event C = A ∪ B, and Ms A chooses the stakes
S(A), S(B) andS(C) respectively. What we want to prove is that coherence implies that
q(C)= q(A)+ q(B). To do so let us consider the possible outcome events and the net gain
of Mr B in each case:A.6
i. A and ¬B: SA (1− qA)−SB qB+SC (1− qC)
ii. ¬A and B: −SA qA+SB (1− qB)+SC (1− qC)
iii. ¬A and ¬B: −SA qA−SB qB−SC qC
(Note that we haven’t considered the event A and B because A and B are mutually
exclusive events.) Now for Ms A to not be able to chose stakes so that Mr B looses
whatever happens (net gain<0 for all SA, SB , SC) nor for Mr A to loose whatever happens
(net gain>0 for all SA, SB , SC), the net gain in each of these three cases must be 0. This
corresponds to setting the determinant of the set of equations
SA (1− qA)−SB qB+SC (1− qC)= 0
A.4. [Gillies, 2000a], p.61.
A.5. See [Williamson, 1999] on whether countable additivity is an acceptable axiom of subjective probability.
A.6. To make the notation easier we will simply set q(A) = qA and similarly for the rest.
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−SA qA+SB (1− qB)+SC (1− qC)= 0
−SA qA−SB qB−SC qC=0
to zero. The value of the determinant is qA + qB − qC, so it then follows that the
probability assignment is incoherent unless qA + qB = qC. And hence, (finite) additivity
holds for coherent degrees of belief. In reverse fashion, the addition law implies coher-
ence.A.7 Thus under a subjective Bayesian interpretation probabilities are defined as the
subjective degrees of belief of a coherent agent. Let us consider now the notion of subjective
conditional probability.
A.2 Subjective Conditional Probability
As we saw in Chapter 2, the most usual usual approach to subjective conditional prob-
ability is the so-called Ramsey test , which takes the subjective conditional probability
Pp(A|B) as given by the degree of belief one has in A when supposing B (or hypothetically
adding B to one’s stock of beliefs). The notion of supposition is crucial for it allows one’s
conditional degree of belief to differ from how one’s beliefs would actually change were one
to learn B with certainty.A.8 Indeed, if one defines Pp(A|B) as the degree of belief an agent
would have (or ought to have) if she were to learn (with certainty) that B is in fact the
case, then one faces several problems that are easily overcome by the supposition account.
For one, even in ordinary cases, it takes a lot of idealization to claim that there is a
single proposition that an agent learns between one time and another. And in many cases,
it seems there are infinitely many such propositions, and it’s not clear that an agent’s
algebra of events will always be closed under such infinite conjunctions. Furthermore, there
are also many cases in which an agent’s degrees of belief change by loss of certainty, rather
than gaining new knowledge. But supposition generally features a single event (or a finite
conjunction of them) rather than an infinite set of premises. And worries about lack of
certainty or the loss of information are irrelevant for there is no such thing as ‘partially
supposing’ a proposition, or ‘negatively supposing’ something.
However, care must be taken with the notion of supposition for it can lead to conclude
that one is omniscient – that is, one should believe ‘if p then I believe that p, and if I
believe that p, then p’. Both a subjunctive truth notion of supposition – on which Pp(A|B)
measures how strongly the agent believes that A would have been the case, if B had been
true – and a subjunctive belief notion of supposition – on which Po(A|B) measures how
A.7. See [Gillies, 2000a], p.61
A.8. We here follow [Easwaran, 2008].
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strongly the agent would believe A, if she believed B – face their own particular challenges.
(To give an example of these two notions of supposition. If A is the event that someone
wrote Macbeth, and B is the event that Shakespeare did not write Macbeth, then for most
people, on the subjunctive truth notion Pp(A|B) is quite low, while on the subjunctive
belief notion Pp(A|B) is fairly high. I would not stop believing that Macbeth had been
written, even if I learned that Shakespeare had not written it.)
The subjunctive truth notion can’t be the correct account since there are many cases
in which it violates the ratio analysis. For example, if A is the event that I exist, and B is
the event that humans have been in Europe for more than 100 years, then my subjunctive
value for Pp(A|B), is fairly low (if humans had not been in Europe, presumably history
would have been so radically different that I would never have come to exist), but the
ratio account says that Pp(A|B) = 1 because my degree of belief in A∩B is the same as
my degree of belief in B. The subjunctive belief account can’t be correct either, as was
already acknowledged by Ramsey:
‘The conditional probability Pp(A|B) is not the same as the degree to which
[the agent] would believe A, if he believed B for certain; for knowledge of B
might for psychological reasons profoundly alter his whole system of beliefs.’
([Ramsey, 1926], p. 180; notation adapted)
[van Fraassen, 1980] gives a particular example of this problem in raising worries
for Brian Ellis’ account of conditionals and [Chalmers & Hájek, 2007] also analyze this
problem.
But regardless of what exactly conditional degrees of belief are – or whether they can
be reduced to some notion of supposition – betting behavior, as with the notion of degree
of belief, sheds important light on this notion. Indeed, it seems that Pp(A|B) ought to
have some connection to the agent’s disposition to accept bets on A, that will be called off
if B is not true; and there is a standard Dutch book argument suggesting that under this
interpretation, one ought to set Pp(A|B) to what the ratio analysis stipulates.
In effect, coherence also implies that subjective conditional probabilities agree with
the probabilities defined by the ratio formula; that is, an agent would be incoherent, i.e.
be ‘Dutch Booked’, if she does not set her conditional degree of belief in A given B to her
degree of belief in their joint occurrence divided by the degree of belief in B, i.e. if she
does not set Pp(A|B) = p(A∩B)p(B) . Hence the coherent agent will set his conditional degree
of belief to precisely what the ratio analysis requires. Let us consider this argument.A.9
A.9. See [Gillies, 2000a], pp. 62-64, and [Howson & Urbach, 1996], pp.63-64.
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The conditional betting quotient for A given B, qA|B, is defined as the betting quotient
which the bettor would give for A on the understanding that the bet is called off and
all stakes returned if B does not occur. Assume that Mr B assigns a degree of belief qB
to the occurrence of event B, qA&B to the occurrence of event A and B and qA|B to the
occurrence of event A given that B has occurred. And the stake-maker chooses the stakes
SB , SA|B and SA&B respectively. What we want to prove is that coherence implies that
qA|B = qA&B/qB. To do so, we consider again the possible outcome events and the total
gain of Mr B in each case:
i. B and A: SB (1− qB)+SA&B (1− qA&B)+SA|B(1− qA|B)
ii. B and ¬A: SB(1− qB)−SA&B qA&B−SA|B qA|B
iii. ¬B: −SB qB−SA&B qA&B
Note that when ¬B occurs the bet concerning the degree of belief on A conditional on
the occurrence of B is called off. Again, for Ms A to not be able to chose stakes so that
Mr B looses whatever happens (net gain<0 for all SA&B , SB , SA|B) nor for Mr A to loose
whatever happens (net gain>0 for all SA&B , SB , SA|B), the net gain in each of these three
cases must be 0. This corresponds to setting the determinant of the set of equations
SB (1− qB)+SA&B (1− qA&B)+SA|B (1− qA|B)= 0
SB (1− qB)−SA&B qA&B−SA|B qA|B=0
−SB qB−SA&B qA&B=0
to zero. The value of this determinant is − qA|BqB+ qA&B and equating it to zero it follows
that the probability assignment is incoherent unless qA|B= qA&B/qB. Thus an agent would
be incoherent, i.e. be ‘Dutch Booked’, if she does not set her conditional degree of belief in
A given B to her degree of belief in their joint occurrence divided by the degree of belief
in B. Hence the coherent agent will set his conditional degree of belief to precisely what
the ratio analysis requires.
A.3 Conditionalization and Conditional Probability
Subjectivists typically recognize no constraints on initial or prior subjective probabilities
beyond the coherence condition or, equivalently, their conformity to Kolmogorov’s axioms.
But they typically advocate a learning rule for updating probabilities in the light of new
evidence. Suppose that you initially have a probability function, and that you become
certain of B (and of nothing more). What should be your new probability function? The
favoured updating rule among Bayesians is the so-called principle of conditionalization.
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Proposition A.1. Principle of Conditionalization. If at time ti one assigns an event
A an initial or prior probability pi(A), and one acquires new evidence B at a later time tf,
then one should systematically transform one’s initial assignment pi(A) to generate a final
or posterior probability assignment pf(A) at time tf by conditioning on B, that is,
pi(A)  pf(A)=Ppi(A|B) (A.1)
Conditionalization derives probabilities posterior to B by redistributing the prior probab-
ilities of all the sample points that B rules out pro rata over all the points that remain.
So, for example, the difference between Pp(1|odd) and p(1) represents the extent to which
the probability attached to ‘1’ changes on receipt of the knowledge that the outcome was
an odd number.
It is important to realize that the notions of conditional probability and conditional-
ization are distinct notions: while conditionalization is a diachronic notion – it applies to
probabilities held at a time prior to learning of evidence B and to probabilities held at a
time posterior to this learning, conditional probability is a synchronic notion – it applies
only to probabilities at one time. And arguments in favour of the synchronic notion do not
necessarily support the diachronic rule. Indeed, the Dutch Book argument which proved
that Pi(A|B) = pi(A∩B)pi(B) only deals with probabilities at the initial time ti but can say
nothing as to whether the degree of belief in B at time tf, pf(B), should be equated with
the conditional on A degree of belief in B, Pi(A|B).
The principle of conditionalization is allegedly supported by a ‘diachronic’ Dutch Book
argument: one is subject to a Dutch book (with bets placed at different times) if one does
not conditionalize and conversely, if one does conditionalize, then one is immune to such
a Dutch Book.A.10 What is involved in this argument is the so-called diachronic coherence
condition, i.e. coherence over time, in contrast to the previous Dutch Book arguments that
involved only synchronic coherence.
There is, however, not a wide consensus on the validity of this argument. The main
criticism is that the allegedly diachronic Dutch Book argument relies on the unjustified
assumption that the probability the agent attaches to A if he were to know that B is
true does not change after he in fact learns that B is true. That is, that if at tf the agent
learns that B is true (and nothing more), then at tf he still maintains the value Pi(A|B),
i.e. Pi(A|B) = Pf(A|B). For then, under this assumption, the condition of synchronic
coherence is enough to guarantee that the agent will infer the unconditional fair betting
quotient on A, pf(A), to be Pi(A|B). But why should the agent be obliged to say in
advance how he is going to bet on A in the event of B’s being true? Moreover he will not
A.10. See [Teller, 1976] and [Lewis, 1997]
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be incoherent if he changes his mind between ti and tf. And in this case no Dutch Book
can be made against him.A.11 In Hacking’s words,
if ‘the man announces his post-B rates only after B is discovered, and
simultaneously cancels his pre-B rates, [then] there is no system for bet-
ting with him which is guaranteed success in the sense of a Dutch Book.’
([Hacking, 1967], p.315)
Thus the allegedly diachronic Dutch Book argument is criticized as being merely a
re-proof of the synchronic Dutch Book proof of ratio, that is, as begging the question.
However, even if the diachronic Dutch Book argument fails to show that conditionalization
is always right, this failure does not show that it is often or even ever wrong: even if it does
not follow from some general principle of rationality, the plausibility of its prescriptions
may still recommend it as a general rule.
A.11. See [Hacking, 1967], [Howson & Franklin, 1994], [Mellor, 2005].
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Appendix B
Problems for the Ratio Analysis
In section 2.3 we emphasized that the ratio formula (2.8) should not be regarded as a
stipulative definition of conditional probability, but rather as an analysis of that notion.
And we saw various justifications for why this should be so. However, [Alan Hájek, 2003]
has forcefully argued against the adequacy of the ratio formula as an analysis of conditional
probability. Briefly, he argues that conditional probabilities can be well defined in many
and important cases in which the ratio analysis goes silent.
In more detail, Hájek shows that every probability assignment has uncountably
many ‘trouble spots’ that come in three varieties which can create serious problems for
the ratio analysis. First, there is the so-called zero denominator problem. The ratio ana-
lysis is mute whenever the condition has probability zero – if p(B) = 0 then p(A∩B)
p(B)
is undefined so the ratio analysis delivers no verdict – and yet conditional probabilities
may nevertheless be well defined in such cases. Indeed, contingent propositions may be
assigned probability 0 – hence, probability 0 does not imply impossibility – and hence it
should be legitimate to form conditional probabilities with probability zero conditionals.B.1
The second problem arises when conditional probabilities are sharp, i.e. determine a
single probability function, and the corresponding unconditional probabilities are vague,
something which the ratio analysis cannot respect. For example, the probability that
the Democrats win in the next election is vague; but the probability that the Demo-
crats win, given that the Democrats win is not vague: the answer is clearly 1. Similarly,
p(the Democrats do not win, given the Democrats win) is not vague and is 0; and p(T ,
B.1. Kolmogorov himself was well aware of this problem and elaborated the ratio analysis to handle cases such
as these while preserving the guiding idea behind the simpler ratio analysis ([Hájek, 2003] p.291). However this
extended analysis also turns out to be inadequate for it also falls prey to the other two problems of the ratio analysis.
Indeed, Kolmogorov’s analysis equates a certain integral in which the relevant conditional probability figures, to the
probability of a conjunction; but when this latter probability is either vague or fails to exist at all, as in my cases
of undefined unconditional probabilities, the analysis goes silent and yet the corresponding conditional probabilities
are defined. In addition, the extended analysis delivers some conditional distributions that fail to comply to the
requirement that the probability of anything consistent, given itself , is 1, a requirement that is self-evident if an
analysis is to adequately capture the pre-theoretical notion of conditional probability. See [Hájek, 2008].
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given the Democrats win) = 1, and p(F , given the Democrats win) = 0, where T and F ,
respectively, stand for necessary and impossible events.
Finally, the third problem lies in that various conditional probabilities are defined even
when the corresponding unconditional probabilities appearing in the ratio analysis are
undefined, and indeed cannot be defined. For example, the probability that a fair coin lands
heads (H), given that I toss it fairly (FT) is 1/2. But the terms that appear in the ratio
formula, i.e. p(H ∩ FT) and p(FT), are undefined; and ‘undefined’ divided by ‘undefined’
does not equal 1/2.B.2 Hájek claims that ‘the trouble spots are inescapable, and that they
are, to put it mildly, plentiful’ ([Hájek, 2003], p.281) and thus concludes that the ratio
analysis is not an adequate analysis of conditional probability.
Nevertheless, he concedes that one might instead regard the ratio analysis as providing
a constraint on conditional probability:
‘... the ratio might be thought of as a successful partial analysis, one
that works for an important sub-class of conditional probabilities, in which
the conditions are met. A sufficient condition for a conditional probability
to equal a particular value is for the corresponding ratio to equal that value.
However, it is not a necessary condition: a conditional probability can equal
a particular value without the corresponding ratio equating that value.’
([Hájek, 2003], p.314)
Hájek then takes a further step and casts doubt on the very project of analyzing con-
ditional probability itself, and claims that conditional probability, and not unconditional
probability, should be in fact taken as the primitive notion. He says:
‘At best, this leaves unfinished the project of giving a correct analysis
of conditional probability [...] But perhaps the very project of analyzing
conditional probability was misguided from the start. [...] We should regard
conditional probability as conceptually prior to unconditional probability. So
I suggest that we reverse the traditional direction of analysis: regard condi-
tional probability to be the primitive notion, and unconditional probability
as the derivative notion.’ ([Hájek, 2003], p.314-315).
B.2. Note that this example is not an appropriate counterexample because the conditional probability involved
is not a (genuine) conditional-on-event probability but rather is a ‘conditional’-on-background-conditions probability
(see section 6.5). However Hájek gives another example that does involve an event conditional probability. Briefly,
imagine throwing an infinitely fine dart at the [0,1] interval, with you assigning a uniform distribution (Lebesgue
measure) over the points at which it could land. The probability you give to its landing in C is undefined (see [Hájek,
2003a] p.279). However, the probability of the dart’s landing in C, given that it lands in C is 1. So we have p(C,
given C) = 1 while ratio is undefined.
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Be this as it may – actually, in a subsequent paper, Hájek says: ‘even primitive condi-
tional probabilities give at best an incomplete account’ ([Hájek, 2008] p.7) – it suffices for
our purposes to keep to Hájek’s conclusion on thinking of the ratio formula as a successful
partial analysis and simply concentrate on those cases in which it does work. For we are
interested in evaluating whether or not quantum theory admits a notion of conditional
probability; and the difficulties in defining such a notion are not related to the problems
we have considered in this appendix.
As a final remark note that, even in Hájek’s arguments against the adequacy of the ratio
analysis of conditional probability were directed toward the general ratio p(A∩B)/p(B),
they apply likewise to the ratio p(A)/p(B) for A⊆B which, as we showed in section 2.4,
suffices to characterize conditional probability. Indeed, theorem 2.1 shows that the ratio
p(A)/p(B) for A ⊆ B extends uniquely to the ratio p(A ∩ B)(p(B), and theorem 2.4 is
proved by first showing that additivity with respect to conditioning events holds for A⊆B
and then applying theorem 2.1 for all A and B in F(S).
We give one example of each of the three problems Hájek considers for the ratio p(A)/
p(B) for A⊆B. First, using the dart example of footnote B.2, the probability that A= the
dart lands on the point 1/4, given that B= it lands on either 1/4 or 3/4, where A⊆B, is
one half, and yet the probability that the point lands on 1/4 or 3/4 is zero according to the
uniform measure. Second, in the examples of the probability that A= the Democrats win,
given that B = the Democrats win, A is included in B. And finally, in the more involved
example of the third-case – the probability that A= the dart lies in C given that it B= lies
in C B.3 – A is also included in B.
B.3. The question of A being a subset of B cannot even arise for the simple example – probability thatA=a fair
coin lands heads, given that B= I toss it fairly – since it is not a (genuine) conditional probability (see footnote B.2).
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Appendix C
Proof of theorem 4.2
We prove that the following bi-conditional holds in L(H).
∀P , Q∈L(H)P(P |Q)= Tr(QWQP )
Tr(QWQ)
⇔P(P |Q)= p(P )
p(Q)
forP 6Q (C.1)
This proof mostly follows ([Malley, 2004], pp.13-15) and ([Beltrametti & Cassinelli, 1981],
p.288).
Let us first prove the implication reading from left to right
ifP(P |Q)= Tr(QWQP )
Tr(QWQ)
for allP andQ, thenP(P |Q)= p(P )
p(Q)
forP 6Q (C.2)
Assume that P 6 Q. Then Q P = PQ= P . By the cyclic property of the trace, we have
that Tr(QWQP )=Tr(WQPQ) and hence Tr(QWQP )=Tr(WQQP )=Tr(W QP )=
Tr(WP ) for P 6Q. Introducing these results in the general expression of the Lüders rule
we get
P(P |Q)= Tr(QWQP )
Tr(QWQ)
=
Tr(WP )
Tr(WQ)
=
p(P )
p(Q)
(C.3)
which is the desired result for P 6Q.
Let us now prove the (much more difficult) implication reading from right to left
ifP(P |Q)= p(P )
p(Q)
forP 6Q, then P(P |Q)= Tr(QWQP )
Tr(QWQ)
for allP andQ (C.4)
By Gleason’s theorem, which shows that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the
set of probability measures on L(H) and the set of density operators on H, P( · |Q) must
be of the form Tr(W · ) for some density operator W . We will first show that this density
operator W is unique and then give its expression.
i. Assume there exist two density operators W1 and W2 such that for all P 6 Q
Tr(W1P )=
p(P )
p(Q)
and Tr(W2P )=
p(P )
p(Q)
. Hence Tr(W1Q)=1 and Tr(W2Q)=1. And
so
Tr(W1Q⊥)=Tr(W2Q⊥)= 0 (C.5)
for Q⊥ the orthogonal complement of projector Q.
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Consider now the unit vectors ϕi in the range of projector Q⊥ which are the
eigenvectors of Q⊥. We may express Q⊥ as the sum of the one dimensional pro-
jection operators onto the 1-D subspaces spanned by its eigenvectors. That is,
Q⊥ =
∑
i
Pϕi, where Pϕi = |ϕi〉〈ϕi|. For any density operator W it then follows
Tr(W Q⊥) =
∑
i
Tr(W Pϕi). Given that W is positive (by definition of density
operator) we have that Tr(W |ϕi〉〈ϕi|)= ϕi∗Wϕi> 0 . And hence
Tr(WQ⊥)=
∑
i
ϕi
∗Wϕi (C.6)
where each term in the sum is positive or equal to zero. Now given (B.5) and (B.6)
W 1 ϕi=W2 ϕi=0 (C.7)
for all vectors ϕi in the range of Q⊥.
Next let Pϕ by any 1-D projector in L(H) so that Pϕ = |ϕ〉〈ϕ| for some unit
vector ϕ. Then Tr(W1Pϕ)= 〈ϕ,W1 ϕ〉 and Tr(W2Pϕ)= 〈ϕ,W1 ϕ〉. We can always
uniquely decompose ϕ into ϕ = ϕQ + ϕQ⊥ where ϕQ ∈ {v |v = Q u, u ∈ H} and
ϕQ⊥∈ {v |v= Q⊥u, u∈H}. Consequently, for i=1, 2 we have
Tr(WiPϕ)= 〈ϕ,Wiϕ〉= 〈ϕQ,WiϕQ〉+ 〈ϕQ⊥,WiϕQ⊥〉+2Re 〈ϕQ,WiϕQ⊥〉 (C.8)
But given that by (B.7) WiϕQ⊥ = 0, we have that Tr(Wi Pϕ) = 〈ϕQ, Wi ϕQ〉.
Now 〈ϕQ, Wi ϕQ〉 = |ϕQ|2 Tr(Wi PϕQ), where PϕQ is the projector onto the 1-D
subspace generated by ϕQ. Note that PϕQ commutes with Q so that by assumption
Tr(W1 PϕQ) = Tr(W2 PϕQ). From this it follows that Tr(W1 P ) = Tr(W2 P ) for all
one-dimensional projectors Pf. And hence
Tr[(W1−W2)Pϕ] = 0 (C.9)
As W1 − W2 is a normal operator and a one-dimensional projection operator is
always positive, we can conclude from (C.9) that W1−W2=0, and so W1=W2.
ii. The operatorWQ=
QWQ
Tr(QWQ)
is a density operator, i.e. a trace class operator of unit
trace:
a) WQ is of the trace class: for two general operators A and B, if A is a trace-
class operator and B is a bounded linear operator, then A B and B A are
both in the trace class. Thus, for any density operatorW , the operator QW
is of the trace class as is also the operator QWQ. QWQ divided by the c-
number Tr(QWQ) is also of the trace class.
b) WQ is of trace one: Tr(WQ)=Tr(
QWQ
Tr(QWQ)
)=
Tr(QWQ)
Tr(QWQ)
=1
As we was shown in the first part of the proof,WQ=
QWQ
Tr(QWQ)
is such that p(P |Q)=
Tr(WQP )=
p(P )
p(Q)
forP 6Q. Given that by i. W is unique, it follows that W =WQ.
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Appendix D
Quantum Frequentism
The differences between classical and quantum probabilities stem from the fact that in
quantum mechanics observables are generally represented by non-commutative operators.
Thus a good place to study the peculiarities of quantum mechanics is by looking at
scenarios which involve probabilities for more than a single observable. The experiments
considered in section 4.4 provided one such scenario; correlation experiments provide
another such scenario, and a more appropriate one to consider unconditional probab-
ilities. In correlation experiments one performs simultaneous measurements of pairs of
different physical quantities on a system and studies the relations that hold between the
various single and joint probabilities.
In section D.1, we show that, for the classical case, these relations are well understood
by thinking of these probabilities as having their source in an ensemble of systems with
well-defined properties; that is, as reflecting the distributions of properties of the systems.
In addition to this objective reading of the classical probabilities, one can also provide a
subjective one and hence view the probabilities as reflecting degrees of belief of a rational
agent. Both interpretations turn out to be formally equivalent.
However, in quantum correlation experiments the empirically found (and theoretically
predicted) single and joint frequencies (probabilities) do not generally satisfy the classical
relations. In sections D.2 we show that the quantum probabilities do not, therefore, gener-
ally admit an ensemble representation, and that, thus, their understanding as revealing an
underlying distribution of properties of quantum objects or as subjective degrees of belief
is precluded. Finally, in section D.3, we explore one way in which one might modify the
classical construal of an ensemble interpretation so as to make it a viable interpretation
for the quantum probabilities.
The discussion in this appendix draws heavily on [Pitowsky, 1989] and [Fine, 1986].
D.1 Classical Correlations
We begin our discussion of classical correlations by focusing on the simplest classical cor-
relation experiment (section D.1.1). This experiment involves only two physical quantities
and is thus defined by the probabilities for each of the two individual physical quantities
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and the probability of their joint occurrence. We assume that the probabilities involved
can be thought of as arising from an ensemble of systems with well-defined properties and
study how this view constrains the relations between them.
We then consider a general correlation experiment (section D.1.2). Here we proceed
in reverse manner: we do not suppose that probabilities reflect proportions of properties
and then consider how this constrains the various single and joint probabilities; rather we
consider the different single and joint probabilities of a general correlation experiment as
uninterpreted numbers and ask when these frequencies allow an ensemble representation.
We give a formal answer to this question by means of a theorem that states the conditions
under which they admit (what we will define in mathematical precise terms as) an ensemble
representation. The discussion in these section draws on Pitowsky’s work ‘Quantum Prob-
ability. Quantum Logic’.
D.1.1 A simple example
Consider the typical understanding of probabilities in the simple scenario of an urn filled
with balls. Each ball has a set of different properties: color, material, size, etc. Now
imagine we randomly select one of the balls from the urn. We cannot know for certain what
properties the ball will have, but we can make some assertions as to the probabilities for
those properties to obtain. So if we want to know the probability that a randomly selected
ball is red we simply count the number of red balls in the urn and divide this number
by the total number of balls, i.e. p(red) = Nred
N
. The probabilities thus simply reflect the
distribution of the different properties of the balls in the urn.
If we do not know the values of Nr,Nw,Nr&w and N , then to ascertain the values of the
various probabilities we would need to perform a large number of draws and subsequently
identify the probabilities with the relative frequency of the various results. This experiment
would constitute the simplest case of a correlation experiment since we only consider
the probability of the occurrence of two individual events and probability of their joint
occurrence.
Let us concentrate on two of these properties, namely color and material, each of which
can take only two values: either the ball is red (r) or it is blue (b), and it is either made
out of wood (w) or of plastic (p). Now imagine we randomly select one of the balls from
the urn. As we noted before, we cannot know for certain what properties the ball will have,
but we can make some assertions as to the probabilities that certain properties obtain. The
probabilities are simply given by proportions: the probability for selecting a red ball will be
given by the proportion of red balls in the urn, i.e., pr=
Nr
N
; the probability for selecting a
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wooden ball will be given by the proportion of wooden balls in the urn, i.e., pw=
Nw
N
; the
probability of selecting a ball that is both red and wooden will be given by the proportion
of red wooden balls in the urn pr&w=
Nr&w
N
; and so forth.
Let us consider the relations that obtain between these numbers. First, we know that
the number of red wooden balls must be at most equal to that of red balls (in which
case there are no plastic red balls), and this number is in turn at most equal to the total
number of balls (in which case there are no blue balls). That is, 06Nr&w6Nr6N . So
the following relation between the probabilities must hold (we simply divide by N ):
06 pr&w6 pr6 1 (D.1)
And similarly, the number of red wooden balls must be at most equal to that of wooden
balls (in which case there are no blue wooden balls), and this number is in turn at most
equal to the total number of balls (in which case there are no plastic balls). In symbols,
06Nr&w6Nw6N . So the following relation between the probabilities must hold:
06 pr&w6 pw6 1 (D.2)
Thirdly, the number of balls which are either red or wood (or both) is the number of red
balls plus the number of wooden balls minus the number of red wooden balls (in order
to not count the red wooden balls twice). In symbols, Nr orw = Nr + Nw − Nr&w. Now
the number of balls that are either red or wooden is at most equal to the total number of
balls (in which case there are no blue plastic balls) so the following inequality must hold:
Nr+Nw−Nr&w6N . Translating this into probabilities:
pr+ pw− pr&w6 1 (D.3)
We have derived these three inequalities by considering a priori constraints on proportions
of properties. That is, we have shown that if the probabilities pr, pw, pr&w reflect propor-
tions of well-defined properties of the balls in the urn then they must satisfy inequalities
(D.1)-(D.3). It turns out these three inequalities are not only necessary for the numbers pr,
pw, pr&w to represent proportions of properties but also sufficient.D.1 That is, inequalities
(D.1)-(D.3) are both necessary and sufficient for the numbers pr, pw, pr&w to represent
probabilities of two events and their joint respectively when these have their source in an
urn filled with balls with well-defined properties. Hence if in a correlation experiment the
probabilities of two events and their joint do not satisfy these inequalities, their under-
standing as reflecting proportions of properties will be forbidden. As we will see in section
D.2, this is precisely what happens for the quantum probabilities.
D.1. The references to this and similar results are given in the following section.
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We can also analyze the correlation experiment from a subjective Bayesian point of
view. Call r the proposition that the selected ball is red and w the proposition that the
selected ball is wooden, and consider the four different possibilities for the draw of the ball:
1. a blue plastic ball is drawn, in which case both r and w are false (so r&w is false)
2. a red plastic ball is drawn, in which case r is true and w is false (so r&w is false)
3. a blue wooden ball is drawn, in which case r is false and w is true (so r&w is false)
4. a red wooden ball is drawn, in which case both r and w are true (so r&w is true)
We are asked to place bets on these four different possibilities. We denote by q1 our
degree of belief in the first case, by q2 our degree of belief in the second case and so forth.
Given that our degrees of belief ought to be coherent and that these four possibilities
are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive, these degrees of belief must add to 1, that
is q1 + q2 + q3 + q4 = 1. Our degrees of belief in propositions r, w and r&w can then be
expressed in terms of the previous qi’s as follows: given that proposition r is true in the
second and the fourth case, we have pr = q2+ q4; given that proposition w is true in the
third and the fourth case, we have pw = q3 + q4; and given that proposition r&w is true
only in the fourth case, we have pr&w= q4.
Let us express this result in the formal language of vectors. We can represent the
numbers pr, pw, pr&w as the components of a vector in R3, namely (pr, pw, pr&w) and
write the relation of these pi’s to the qi’s as (pr, pw, pr&w) = (q2+ q4, q3+ q4, q4). This is
equivalent to writing (pr, pw, pr&w) as the following sum: (pr, pw, pr&w)= q1 (0,0,0)+ q2(1,
0, 0) + q3(0, 1, 0) + q4(1, 1, 1) which, given that q1+ q2+ q3+ q4= 1, is simply the convex
sumD.2 or weighted average of the four previous vectors. Letting 1 stand for ‘true’ and
0 stand for ‘false’, these vectors can be interpreted as the truth values assigned to the
propositions r,w and r&w in the four possible cases: (0, 0, 0) corresponds to the first case
wherein r,w and r&w are all false; (1,0,0) corresponds to the second case wherein r is true
but both w and r&w are false; and so forth. Hence if pr, pw, pr&w represent our degrees
of belief in two propositions and their conjunction then they will be expressed as a convex
combination of all truth value assignments.
Now it turns out that the set of vectors (pr, pw, pr&w) which can be expressed as a
convex sum of the vectors (0, 0, 0), (1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0) and (1, 1, 1) is equivalent to the set of
vectors (pr, pw, pr&w) whose components pr, pw, pr&w satisfy inequalities (D.1)-(D.3). That
is, pr, pw, pr&w satisfy the inequalities (D.1)-(D.3) if and only if (pr, pw, pr&w) = q1 (0, 0,
0) + q2(1, 0, 0) + q3(0, 1, 0) + q4(1, 1, 1), where
∑
i=1
4
qi = 1. Hence the numbers pr, pw,
pr&w of our correlation experiment can only represent degrees of belief of a rational agent
D.2. By definition a convex sum of vectors {v1,  , vn} is another vector v =
∑
i=1
n
λi vi such that ∀i, λi ∈R
and
∑
i=1
n
λi=1.
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in two propositions and their conjunction or proportions of two properties and their joint
in a given sample if they satisfy inequalities (D.1)-(D.3) or, equivalently, if they can be
expressed as the convex sum of vectors (0, 0, 0), (1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0) and (1, 1, 1).
To conclude, we have considered two different understandings of the probabilities in our
simple correlation experiment: an objective reading that regards probabilities as reflecting
distributions of properties and a subjective reading that views them as reflecting degrees
of belief of a rational agent. Both of these readings have been grounded in thinking of the
ensemble of balls in the urn as their source. We have also seen how both interpretations
are formally equivalent: the objective view leads to constraints on the probabilities in
terms of linear inequalities while the subjective view leads to constraints as convex sums
of certain vectors, where both constraints are mathematically equivalent. We turn now to
generalizing our previous results for a general correlation experiment.
D.1.2 General Correlation Polytopes & Ensemble Representations
The structure of this section is as follows: we first present the general way of talking about
the single and joint probabilities in a general correlation experiment, then we define what it
is to give an ensemble or classical representation for these probabilities and last we consider
the conditions under which this representation can be given.
Let us first name the various single and joint probabilities of a general correlation
experiment. Let N be a non-empty subset of the set of pairs of numbers (i, j) such that
for a given n> 2, 16 i< j6n. That is N ⊆{(i, j): 16 i< j6n}. To give some examples,
− for n=2: N ⊆{(1, 2)}
− for n=3: N ⊆{(1, 2), (1, 3), (2, 3)}
− for n=4: N ⊆{(1, 2), (1, 3), (1, 4), (2, 3), (2, 4), (3, 4)}
We denote by |N | the cardinality of N , that is, the number of elements of N . Note that
N is a subset of {(i, j)} so it does not necessarily contain all the possible pairs.
We are given n+ |N | numbers as follows:
− pi i=1, , n
− pij (i, j)∈N
These numbers are intended to represent the single and joint probabilities of the different
quantities involved in a correlation experiment. We give some particular instances:
− for n=2, are given 2+1 numbers, namely p1, p2, p12.
− for n=3 and N = {(1, 2), (1, 3), (2, 3)}, are given 3+ 3 numbers, namely p1, p2, p3,
p12, p13, p23.
− for n=4 and N = {(1, 3), (1, 4), (2, 3), (2, 4)}, are given 4+ 4 numbers, namely p1,
p2, p3, p4, p132, p14, p23, p24.
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We can think of these numbers as determining an (n+ |N |)-tuple which we denote (p1, ,
pn, .pij .) where the pij are ordered by their indices ij ordered lexicographically. Each
of these tuples defines a correlation experiment.
One formally defines what it means to give an ensemble representation of the p1,  ,
pn, .pij numbers as follows.D.3
Definition D.1. Ensemble Representation. The (n+ |N |)-tuple (p1, , pn, , pij , )
admits an ensemble or classical space representation if
i. there exists a probability space 〈S,F(S), p〉.
ii. there exist (not necessarily distinct) sets A1, , An∈Σ such that for all i∈{1,2, ,
n} and all (i, j)∈N we have
pi= µ(Ai) and pij= µ(Ai∩Aj) (D.4)
Let us now consider the conditions under which the (n + |N |)-tuple (p1,  , pn, ..pij )
admits an ensemble representation. To give an answer we will first need to introduce the
notion of a classical correlation polytope. And to do so at this level of generality we again
need to introduce some more notation. Let {0,1}n denote the set of all n-tuples of 0’s and
1’s. To give some particular cases:
− for n=2, {0, 1}2= {(1, 1), (1, 0), (0, 1), (0, 0)}
− for n=3, {0,1}3= {(1,1,1), (1,1,0), (1,0,1), (0,1,1), (1,0,0), (0,1,0), (0, 0,1), (0,0,
0)}
The cardinality of {0, 1}n is 2n. Now denote by ε any such n-tuple. That is, ε ∈ {0,
1}n, which we can write as ε = (ε1,  , εn) where the εi can be either a 0 or a 1. Clearly
there are 2n possible ε’s. With this notation we can express the (n + |N |)-tuple (p1,  ,
pn, .pij .)when the pi’s and pij’s take only values 0 or 1 as pε=(ε1, , εn, , εi εj , ),
where the term εi εj appears only if (i, j)∈N . For example,
− for n=2 and N = {(1,2)} there are 22 possible ε’s: (1,1), (1,0), (0,1) and (0,0), and
the 4 corresponding pε=(ε1, ε2, ε12)’s are:
p(1,1)=(1, 1, 1) p(1,0)=(1, 0, 0) p(0,1)=(0, 1, 0) p(1,1)=(0, 0, 0)
− for n=3 and N ={(1,2), (2,3)}, the pε’s take th form pε=(ε1, ε2, ε3, ε12, ε23), which
for a particular ε, say ε=(1, 1, 0), yields the tuple p(1,1,0)=(1, 1, 0, 1, 0).
The classical correlation polytope c(n, N ) is the set of all n + |N | vectors that can be
expressed as a convex or weighted sums of the 2n vectors of the form pε, where ε∈{0,1}n.
D.3. One can show that definition 8.1 of a classical space representation is equivalent to a deterministic hidden
variable model that explicitly constructs observables as random variables over a classical probability space, i.e. the
space of hidden variables. For a proof in a simple case see [Malament,1], pp.7-9. See also [Fine,1982a], p.165.
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Definition D.2. Convex Polytope. c(n, N) is the closed, convex polytope in R(n+|N |)
whose vertices are the 2n vectors of the form pε, where ε∈{0, 1}n.
This characterizes the polytope as the convex hull of its vertices. Thus a given vector
(p1,  , pn, ..pij ) is an element of the polytope if and only if it can be expressed as a
convex combination of the vertices pε. Consider the n= 2 case where N = {(1, 2)}. The
polytope c(2,N ) is the set of all vectors (p1, p2, p12) that can be expressed as a convex sum
of p(1,1)=(1, 1, 1), p(1,0)=(1, 0, 0), p(0,1)=(0, 1, 0) and p(1,1)=(0, 0, 0). So a given vector
(p1, p2, p12) is an element of the polytope c(2, N) if and only if it can be expressed as a
convex combination of the vertices (1, 1, 1), (1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0) and (0, 0, 0).
Now every convex polytope in R(n+|N |) has another description. Under this second
description a vector is an element of the polytope if and only if its coordinates satisfy a set of
linear inequalities which represent the supporting hyperplanes of the polytope. However the
characterization of the general correlation polytope as the set of vectors whose components
satisfy a particular set of linear inequalities turns out to be extremely complex (in fact it
is practically impossible since it would require too much, i.e. exponential, timeD.4). In the
simple case of c(2,N) the vector (p1, p2, p12) belongs to c(2,N ) if and only if the following
inequalities hold:D.5
06 p126 p16 1
06 p126 p26 1
p1+ p2− p126 1 (D.5)
This set of inequalities correspond to the inequalities (D.1)-(D.3). We will also give the
inequalities that characterize two other important polytopes in sections D.1.3 and D.1.4.
We are now ready to answer the main question of this section, namely when does the
(n+ |N |)-tuple (p1,  , pn,  .pij .) admit an ensemble representation? We motivate the
answer by reasoning on the c(2,N ) case of the previous section.
Recall that (pr, pw, pr&w) can be seen as representing proportions of two properties and
their joint in a given sample only if these numbers satisfy inequalities (D.1)-(D.3). And
that they can be seen as the degrees of belief of a rational agent on two propositions and
their conjunction only if (pr, pw, pr&w) can be expressed as the convex sum of the vectors
(1,1,1), (1,0,0), (0,1,0) and (0,0,0). Now inequalities (D.1)-(D.3) and the convex sum of
vectors (1, 1, 1), (1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0) and (0, 0, 0) are precisely the two ways of characterizing
the polytope c(2,N); and giving an ensemble representation for pr, pw, pr&w is what allows
their reading as proportions of properties or as degrees of belief. Thus we see that (pr, pw,
pr&w) admits an ensemble representation only if it belongs to the polytope c(2, N).
D.4. See [Pitowsky, 1989], pp.33-46 for an account of the intractability of this problem.
D.5. For a proof see [Pitowsky, 1989], p. 24 or [Malament, 1], p.5.
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It turns out that this result holds generally as the following theorem states:D.6
Theorem D.1. For all n and N, the (n + |N |)-tuple (p1,  , pn,  .pij .) admits an
ensemble representation if and only if it belongs to the polytope c(n,N ).
We now focus on two particular polytopes which will be important for our discussion
of the quantum probabilities.
D.1.3 The Bell-Wigner polytope
Let n=3 and N = {(1, 2), (1, 3), (2, 3)}. Theorem D.1 tells us that a vector (p1, p2, p3, p12,
p13, p23) admits a classical representation if an only if it belongs to the the polytope c(3,
N ). This is the so-called Bell-Wigner polytope. Let us see the two characterizations of
this polytope.
a) As a convex sum of its vertices: c(3,N ) is the closed, convex polytope in R6 whose
vertices are the 23 vectors of the form pε = (ε1, ε2, ε3, ε12, ε13, ε23), where ε ∈ {0,
1}3= {(1, 1, 1), (1, 1, 0), (1, 0, 1), (0, 1, 1), (1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1), (0, 0, 0)}
Thus a vector (p1, p2, p3, p12, p13, p23) belongs to the polytope c(3,N ) if and only
if it can be expressed as a convex sum of the following eight pε’s:
(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0), (1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0), (1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0), (1, 0, 1,
0, 1, 0), (0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1), (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1) (D.6)
b) In terms of linear inequalitiesD.7: a vector (p1, p2, p3, p12, p13, p23) belongs to the
Bell-Wigner polytope c(3, N) if and only if for all i, j ∈{1, 2, 3} and (i, j)∈R,
06 pij6 pi6 1
06 pij6 pj6 1
pi+ pj− pij6 1
p1+ p2+ p3− p12− p13− p236 1
p1− p12− p13+ p23> 0
p2− p12− p23+ p13> 0
p3− p13− p23+ p12> 0 (D.7)
The last 4 inequalities go by the name of the ‘Bell inequalities’ and as we shall see
in section D.2.2 they are violated by the quantum probabilities.
Thus the vector (p1, p2, p3, p12, p13, p23) admits an ensemble representation if and only if it
can be expressed as a convex sum of the eight vectors in (8.8) or if its components satisfy
the inequalities (8.9).
D.6. For a proof see [Pitowsky, 1989], p.23 or [Malament, 1], pp.2-3.
D.7. For a proof see [Pitowsky, 1989], pp.25-27 or [Malament, 1], pp.5-6.
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We could have arrived at this same result by the same route that we used in section
D.1.1 First consider the subjective view on probability and how it leads naturally to a
description of the correlation polytope c(3, N ) in terms of its vertices. Consider three
propositions a1, a2, a3 and their possible three conjunctions a1&a2, a1&a3, a2&a3. In terms
of our urn experiment we can think of a1 as the proposition that the selected ball is red,
a2 as the proposition that the selected ball is wooden, and a3 as the proposition that the
selected ball is small, where there are only two sizes (small or large).
There are eight possible cases when a ball is drawn: 1) a big blue plastic ball is drawn,
in which case a1, a2, a3 and all the possible conjunctions are false; 2) a big red plastic ball
is drawn, in which case a1 is true but a2 anda3 and all the possible conjunctions are false;
3) a big blue wooden ball is drawn, in which case a2 is true and a1, a3 and all the possible
conjunctions are false; 4) a small blue plastic ball is drawn, in which case a3 is true and
a1, a2 and all the possible conjunctions are false; 5) a big red wooden ball is drawn, in
which case a1, a2, a1&a2 are true and a3, a1&a3, a2&a3 are false; 6) a small red plastic ball
is drawn, in which case a1, a3, a1&a3 are true and a2, a1&a2, a2&a3 are false; 7) a small
blue wooden ball is drawn, in which case a2, a3, a2&a3 are true and a1, a1&a2, a1&a3 are
false; and 8) a small red wooden ball is drawn, in which case a1, a2, a3 and all the possible
conjunctions are true. These eight possible truth value assignments are exactly what the
vectors in equation (8.8) correspond to.
Now we are asked to place bets on these eight different possibilities. We denote by qi
our degree of belief in the i case, with i=1, ,8. Given that our degrees of belief ought to
be coherent and that these eight possibilities are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive,
we have that
∑
i=1
8
qi= 1. We can then express our degrees of belief in propositions a1,
a2, a3, a1&a2, a1&a3, a2&a3, namely p1, p2, p3, p12, p13, p23, in terms of these qi’s. This will
result in expressing (p1, p2, p3, p12, p13, p23) as the convex sum of the vectors in (8.8). Thus
if (p1, p2, p3, p12, p13, p23) are to be regarded as coherent degrees of belief then they must
belong the Bell-Wigner polytope. And the converse also holds true.
The frequency view is most naturally connected to the description of the correlation
polytope in terms of linear inequalities. Consider three events with probabilities p1, p2, p3
and the joints p12, p13, p23. In terms of our urn example we can think of p1 as expressing
the proportion of red balls, p2 that of wooden balls, p3 that of small balls, p12 that of red
wooden balls, p13 that of small red balls, and p23 that of small wooden balls. Just as in
our urn example, each pair out of the three events must satisfy the inequalities for pair of
events and their joint. So we have for 16 i < j6 3:
06 pij6 pi6 1 06 pij6 pj6 1 pi+ pj− pij6 1 (D.8)
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Now these inequalities are not sufficient for the numbers p1, p2, p3, p12, p13, p23 to represent
proportions of properties; we have to add some constraints on all three events and not just
pairs. First, we know that the number of balls which are either red or wood or small is
the number of red balls, plus the number of wooden balls, plus the number of small balls,
minus the number of red wooden balls, minus the number of small red balls and minus the
number of small wooden balls. In symbols, N1 or2 or3=N1+N2+N3−N12−N13−N23.
Now the number of balls that are either red or wooden or small is at most equal to the
total number of balls (in which case there are no big blue plastic balls) so the following
inequality must hold:
p1+ p2+ p3− p12− p13− p236 1 (D.9)
We also know that the number of balls which are either not red (so blue) or wood or small
is the number of blue balls (N¬1 = N − N1), plus the number of wooden balls, plus the
number of small balls, minus the number of blue wooden balls (N¬12=N2−N12), minus the
number of small blue balls (N¬13=N3−N13) and minus the number of small wooden balls.
In symbols, N¬1 or2 or3=N¬1+N2+N3−N¬12−N¬13−N23=N −N1+N12+N13−N23.
Now again the number of balls that are either blue or wooden or small is at most equal to
the total number of balls so the following inequality must hold:
p1− p12− p13+ p23> 0 (D.10)
By considering that the number of balls which are red or plastic or small is at most equal
to the total number of balls, and that the number of balls which are red or wooden or big is
at most equal to the total number of balls we deduce the remaining two inequalities, namely
p2− p12− p23+ p13> 0 p3− p13− p23+ p12> 0 (D.11)
D.1.4 The Clauser-Horne polytope
Let n=4 and N ={(1,3), (1,4), (2,3), (2,4)}. Theorem D.1 tells us that a vector (p1, p2, p3,
p4, p13, p14, p23, p24) admits a classical representation if an only if it belongs to the polytope
c(4,N). This is the so-called Clauser-Horne polytope. We won’t characterize this polytope
in terms of its vertices (which by now is straightforward), but will give its characterization
in terms of inequalities. A vector (p1, p2, p3, p4, p13, p14, p23, p24) belongs to c(4, N ) if and
only if for all i, j ∈{1, 2, 3} and (i, j)∈N ,D.8
06 pij6 pi6 1
06 pij6 pj6 1
pi+ pj − pij6 1
− 16 p13+ p14+ p24− p23− p1− p46 0
D.8. For a proof see [Pitowsky, 1989], pp.28-30 or [Malament, 1], pp.6-8.
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− 16 p23+ p24+ p14− p13− p2− p46 0
− 16 p14+ p13+ p23− p24− p1− p36 0
− 16 p24+ p23+ p13− p14− p2− p36 0 (D.12)
The last 4 inequalities go by the name of the ‘Clauser-Horne inequalities’ and as we shall
see in section D.2.1 they are violated by the quantum probabilities.
Following the procedure of the previous section we could deduce these inequalities by
assuming that the probabilities represent proportions or relative frequencies. Similarly, we
can also deduce the representation of c(4,N ) in terms of its vertices by assuming that the
probabilities represent degrees of belief on four propositions and their conjunctions.
To conclude, the probabilities p1,  , pn,  pij  of a general correlation experiment
can only represent proportions of single properties and their joints in a given sample or
the degrees of belief of a rational agent on various propositions and their conjunctions
if the vector (p1,  , pn,  pij ) belongs to the polytope c(n, N). The frequency view is
most naturally connected to the description of the correlation polytope in terms of linear
inequalities while the subjective view leads naturally to a description of the correlation
polytopes in terms of its vertices. But both views lead to the same set of constraints on
correlations.
D.2 Quantum Correlations
In this section we consider several quantum correlation experiments and show how in many
cases the quantum probabilities do not admit an ensemble representation. We begin in
section D.2.1 by considering a correlation experiment involving the measurement of spin on
a two-electron system in four different directions. We show that for certain directions the
single and joint probabilities of this experiment violate the Clauser-Horne inequalities, thus
posing difficulties for their interpretation. In section D.2.2 we briefly consider a quantum
correlation experiment involving three physical quantities and how for certain situations
this leads to violations of the Bell inequalities.
D.2.1 Violations of the Clauser-Horne inequalities
Consider the following experiment performed on a composite system of two electrons which
briefly interact and then become widely separated in space. When a pair is emitted the two
electrons travel in opposite directions ‘left’ and ‘right’. On each particle we perform one
of two incompatible measurements: we measure the spin of the left electron either in the
x direction (Sx) or in the y direction (Sy); and we measure the spin of the right electron
either in the z direction (Sz) or in the w direction (Sw). Measurements on the pair are
made simultaneously.
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The quantum mechanical analysis of this experimental situation determines the prob-
abilities for any measurement outcome for each observable separately and the joint probab-
ilities for any pair of outcomes in a simultaneous measurement of either Sx or Sy on
the left electron with either Sz or Sw on the right electron. These probabilistic predic-
tions are in accordance with the experimental results, where these probabilities can be
interpreted as physical values or measurement results. Let us consider this analysis.
Quantum mechanics describes the space of the spin states of each individual electron
by a two-dimensional Hilbert space H. We denote by Sx the operator corresponding to a
measurement of the spin of the electron in the x direction which has (normalized) eigen-
states ψ+x and ψ−x corresponding to ‘spin up’ and ‘spin down’ in the x direction. P+x and
P−x are the projection operators on the one-dimensional subspaces spanned by ψ+x and
ψ−x respectively; by the spectral theorem we have Sx=
1
2
(P+x − P−x). Analogue results
hold for Sy, Sz and Sw corresponding to measurement of spin in the y, z and w direction
respectively. Taking spherical coordinates (r, θ, φ) in physical space, the following relations
hold between the eigenvectors corresponding to the spin in the z = (1, 0, 0) direction Sz
and those corresponding to the spin in a general u=(1, θ, φ) direction Su:
ψ+u= cos(
θ
2
)e
− iφ
2 ψ+z+ sin(
θ
2
)e
iφ
2 ψ−z
ψ−u=− sin(θ
2
)e
− iφ
2 ψ+z+ cos(
θ
2
)e
iφ
2 ψ−z (D.13)
The space of spin states of a two-electron system is described by the tensor product
of the Hilbert spaces of each individual electron, i.e., H(L)⊗H(R). We shall perform our
experiment on electron pairs in the so-called singlet state; this state corresponds to a state
of total spin zero and is expressed as:
ψS=
1
2
√ [ψ+ξ⊗ ψ−ξ− ψ−ξ⊗ ψ+ξ] (D.14)
for an arbitrary direction ξ. We denote byWS the corresponding density operator which is
simply the projection operator in H(L)⊗H(R) onto the one-dimensional subspace spanned
by ψS, i.e., WS=PψS.
We are interested in calculating the probabilities of certain ‘properties’ of the two-
electron system:
− single probabilities: for the left electron to have spin up in the x direction (p1); for
the left electron to have spin up in the y direction (p2); for the right electron to
have spin up in the z direction (p3); and for the right electron to have spin up in
the w direction (p4).
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− joint probabilities: for the left electron to have spin up in the x direction and the
right electron to have spin up in the z direction (p13); for the left electron to have
spin up in the x direction and the right electron to have spin up in the w direction
(p14); for the left electron to have spin up in the y direction and the right electron
to have spin up in the z direction (p23); and for the left electron to have spin up in
the y direction and the right electron to have spin up in the w direction (p24).
Note that this situation corresponds to setting n= 4 and N = {(1, 3), (1, 4), (2, 3), (2, 4)}
in the formal description of correlation experiments. These single and joint probabilities
are given by quantum probability theory as:
pi=Tr(WSPi)
pij=Tr[WS (Pi∧Pj)] (D.15)
In order to proceed to their calculation we first need to identify the projection operators
Pi on H(L) ⊗H(R) that correspond to the ‘properties’ we are interested in. Consider the
projector associated with the left electron having spin up in the x direction: for the left
electron the projection operator is simply P+x, defined on H(L); given that we are not
considering any property of the right electron we may identify the projection operator
on H(R) with the identity, which can be expressed as P+x∨P−x. Hence, the projector on
H(L)⊗H(R) corresponding to the left electron having spin up in the x direction is
P1=(P+x⊗P+x)∨ (P+x⊗P−x) (D.16)
Similarly, the projector corresponding to the left electron having spin up in the y direction
is:
P2=(P+y⊗P+y)∨ (P+y⊗P−y) (D.17)
the projector corresponding to the right electron having spin up in the z direction is:
P3=(P−z⊗P+z)∨ (P+z⊗P+z) (D.18)
and the projector corresponding to the right electron having spin up in the w direction is:
P4=(P−w⊗P+w)∨ (P+w⊗P+w) (D.19)
Let us now identify the projections corresponding to the joint properties of the composite
system, namely
P1∧P3=P+x⊗P+z corresponds to the left electron having spin up in the x direction
and the right electron to have spin up in the z direction,
P1∧P4=P+x⊗P+w corresponds to the left electron having spin up in the x direction
and the right electron to have spin up in the w direction,
P2∧P3=P+y⊗P+z corresponds to the left electron having spin up in the y direction
and the right electron to have spin up in the z direction, and
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P2∧P4=P+y⊗P+w corresponds to the left electron having spin up in the y direction
and the right electron to have spin up in the w direction.
Note that the spin observables for the left electron commute with those of the right
electron, i.e., [P1, P3]= [P1,P4]= [P2, P3]= [P2, P4]=0, so that all the joint probabilities we
are considering correspond to well-defined measurements. Also note that the spin observ-
ables for each particle are incompatible, i.e., [P1, P2] 0 and [P3, P4] 0.
We are now ready to calculate the various probabilities predicted by quantum theory
for this correlation experiment. For the single probabilities pi=Tr(WSPi) the calculation
yields:D.9
p1= p2= p3= p4=
1
2
(D.20)
We can calculate the joint probability p13=Tr(WS (P1∧P3) as |〈ψ+x⊗ψ+z |ψS〉|2. Taking
spherical coordinates (r, θ, φ) in physical space with z=(1, 0, 0) and u= x=(1, θ, φ),
ψ+x= e
iϕ
2 cos(
θ
2
)ψ+z+ e
− iϕ
2 sin(
θ
2
)ψ−z (D.21)
where θ=xz , which yields:D.10
p13=
1
2
sin2(
xz
2
) (D.22)
Similarly,
p14=
1
2
sin2(
xw
2
); p23=
1
2
sin2(
yz
2
); p24=
1
2
sin2(
yw
2
) (D.23)
This concludes the calculation of the single and joint probabilities for this quantum correl-
ation experiment. We can now easily show that for certain choices of x, y, z, w the vector
p=(p1, p2, p3, p4, p13, p14, p23, p24) does not belong to the correlation polytope c(4,N ). Set
for example xz =xw = yw = 120◦ and z= y so that yz =0◦. Substituting these values in
equations (D.20)-(D.23) yields the following values p=(1
2
,
1
2
,
1
2
,
1
2
,
3
8
,
3
8
, 0,
3
8
). Given that
p13+ p14+ p24− p23− p1− p4= 1
8
> 0 (D.24)
these probabilities do not satisfy one of the Clauser-Horne inequalities (D.12), namely
− 16 p13+ p14+ p24− p23− p1− p46 0 (D.25)
The maximal violations of the Clauser-Horne inequalities occur for xz = xw = yz = 135◦
and yw = 45◦.
D.9. p1 = |〈ψ+x ⊗ ψ+x ∨ ψ+x ⊗ ψ−x|ψS〉|2 = 12 |〈ψ+x ⊗ ψ+x ∨ ψ+x ⊗ ψ−x|ψ+x ⊗ ψ−x − ψ−x ⊗ ψ+x〉|2 =
1
2
|〈ψ+x⊗ ψ−x|ψ+x⊗ ψ−x〉|2= 12 . Similarly for p2, p3, p4.
D.10. p13= |〈ψ+x⊗ψ+z|ψS〉|2= |〈ψ+x⊗ψ+z| 1
2
√ [ψ+z⊗ψ−z−ψ−z⊗ψ+z]〉|2= 12 |〈ψ+x⊗ψ+z |ψ+z⊗ψ−z〉|2+
1
2
|〈ψ+x⊗ ψ+z |ψ−z⊗ ψ+z]〉|2=0+ 12 |〈ψx|ψ−z〉|2=
1
2
|〈e
iϕ
2 cos(
θ
2
)ψ+z+ e
− iϕ
2 sin(
θ
2
)ψ−z |ψ−z〉|2= 12 sin2(
θ
2
)
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Now as we showed in section D.1.4, p = (p1, p2, p3, p4, p13, p14, p23, p24) admits an
ensemble representation if and only if it satisfies equations (D.12). Hence the quantum
probabilities of this correlation experiment cannot be given an ensemble representation.
That is, they cannot be given an objective reading in terms of frequencies or proportions
of properties nor a subjective reading in terms of degrees of belief, both if the events are
interpreted as physical values or measurement results.
D.2.2 Violations of the Bell Inequalities
We now show how the quantum probabilities also violate the Bell Inequalities. The exper-
imental situation is similar to the one in the previous section, but now we consider the
following projections on H(L)⊗H(R) for three direction x, y, z:
P1=(P+x⊗P+x)∨ (P+x⊗P−x) (D.26)
the projector corresponding to the left electron having spin up in the x direction,
P2=(P+y⊗P+y)∨ (P+y⊗P−y)∨ (P−y⊗P−y) (D.27)
the projector corresponding to the left electron having spin up in the y direction or the
right electron having spin down in the y direction, and
P3=(P−z⊗P−z)∨ (P+z⊗P−z) (D.28)
the projector corresponding to the right electron having spin down (not up as before) in
the z direction. The projections corresponding to the joint properties of the composite
system are:
P1∧P2=P+x⊗P−y
P1∧P3=P+x⊗P−z
P2∧P3=P+y⊗P−z (D.29)
As before we perform this experiment on an electron pair system in the singlet state, so
the quantum probabilities are given by equation (D.15). Similarly we find:
p1= p2= p3=
1
2
(D.30)
p12=
1
2
cos2(
xy
2
); p13=
1
2
cos2(
xz
2
); p23=
1
2
cos2(
yz
2
) (D.31)
We can now easily show that for certain choices of x, y, z the vector p=(p1, p2, p3, p12, p13,
p23) does not belong to the correlation polytope c(3,N), with N ={(1,2), (1,3), (2,3)}. Set
for example xy =xz = yz = 120◦. Substituting these values in equations (8.29) and (8.30)
yields the following values p=(1
2
,
1
2
,
1
2
,
1
8
,
1
8
,
1
8
). Given that
p1+ p2+ p3− p12− p13− p23= 9
8
> 1 (D.32)
these probabilities do not satisfy one of the Bell inequalities (D.7), namely
p1+ p2+ p3− p12− p13− p236 1 (D.33)
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D.3 Modifying the Ensemble Interpretation
In this section we briefly explore one way in which one might modify the classical construal
of an ensemble interpretation so as to make it a viable interpretation for the quantum
probabilities. It is provided by Fine’s ‘prism models’ [Fine, 1986].
To discuss this issue we focus on the Clauser-Horne case. Fine considers a general
version of this correlation experiment. As before we perform the experiment on a composite
system of two particles, call them α and β, which briefly interact and then become widely
separated in space. Let ψ denote the state function of this coupled system. On each particle
we perform one of two incompatible measurements: we can measure either A or A′ on α,
and either B or B ′ on β. Each of these observables has only two possible values: a1 or a2
for A , a1
′ or a2′ for A′, b1 or b2 for B and b1′ or b2′ B ′. Observable A commutes with B and
B ′, as does A′. Measurements on the pair are made simultaneously.
The quantum mechanical analysis of this experimental situation determines the prob-
abilities for any measurement outcome for each observable separately and the joint probab-
ilities for any pair of outcomes in a simultaneous measurement of A or A′ with either
B or B ′. For example, for the composite system in state ψ quantum mechanics determ-
ines the following single probabilities pψ(a1), pψ(a1
′ ), pψ(b1), pψ(b1′ ) and the following
joint probabilities pψ(a1&b1), pψ(a1&b1
′ ), pψ(a1′&b1), pψ(a1′&b1′ ).D.11 The question again
is whether these quantum probabilities can be seen as arising from an ensemble of two-
particle systems all prepared in state ψ.
We know from our previous section that one can give an ensemble representation for
AA′ BB ′ in state ψ if and only if the Clauser-Horne inequalities are satisfied in state
ψ. Fine shows that in this situation of correlated systems the existence of an ensemble
representation is fully equivalent to the existence of a well-defined joint distribution for the
incompatible observables of each particle. That is, there exists an ensemble interpretation
only if one can interpolate a well-defined joint distribution for the incompatible observables
(the AA′&BB ′ pair) among the given quantum distributions for the compatible ones (the
AB pairs). The following theorem states this result:D.12
D.11. In terms of our previous notation we have: p1 = p
ψ(a1), p2 = p
ψ(a1
′ ), p3 = pψ(b1), p4 = pψ(b1′ ),
p13 = p
ψ(a1 &b1), p14 = p
ψ(a1 &b1
′ ), p23 = pψ(a1′&b1), p24 = pψ(a1′&b1′ ). Note that it is enough to consider the
single and joint probabilities for one of the outcomes of the observables, say, a1, a1
′ , b1, b1′ , for we can calculate
the probabilities for the rest of the outcomes form these: (i) we can calculate the rest of the single probability
distributions p(a2),p(a2
′ ),p(b2) and p(b2′ ). For example, p(a2) is simply p(a2) = 1− p(a1); (ii) we can calculate the
various joints. For example, given that p(a1)= p(a1b1)+ p(a1b2) we get p(a1b2)= p(a1)− p(a1b1). And analogously
for p(a1b2
′ ), p(a1′b2) and p(a1′b2′ ); Also, given that p(b1) = p(a1b1) + p(a2b1) we get p(a2b1) = p(b1) − p(a1b1).
And analogously for p(a2b1
′ ), p(a2′b1) and p(a2′b1′ ); and finally we can calculate, say, p(a2b2) since we know that
p(a1b1) + p(a1b2)+ p(a2b1)+ p(a2b2) = 1. Analogously for p(a2b2
′ ), p(a2′b2) and p(a2′b2′ ).
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Theorem D.2. There exists an ensemble representation for the observables AA′BB ′ in
state ψ if and only if there is a well-defined distribution for BB ′ (relative toAA′).
There is a well-defined distribution for B andB ′ (relative to A and A′) in state ψ if
i. there exists a joint distribution for ABB ′ that returns as marginals the quantum
mechanical distributions for AB and for AB ′ and analogously for A′BB ′.
ii. Each of these distributions p(A′BB ′) and p(A′BB ′) returns one and the same joint
distribution for BB ′
Hence we can conclude that an ensemble representation can be given, or, equivalently, the
Clauser-Horne inequalities are satisfied for AA′BB ′ in ψ, if and only if there exists this
well-defined joint distribution for BB ′ and AA′ in state ψ. Thus, if the Clauser-Horne
inequalities are violated, there is no joint distribution for BB ′ and AA′.
The problem in giving an ensemble representation thus appears when we consider a
unique probability function defined over an ensemble of systems in which all four observ-
ables AA′BB ′ together take determinate pre-measurement values. For it is then that we
cannot ignore the incompatibility between the values given for the BB ′ correlations by the
ABB ′ distribution and those given by the A′BB ′ distribution. Hence if one could somehow
get rid of this incompatibility then the quantum statistics might be understood as having
their source in an ‘urn’ of systems with well-defined properties.
Fine presents a clever way of avoiding this incompatibility which he puts to work in
his ‘Prism Models’.D.13 We considered this possibility in section 8.2.2.
D.12. See [Fine, 1986] p.44, or [Fine, 1982b], p.292, Proposition 1.
D.13. See [Fine, 1986], pp. 51-57 and references therein.
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Appendix E
The Mass-Energy ‘Equivalence’
In the passage cited in section 9.5, when comparing classical and relativistic mass, Kuhn
writes that Newtonian mass is conserved while Einsteinian is convertible with energy. Both
these claims are incorrect. First, as we saw in section 9.3, proper mass m, like classical
mass, is a conserved quantity. Indeed, given that E and p are conserved and together
determine m by equation (9.1), mass conservation holds in relativity theory. And second,
mass is not convertible into energy. Indeed, the supposed conversion of mass into energy
(or vice versa) is not a physical process: whether and when a ‘conversion’ occurs depends
on the frame respect to which we describe the real physical process. As Lange says:
‘To think of the ‘conversion’ of mass into energy (or vice versa) as a
process that really occurs in nature, like the conversion of a caterpillar into a
butterfly, would make sense only if energy and mass were (or measured the
quantities of) real [i.e. objective] stuff.’ ([Lange, 2002] p.240)
Let us see why this is so. Sometimes physics textbooks present examples in which mass
is ‘converted’ into energy, and the equation E=mc2 is then used to determine how much
energy is ‘equivalent’ to the mass that disappears. For example, after a radioactive nucleus
decays, there is a ‘mass defect’: the sum of the masses of the daughter bodies is less (by
∆m) than the mass of the original nucleus. Some of the original mass (∆m) is said to
have been converted into the kinetic energy E of the daughter bodies, where E=(∆m) c2.
(Since c is so large, a very small mass can be ‘turned into’ a great deal of energy).
The equation E=mc2 is thus generally taken as saying that mass and energy are two
forms of the same thing, and that one can be converted into the other. For example, Edwin
F. Taylor and John Archibald Wheeler, in their famous book ‘Space time Physics’, write
[J]oules and kilograms are two units – different only because of historical
accident – for one and the same kind of quantity, mass-energy [...]. The
conversion factor c2, like the factor of conversion from [...] miles to feet, can
today be counted, if one wishes, as a detailed of convention, rather than as
a new deep principle’ (quoted in [Lange, 2002] p.227)
And physicist-philosopher of physics Max Jammer, in his book ‘Concepts of Mass in
Classical and Modern Physics’, says
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‘Are not the two entities [i.e. mass and energy] which are interchangeable
essentially the same? Is not what is generally spoken of as an equival-
ence relation in reality an identity? Are therefore not ‘mass’ and ‘energy’
merely synonyms for the same physical reality, which [...] may perhaps be
termed ‘massergy’?’ ([Jammer, 1961], p.184)
whose answers he clearly intends to be ‘yes’. Even Einstein himself writes
‘Mass and energy are therefore essentially alike; they are only different
expressions for the same thing.’ (quoted in [Lange, 2002], p.227)
But is this mass-energy identification correct? In relativistic physics mass is an
objective property (recall that mass is Lorentz invariant) whereas energy is not, and hence
mass should not be viewed as a form of energy nor as converting into it (or vice versa).
To understand the conceptual mistake, let us look in detail at the following example of
a radioactive nucleus decay. When a tritium nucleus – one proton, two neutrons (1
3T ) –
decays into a helium-3 nucleus – two protons, one neutron (2
3He) – along with an electron
(e−) and an anti-neutrino (v¯e), i.e.
1
3T 2
3He+ e−+ ve¯
the tritium’s mass exceeds the sum of the product’s masses by a small quantity.E.1 In this
decay there is a ‘mass defect’ in that the masses of a helium-3 nucleus, an electron, and
an anti-neutrino add up to less than the mass of a tritium nucleus. The ‘missing mass’ is
said to have been ‘converted’ into kinetic energy of the resulting bodies.
Now, while the transformation of the tritium’s neutron into a proton, an electron,
and an anti-neutrino is a real occurrence, this ‘conversion’ of mass into energy is not , in
contrast, real. The ‘mass defect’ appears to rise from the fact that the sum of the three
masses after the decay is less than the system’s mass before the decay, the difference
reflecting the three bodies’ kinetic energies in the p = 0 frame. (Recall that equation
E=mc2 only holds in the p=0 frame). But the sum of the three masses after the decay
is also less than the system’s mass after the decay, that is, it is less not only before the
decay. This is because, as we showed in section 9.3, mass is not additive. It is our mistaken
expectation that it is additive (arising because we expect it to measure the amount of
matter forming the bodies) that leads us to characterize the system as suffering from
a ‘mass defect’ and to ask where the ‘missing mass’ has gone. There is simply no ‘missing
mass’ and no ‘conversion’ into energy.
E.1. The tritium releases 18.6 keV of energy in the decay process. The electron has an average kinetic energy
of 5.7 keV, while the remaining energy is carried off by the electron anti-neutrino.
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The supposed ‘conversion’ of mass into energy is an illusion produced by a subtle shift
in our perspective. Indeed, we treated the system as initially forming a single body: a
tritium nucleus; but we treated the system after the decay as consisting of three bodies,
each with its own mass. This change of perspective is what led us to characterize the system
as suffering from a ‘mass defect’. But the system’s mass after the decay is the same as the
system’s mass before the decay. There is no ‘mass defect’ here for mass is conserved given
that E and p are conserved and together determinem by equation (9.1). As Lange explains,
The ‘mass defect’ results not from some physical transformation of
matter-stuff into energy-stuff, but rather from our illicitly trying to view
the system from two different ‘perspectives’ at the same time. It is pro-
duced by our treating the post-decay system as a collection of bodies though
we treated the pre-decay system as a single body. The fact that ∆m of the
system’s initial mass ‘becomes’ energy (∆m) c2 when we think of the post-
decay system as a collection of bodies, each with its own mass, does not mean
that mass is really nothing but energy or that mass and energy are different
ways of measuring the same property (like distance in feet and in miles).
The ‘conversion’ of mass into energy occurs because we have shifted our
perspective, not because the nucleus has decayed.’ ([Lange, 2002] pp.238-239)
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